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EDITOR'S NOTE

The dozen papers in this volume represent current research and scholarship on Korea as presented at three gatherings in the UK in 2006 and 2007. Two of these were organised by the British Association for Korean Studies, at its 2006 Conference in Sheffield and the 2007 Workshop at SOAS, London. The third, the Edinburgh Conference held in November 2007, took place under different aegis, but BAKS is pleased to print here three examples that demonstrate the high standard of work being carried out in Great Britain by koreanists of a rising generation. On the basis of this evidence, the future of Korean studies is in good hands, and in Volume 12 of *BAKS Papers* the Association is glad to be able to show its recognition of these younger scholars.

The Association records its deep gratitude to the Korea Foundation for financing the publication of this volume. And just as previous volumes of *BAKS Papers* have borne witness to the cooperation and support which the Association enjoys from other institutions and bodies, including the British Museum, the British Library, the Korea Foundation, the Embassy of the Republic of Korea and the Korea Overseas Information Service, so too does *BAKS 12* acknowledge similar welcome collaboration. In March 2007, BAKS was able to join with the Centre for Korean Studies at SOAS to invite to Britain six Korean historians who had just attended that year's AKSE meeting in Paris. The papers they gave in the Brunei Centre focused on a subject that attracted a good audience—the mutual perceptions that Korea and the West had of each other in the 19th century—and revealed not only some fascinating work that has already been done but also the rich resources and lines of investigation that still remain to be explored in this valuable field of study. Thanks to a grant from the Korea Foundation they have been translated for publication here by Somang Translations of Canada.

Two papers from Sheffield were published in *BAKS Papers* Volume 11, and three more are printed here. The title of the Conference was 'Looking forward, looking back', a theme that we can see being carried a step further forward in the three papers chosen for publication from the post-graduate students' Edinburgh Conference. Both Andrew Logie and Young Ju Rhee are concerned with aspects of a subject that has preoccupied Koreans ever since the 19th century, that of identity. The confusion experienced by so many Koreans, reeling at the impact of modernisation and colonialism through the twentieth century, is laid bare in the story of Ch'oe Inhun's 'Grey Man'. The mental and physical anguish that we read about in this novel evokes

our sympathy (and incidentally matches the tragic real life biography that Ch'oe's contemporary, the artist Yi Chungsoŏp, reveals so plainly in his painting). But in an age as deeply concerned as ours with issues of displacement, migration, and ethnic allegiance, we are bound too to empathise with the complex issues of citizenship in the ROK explored by Young Ju Rhee. Her essay may be concerned primarily with the implications of belonging and citizenship at the higher level of political policy, but what it means in practice for so many South Koreans, whether in individual or social terms, shows clearly below the surface of the text.

Ethnic issues, as well as the relationship of the past to the present and future, are also illuminated by the fieldwork of David Prendergast and Dorota Szawarska. Their papers both reveal the strains put upon families by twentieth-century upheavals, and sympathetically—even touchingly—describe the efforts made to come to terms with unprecedented situations. Recent articles in both Korea and China have focused on modern interpretations and implications of filial piety, and here we find concrete examples of the brave attempts being made by ordinary people to live up to the high standards of their inherited traditions.

In the papers by Alon Levkowitz and Tristan Webb our attention shifts from the individual and the group to politicians and the state. Alon's wide-ranging assessment of the tensions besetting the Korean peninsula and the whole East Asian region as a result of the continued separation of the two Koreas is taken a step further by Tristan's detailed consideration of the DPRK's energy resources and requirements. If his paper represents the past in geological rather than historical terms, the state's need for power in the future, and the implications of this, is clearly a political and potentially threatening issue. Nevertheless, this thorough examination brings the volume to an end with at least the hint of optimism for the future.

Keith Pratt
Durham, May 2008

CH'OE INHUN'S *A GREY MAN*: THE STRUGGLE FOR IDENTITY AS A YOUNG, INTELLECTUAL MALE IN THE POSTWAR ERA

ANDREW LOGIE

*A Grey Man*¹ was first published in 1963. It is the second significant work by the novelist Ch'oe Inhun, best known for his first published work *The Square* which was written following the April 19 Revolution in 1960.

Ch'oe Inhun was born in 1936 in present day North Korea and fled to the South with the outbreak of the Korean War when in his second year of high school. Living as a refugee, his was notably the very first generation to graduate from high school in South Korea. Whilst *The Square* was written during a brief period of relaxation from severe censorship and autocratic government, by the time *A Grey Man* was written South Korea was firmly under the military dictatorship of Park Chung Hee. Ch'oe Inhun consequently describes *A Grey Man* to be:

the record of a search in the dark for a new 'rite of passage guide' in which I had to ask myself again where am I in society and what kind of life am I living? (Ch'oe, 1997:21)

The grey man and his self in postwar South Korea

The protagonist of *A Grey Man*, Tokko Chun, is born into a landowning family in a small village not far from the port city of Wŏnsan that following liberation was to become part of North Korea. As a child and adolescent Tokko Chun defines his ego through reading. Through his study of Western literature he becomes keenly aware of himself as an individual at an early age and consequently feels alienated from the increasingly defunct values that could otherwise have defined his self as 'Korean': chiefly that is, the traditional notion of 'family.'

At odds with the ideologically charged society of North Korea, Tokko Chun becomes aware of himself in the abstract as an isolated and lonely ego. 'Lonely' is Tokko Chun's defining characteristic. It is his sincere condition and it is surely no coincidence that the characters of his unusual first name are given as those of *kodok*, the Korean for 'lonely,' in reverse.

A poignant scene unfolds early on in his youth when, during the war, South Korean

troops reach his village in North Korea and he gets a lift on one of their trucks into Wŏnsan. It is Tokko Chun's first direct encounter with South Koreans as well as, it may be assumed, his first ride on a motor vehicle. Along the way they pass by an old farmer carrying an A-frame on his back: the archetypal, derogatory personification of 'old Korea' who, when struck by apples from the boisterous soldiers, reacts in pitiful terror. Tokko Chun's own response is twofold:

Chun was laughing. Because the soldiers were laughing merrily he copied their expressions. He was riding the vehicle in secret. If only in expression he had to respond in kind. But **inside he felt sick with sadness and loneliness** (Ch'oe, 1991:58)

Already it is clear that he shares no common conscience with Koreans of the post-liberation generation on either side of the divided country.

Tokko Chun escapes to South Korea aboard a naval vessel, leaving behind his older sister and mother. However, he is at least able to live with his father who had already fled south and together they struggle against the daily cold and hunger in Pusan. There follows a brief interlude, allowing Tokko Chun to study at the makeshift high school and enter university under the semblance of family life with his Korean father working hard to support him. However, it is short lived.

When in the spring of his second year at university his father died, Chun became an adult. It was **an icy cold despair** that the word 'sadness' cannot well express. (ibid.:63)

Thus Tokko Chun's loneliness is seen to be not self-made from a [modernist] existentialist mindset but rather derives from the tragedy of historical conditions. Separated from his mother and sister left in the North and with the death of his father, he is deprived of the family that could have defined his ego as 'Korean' and consequently he becomes an intensely isolated self.

Lacking funds to continue studying his decision to volunteer for the army is precipitated, and yet surprisingly his time spent on duty at observation posts turns out to be a life-affirming experience.

Whilst on observation duty at the demilitarized zone he had had various thoughts but somehow had affirmed his will to live... The life instinct for Tokko Chun had come as a revelation. Life is worth living. Even without a home. Even without a father. Even with one's fatherland rotten. Humans must live, he was taught. The summer clouds flowing across the sky of the DMZ. The beautiful and mysterious night sky and the thickly grown mountain plants, [all] had taught him so. (ibid.:145)

Tokko Chun's time spent in the South Korean military is described in a retrospective soliloquy given over chiefly to the romantic contemplation of nature and his own self. Like an exiled member of the literati during the Chosŏn dynasty, he finds solace in nature and like the atheist Romantic poets of nineteenth-century England searches

for the sublime and reflection of his self therein. It is only following his discharge from the military that he becomes aware of his personal despair as, in spite of the company of his politically engaged friend Kim Hak, he finds himself alone in South Korean society, severed from family and becoming increasingly nihilistic.

The condition of 'greyness' which describes Tokko Chun's state of mind represents his dissociation from society and the few individuals such as Kim Hak whom he interacts with. He shares no common conscience because he already sees the political answers they long for—in Kim Hak's case revolution or in wider society the ideologies pushed by the two polarised regimes—as being of no 'Korean' value for Korea itself.

Tokko Chun's own answer comes instead in the form of his major studied at university, Korean literature. What this represents is that he has chosen to be Korean in a period when 'Korea' as a political nation hardly survives and Korea as a 'culture' is viewed as retrogressive in the face of Western modernity. Hence his identity in South Korea is marginalized, causing again his 'greyness', but this is also what bestows on him a historical consciousness independent of the prevailing black-and-white political climate and allows him to critically observe that

if, instead of the foolish fight between democracy and capitalism that the South conceitedly undertook and suffered for, we had pursued a naïve nationalism with the same ardour then our circumstances would have greatly improved by now. (ibid.:100)

This statement is the conclusion to his ruminations on the concept of 'family' in the context of Korea during which he considers how a Korean's individual identity has traditionally been determined by his lineage.

Like his own self, Koreans are losing their identity because of the breakdown of this old, traditional system with no modern 'Korean' alternative for them to associate with. He observes that

even for modern Koreans the term 'clan' strikes a deep chord yet 'nation' [remains] somehow awkward. Consequently 'race' which implies clan or extended family on a wider scale is much easier to understand. (ibid.:99)

However, this does not change the fact that Tokko Chun himself remains alone in South Korea. What does is the discovery of the Workers' Party membership card of his former brother-in-law Hyŏn Hosŭng.

Hyŏn Hosŭng had similarly fled North Korea and since made a successful career for himself as a corrupt politician in the South, taking a new wife and refusing to acknowledge any obligation towards Tokko Chun's family. The Workers' Party card Tokko Chun finds amongst some belongings of his sister proves a trump with which to blackmail his brother-in-law, simultaneously taking revenge for his sister's betrayal and securing his own financial stability.

In spite of Hyŏn Hosŭng's obvious impropriety Tokko Chun remains uneasy with the potential risk involved in the plan. This time however it is his personal isolation, with no one to endanger but himself, that gives him the necessary courage to act. In reaching this assurance for himself, Tokko Chun arrives at another revelation about his Korean ego in the modern era:

I am alone. Having no family, I am free. God is dead. Therefore humans are free, the astute thinkers of the West perceived. For them it was correct. [But] for us it goes like this. We have no family, therefore we are free. This is our proclamation of modern times. (ibid.:110)

Thus Tokko Chun 'koreanises' Nietzsche's modernist declaration. The ability to 'koreanise' this modern, Western idea reveals the joker dealt in his hand by choosing Korean literature as his major, in place of a purely Western discipline: that of neo-traditionalism. He draws a distinction between the traditional Christian values of Europe that progressive writers such as Shelley and Nietzsche so harshly criticised, and those of pre-modern Korea which were not so much undermined by rationalist intellectuals as simply decimated during irrational foreign invasions and tragic warfare. He states clearly:

Our god has not dwelt in the Old or New Testaments but in our *chokbo*. Our idol was not a single human bearing alone [the burden of] sin nailed to a cross but was the *chokbo* carved with clan lineage and genealogy. Because of this our god was 'family,' the 'clan.' (ibid.)

Standing from his newly gained, third position of 'Korea'—still 'grey' because of its contemporary lack of political or cultural definition—Tokko Chun is able to make the jump that had eluded Koreans in the modern era up until then and, as a Korean, renounce the values of the West for essentially not being relevant to Korea:

The West is a two-faced Janus. Capitalism. Communism. There is no place for us. We are not leading roles, only extras. For us there is neither good nor evil. For us Koreans [uses self-deriding term *yŏmjŏn*] 'family' is first. The only thing we can truly love is 'family.' (ibid.:111)

Thus Tokko Chun has managed to define 'Koreanness' through a neo-traditionalist thought process tragically, as he is aware, for want of a family, denying himself a place therein. He has come full circle from being an isolated self, sharing no common conscience with his politically minded contemporaries, to the revelation that 'Korea' still exists as an alternative ideal to Western models; but he consequently reaffirms his own alienation as a lonely Korean in postwar South Korea.

Tokko Chun's neo-traditionalism defined: advocacy of *The Tale of Ch'unhyang*

Tokko Chun is to declare later in the novel:

At present our entire race is essentially [already] studying abroad. What we see, listen to, the way we behave, isn't it all American culture? (*ibid.*:186)

His neo-traditionalist ideas are most clearly stated in conversation with Yi Yujŏng, who is a painter recently returned from studying abroad in America. The speech he delivers to her is key to the discourse of *A Grey Man* and in spite of its pessimism for the future of traditional Korean culture, on a personal level it proves the closest he gets to resolving the potential nihilism of a young intellectual male trying to subsist in postwar South Korea.

He thus proclaims, 'I have chosen *The Tale of Ch'unhyang* over *Romeo and Juliet*' (*ibid.*:187), though he simultaneously acknowledges that a time when *The Tale of Ch'unhyang* will become the symbolic love story throughout the world is unlikely ever to arise. In spite of this, he means he has chosen to adhere to traditional Korean culture and, being in an apparent minority of himself, it is the first clear identification of his self as an individual, defined—significantly—by a 'Korean' attribute. He believes Korean art and culture has been neglected in the process of Western modernisation and so Koreans are diminished as a people for their lack of pure artists. Consequently, although he concedes the Korean art world is quite active, it only imitates trends and styles from modern Western art, without indigenous innovation. 'Antitheses without thesis,' he declares, 'this is the climate of our art.' (*ibid.*:188) Later on in the novel, after watching a theatrical performance of a Greek tragedy and being unimpressed with the remoteness of the play from any Korean aesthetic, he is similarly to observe that

Koreans have a strange tendency, for with something Western, even if it's classical they feel it to be modern but with something Korean, even if it is a modern work, it feels [to them] classical or, rather, old-fashioned... (*ibid.*: 240)

He castigates too the acting in modern Korean films, 'We watch laughing. But were we to realise it is our own face, our smiles would stiffen' (*ibid.*:189). It is only in historical dramas he believes Korean acting becomes natural because then 'they are moving to their own rules,' otherwise, 'it becomes clumsy like a translated play as [Koreans] are wearing foreign dress but without the indigenous symbols, traditional voices or modes of speech [of that country].'

Humanism—that is to say, modernism—is not impossible for Koreans he maintains, but must be born of Korean tradition. He insists that 'resistance means

using the weapon of tradition in reverse [i.e. progressively], not using a new weapon [altogether]. For that would cause a severance rather than an antithesis' (ibid.).

Tokko Chun thus dictates the dialectic which already has an established antithesis in modernism but the thesis of which has been consistently eluding Koreans. The thesis, he asserts, is necessarily traditionalism, not Western classicism but indigenous Korean culture: this is why he chooses *The Tale of Ch'unhyang* in place of *Romeo and Juliet* and rejects the idea of Koreans staging Greek tragedies. Thus he arrives at the synthesis of neo-traditionalism. The freedom for which Koreans were liberated as individuals should have been the pursuit of this.

However history, as Tokko Chun is aware, has dictated otherwise and so he is resigned cynically to the idea that in the future,

Ch'unhyang will have a perm, ride in cars and eventually dance to jazz. In the end even her love for Yi Mong-ryong will undergo the frightening calamity of a love [that has been reduced to] ennui. (ibid.: 189)

Conclusion

Tokko Chun continues to the end of the novel in a state of flux between the despair of an isolated ego and the existentialist mindset of a modern Korean individual who has been liberated from the traditional notion of family. His only hope is in being able to endure the present historical nightmare through his own self-reliance, as he resolves: 'If only I can endure the loneliness of a lost *chokbo*, then I may be able to see a new sun' (ibid.:279).

A descent into nihilism with the likely conclusion of suicide is thus not so much overcome as held in check by a large dose of Stoicism, derived from his will to live at all costs and affirmed in the presence of nature whilst on military duty. In spite of the modernist overtones, his remains an essentially romantic condition looking to the past in order to create a present.

This is as much as Tokko Chun manages for himself in the postwar environment of South Korea: in the absence of family, egotism is established by default as a very literal *self*-defence mechanism. Thus near the end he states defiantly, 'I have decided to rely only on the hatred my own heart believes in' (ibid.:300). This individual will to hate is in contrast to his friend Kim Hak's view that the trauma of war and ills of society are born of purely political evils: a view closer to the protagonist also of *The Square*—Yi Myŏngjun—that holds the external world to be in direct confrontation with the self.

What Tokko Chun possesses over these other young characters is a 'negative capability' expressed again in the quality of his greyness: his ability to resist oversimplification of the human condition that occurs when taking political or moral

stances. He accepts the fact that there is no immediate resolution to the plight of the Korean peninsula and that although there is a possible solution in a nationalism based on traditional Korean values that he has prescribed, it is presently not at all near to being realised.

Just as Ch'oe Inhun was in the first year to graduate from South Korean high school, Tokko Chun represents the first generation of South Koreans for whom 'Koreanness' becomes a possibility again. His affliction and loneliness stem not so much from the trauma of recent history, as seen in the protagonists of other postwar novels including *The Square*, but from the pain of one redefining him- or herself in the absence of established values. Tokko Chun charges himself with the task of creating the modern South Korean individual, and it is with these qualifications of 'modern' and 'Korean' that he forges the framework for a neo-traditional revival. For few would deny that such a process has since occurred in the brief history of South Korea, whether under the harshness of Park Chung Hee's Yushin System, during the subsequent *minjung* movement of the 1980s, or amidst the nationalistic pride that continues to infuse Koreans' appreciation for their reconstructed heritage today.

Tokko Chun's insistence of Korean value in the postwar era affects a positive challenge to reality and for modern South Koreans this has proved to be an enduring one. In Ch'oe Inhun's own words:

I considered *A Grey Man* to be a record from the workshop of a certain **founding youth** arrested by the conviction that he must create the provisions for his rites of passage by himself. (Ch'oe, 1997:22)

Thus Tokko Chun may be considered the 'founding youth' of South Korea and a personification of the nation itself.

Note

1. Works are referred to by their titles as they have appeared in English translation, however all quotes have been translated from the original Korean by myself and lean towards academic accuracy over literary fluency. Text highlighted in bold within quotations is my own emphasis.

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CHANGES IN THREAT PERCEPTION IN KOREA: WHY?

ALON LEVKOWITZ

Introduction

On the 4th of July 2006, during the United States' Independence Day celebration, North Korea held a missile test—some would say a missile demonstration to prove its ability to launch the Taepodong-2 (*CNN*, 2006) and apparently upgraded short-range missiles as well. Pyongyang pursued its plan to conduct the missile drill in spite of all the requests and the threats made by the regional states. The Taepodong-2 missile test failed 50 seconds after its launch (Wright, 2006). The failure prevented the need to disclose the missile's destination and test if the United States' missile defence system could identify and intercept the North Korean missile. After the test, due to their failure to gain the support of China, Russia and South Korea—all members of the Six-Party Talks mechanism—Japan and the United States unsuccessfully tried to convince the regional states to impose sanctions on North Korea (*China Daily*, 2006).

China and Russia did not support the Japanese and US initiative due to bilateral and global interests. Seoul did not support the sanctions because of internal and regional interests. One would have expected South Korea, an important US ally in the region threatened by North Korea, to support the US initiative and classify the DPRK as a threat to the region, just as the US and Japan had done. From Washington's point of view the missile test was not a threat in the East Asian region alone, but to other regions as well. This was not the first time that Seoul disagreed with Washington on its policy towards the DPRK. The most prominent example is South Korea's attempt to convince the White House that North Korea should not be included in the 'Axis of Evil' (Kim, 2002; Miles, 2002; Rozman and Rozman, 2003). These are just two examples of how Seoul, an important US ally in Asia threatened by the DPRK, does not agree with the United States. The two states should have shared the same threat perception towards the DPRK, but in some cases they do not agree on this issue.

This paper will examine this conceptual and actual change in South Korea's perceptions of the DPRK threat and will attempt to discover if the reason behind it

lies within the political arena or rather stems from generational or economic changes. The first part of the paper will discuss the changes that occurred in the region over the last few decades and their relevance to the South Korean threat perception. The second part will briefly outline the theories of threat perception. The third part of the paper will discuss the changes within Korea, and the last part will examine the implications these changes would have on United States-Korea relations.

The changes in the regional arena and their implication on threat perception

Over the last three decades the North-East Asian arena has changed its balance of power and even the regional balance of threat. Old enemies became allies and threatening states became trade partners. For many years China and the Soviet Union were North Korea's allies. These three adversary states played an important role in Seoul and Washington's defence policies and decisions regarding the structure and number of Korean and US forces in the Korean peninsula and the US forces in the region. From the mid 1980s, the Soviet Union, China and South Korea began an incremental process of normalization after many years of tension and hostility between these states, which was part of the Cold War conflict (Blank, 1995; Hao and Zhuang, 1992; Kim, 1997). The slow incremental process that began in the 1980s continued with President Roh Tae-woo's Nordpolitik Policy, which improved relations between South Korea and China and the Soviet Union.¹

The end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the normalization of relations between Pyongyang's allies were the most important changes in the regional threats from Seoul's point of view. The decline of tension in the region left the DPRK as the last remaining main threat to South Korea. Its conventional capabilities and even its potential nuclear capabilities were and still are a source of concern in Seoul and Washington (Cha, 2002a). The assessment of the North Korean threat has changed throughout the years, depending on its capabilities and the intelligence evaluations. Since its establishment, the DPRK's pattern of engagement with the ROK was based on Pyongyang's use of force, for example the Korean War and terrorist attacks against the South and the US forces in Korea, which led Seoul to perceive the North as a permanent existential threat (Lerner, 2002).

For many years Seoul saw North Korea as an imminent threat. An illustration of this was Seoul's objection to each of Washington's initiatives to decrease or withdraw US forces stationed in Korea (Bandow, 1996; Han, 1980; Kusano, 1987; Lee, 2006; Wood and Zelikow, 1996:3). The fear of abandonment by the US was extremely high during those years (Cha, 1999:42; Liska, 1962:75–6). The first withdrawal of US forces from Korea was before the Korean War and later instances occurred

during Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter and others' presidencies. The South Korean government rejected each of these initiatives since they feared it would severely affect the deterrence of the DPRK and eliminate the US's security commitment to South Korea. President Park Chung-hee, for example, repeatedly stated that the DPRK was an imminent threat to South Korea's security and had disagreements with Presidents Nixon and Carter on their initiatives to withdraw a portion (Nixon) and the majority (Carter) of the US military forces stationed in Korea (Kim, 1978:374; Soh, 1989:29–30; Yang, 1981:269).

The tension between the two Koreas rose several times because of the Cold War, tensions between the superpowers, and internal politics within the two Koreas. The major potential crisis occurred at the beginning of the 1990s with the fear that the nuclear build-up might lead the Korean peninsula to a second Korean War (Wit, Poneman and Gallucci, 2004). While South Korea focused on the Korean peninsula parameter, the US had a broader interest in the region and in other regions as well. The differences between Seoul and Washington in their analysis of the North Korean threat were caused by their different points of view, where both countries analysed the DPRK's capabilities and intentions and the implications that any policy towards Pyongyang would have on other regions. Washington's prism would in most cases be a global prism, which might occasionally conflict with Seoul's prism. The US's global interests did not always correlate with South Korean interests. An example of this can be seen by analysing the US policy towards the DPRK regarding the nuclear issue. South Korea perceived the main issue to be the implications for the Korean peninsula of any nuclear escalation by the DPRK or of the US policy towards the DPRK. For example, Seoul focused on the US's 'Axis of Evil' policy and its implications on North-South Korea, while from the US point of view the 'Axis of Evil' included other states that should be taken into consideration when assessing Washington's policy decisions towards the DPRK. The US believed that a tough policy towards the North would have positive implications on other states that were the US's 'states of concern' or 'rogue states' (Jentleson, 2005; Lennon, 2004; Litwak, 2000).

The main change in the South Korean threat perception began during President Kim Dae-jung's era and has continued ever since. The disparity between the US and South Korean threat perception towards the DPRK has increased since that era. The change in the threat perception was not just on a political level but began to change on the nation level—among the citizens of the South. The gap between survey polls conducted in the US and South Korea at critical times, such as during the missile tests and even before, revealed a disparity between how South Korea perceived the DPRK threat, which (prior to 2006) was lower than one might expect in a state bordering a potential nuclear state, while US citizens perceived the DPRK as an imminent threat, albeit a lower threat to the US than to South Korea.²

What are the reasons for the increased threat perception in Seoul and Washington?

Why is there no correlation between the threat perception of American and South Korean citizens? And why does South Korea, which is potentially more threatened by North Korea than the US, have a lower perception of the North Korean threat than the US?

What is threat perception?

What is threat perception? Who and what influences threat perception? Could threat perception be changed or manipulated by state leaders, for example to increase the defence budget or to find a scapegoat for internal crisis? Could the government change the public's threat perception? What are factors that influence the changes in the public's threat perceptions? What do International Relations theories state about threat perception?

There are many factors that influence the state's threat perception. We can roughly divide these into: the capabilities of the threatening state, its intentions, and the interpretations of these elements by state leaders and citizens. According to the Balance of Power theory, states will be influenced by the distribution of power regardless of the state's intentions (Buzan, 2000:43–6; Geller, 1998:ch.4; Waltz, 1979). In an anarchic structure (Milner, 1991; Wendt, 1992) of the international system, the state must assume that other states might harm it (Waltz, 1979:116–20). The power distribution within the international system will influence the state's threat perception and the alliances that the state might decide to join in order to obtain assistance in handling the threats it faces (Cossa, 1997; Mochizuki, 1995; Pollack and Cha, 1995; Snyder, 1990:105). Changes in the international system's distribution of power since the establishment of the Koreas should have changed South Korea's threat perception according to the changes within the system. One can see that the changes of the South Korean regime's threat perception were not always correlated with the balance of power.

The Balance of Threat theory (Walt, 1987) suggests that in order to understand the balance of threat one should look at four indicators: the aggregate power of the state, its geographic proximity, its offensive power, and its aggressive intentions. According to this theory, the DPRK is an imminent threat to South Korea. North Korea has demonstrated its willingness to use its military capabilities in the Korean War (Millett, 1997; Lee, 2001; Stueck, 2002). Its actions have shown that Pyongyang has revisionist intentions and does not accept the current status quo of a divided Korean peninsula. This is one of the main reasons why South Korea insisted on signing a security alliance with the US after the Korean War (Baek, 1988; Boose, 2003). Since the Korean War, the DPRK has worked on increasing its military capabilities in order to deter any attempt by South Korea or the United States to attack its soil and to prepare itself for pursuing a militarized unification if circumstances allow it

(Bermudez, 2001). Due to Pyongyang's failure to fulfil its goal of unifying Korea in the Korean War and Kim Il-sung's understanding that China and the Soviet Union would not support another military operation to unify the Korean peninsula, Kim Il-sung decided to strengthen North Korea's military force. The logic of Kim's decision was to acquire enough military capabilities to allow the DPRK, if conditions would allow, to pursue a military operation without the assistance of its allies. Pyongyang invested an immense amount of money in the military industry for this purpose. The capacity of the North Korean People's Army to win a war is questionable (Minnich, 2005; O'Hanlon, 1998), but its potential to damage the infrastructure and lead to casualties in South Korea and even to harm the forces and infrastructures of other states in the East Asian arena with its missile and artillery capabilities is unquestionable (Bermudez, 2001). North Korea has been a potential threat to South Korea and to US forces in the region since the 1950s. It has aggregate power, for example its artillery capabilities can cause immense damage to the capital Seoul, and its offensive power is very impressive, although as previously stated, it cannot win a war. These indicators show that the DPRK is a potential threat to the ROK. The disputed issue between Seoul and Washington has been North Korea's intentions. Throughout the years there were few disagreements between Seoul and Washington over the level of threat that North Korea posed to the South and to the US forces stationed in Korea, and even on US soil. In the 1950s and '60s there was a correlation between the US and South Korea over North Korea's potential threat. When President Richard Nixon decided to decrease the number of US soldiers stationed in Korea (Greene, 1970), and later President Jimmy Carter pursued his initiative to withdraw the majority of US forces from the Korean peninsula (Han, 1980:1079; Wood and Zelikow, 1996:3), the South Korean government did not accept Washington's assessments of the DPRK's military capabilities (Park, 1978:154). Since the elections of President Kim Dae-jung and President Roh Moo-hyun, the gap between the Seoul and Washington perceptions of the North Korean threat, specifically Pyongyang's intentions, is increasing.

The change of threat perception was not unique to the leaders of South Korea. The changes occurred at the nation (citizen) level as well. When one looks at the survey polls conducted in South Korea throughout the years a change in the threat perception of North Korea can be traced. What are the reasons behind the transformation in the threat perception of the Korean people? Is it influenced by the state or are there changes within the society that influence this modification? The answers to these questions are complicated. We can state that the public is influenced by the reality that the government is attempting to create, and the public also influences the government in turn.

The Economy

One of President Clinton's slogans in 1992 when he ran for President was: "It is the Economy, Stupid". Well, it is the economy in South Korea as well. The economy plays an important role in designing the security policy and even in the threat perception of the state and the people (Fordham, 1998; Gates and Katsuaki, 1992). For many years the idea of having a unified Korea has been the dream and the reality for many Koreans. Mending the mistakes made by the superpowers at the end of the Second World War that led to the division of the Korean peninsula was one of the main official goals of every South Korean president.

The economic factor became an important one in a few cases. The unification of Germany, the first case of a nation divided as a result of the Cold War to be reunited, became an empirical case study to reveal the costs involved (Wolf, 2005). Until the German unification the issue of Korean unification was only a theoretical case study. German unification allowed the experts and Korean citizens to closely observe the social, political and the economic costs and implications. At that time the possibility of a Korean unification was very slim, which is why the implications for the Korean public were not crucial. The economic factor became more significant after the 1997 economic crisis, or as the Koreans call it the 'IMF crisis'. The IMF crisis allowed the Korean public to get a first hand feeling and understanding of the economic implications of a Korean unification.

As a result of the economic crisis, the Korean public became more aware of the costs of Korean unification. This raised fears among the South Korean public that a military escalation in the Korean peninsula could lead to a war or to the collapse of the DPRK, which might lead to a quick, uncontrolled and very expensive unification (Pollack and Lee, 1999). This could be one of the reasons why the survey polls conducted in Korea revealed that citizens were afraid that a harsh policy towards the North, as Washington proposes, might lead to the collapse of the Northern regime. Since the 1997 economic crisis, the economic factor has become more vital in the threat perception of the South Korean public. From their point of view, the North Korean threat is not just a military threat; it is an economic threat as well. Any policy towards the DPRK is analysed by its implications of how much it will cost and to what extent it will affect the standard of living.

Politics—The Sunshine Policy and the June 2000 summit

The June 2000 summit between South Korean leader Kim Dae-jung and the North Korean leader Kim Jung-il (Bleiker, 2001; Koh, 2002; O'Neil, 2001) is an important event that influenced the threat perception of South Korea. North Korea, which had been the South's enemy for many decades (Yang, 1999), began to be treated

differently by the Kim Dae-jung regime. South Korean President Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy began to change the DPRK's image, subsequently changing the threat perception. North Korea's capabilities were unquestionable (Kaufmann, 2004) but the major disagreement between Seoul and Washington was and still is the DPRK's intentions.

In the joint declaration made by the South and North Korean leaders, we can read between the lines that on 15 June 2000 they declared that North Korea is not an enemy of the South (*Korea Times*, 2001), stating that the issue would be solved by the Koreans themselves and not by the superpowers. However, everyone silently agrees that the US has an important role in solving the Korean peninsula crisis issue. In a press conference held by the South Korean Ministry of Defence on 31 March 2001, the spokesman stated that North Korea was a threat to South Korea:

'The North holds a quantitative advantage over South Korea in military might. It has long- and medium-range missiles, which can attack the rear and front lines in the South.'

The major change in the press conference was the decision not to declare North Korea as an 'Enemy State' (*ibid.*). President Kim Dae-jung stated that he did not perceive the DPRK as an enemy state with the intention of attacking South Korea, although it had the capabilities to do so. Even though North Korea was not declared an enemy state, President Kim did not change the South Korean military structure to exhibit a change in defence policy as a result of the DPRK's threat perception.

The Clinton administration supported Kim Dae-jung's initiative as long as it did not contradict the US policy towards the DPRK, but it did not change its threat perception of North Korea prior to the June 2000 summit (*FNS*, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c; US Department of Defense, 2000).

President Kim Dae-jung's election stimulated a debate in South Korea regarding his Sunshine Policy (Levin and Han, 2002). Should South Korea view the DPRK as the enemy or should it change its perception of Pyongyang? The main point of contention between Washington and Seoul surrounded (and still does) North Korea's intentions. While Seoul perceived North Korean intentions as defensive and stable, Washington tilted towards the offensive and saw Pyongyang as a revisionist state.³

During the Clinton administration's era there was an informal agreement between Seoul and Washington over Seoul's Sunshine Policy towards the DPRK. Once the Bush administration was elected the winds in Washington began to change. The 9/11 events and later the definition of the DPRK as part of the 'Axis of Evil' changed the policy towards the DPRK (Landau and Erez, 2003). President Kim tried to convince the Bush administration to change its policy towards the DPRK. President Kim Dae-jung was the first foreign President to visit Washington after President George W. Bush's election. He expected President Bush to support his Sunshine Policy to the

same degree as President Clinton. To his surprise President Bush gave him the cold shoulder. President Bush's 'Axis of Evil' policy created a new problem for the South Korean President when President Bush included North Korea as part of the Axis. President Kim tried to convince the American President not to include the DPRK as part of the Axis with Iran and Iraq. The 'Axis of Evil' policy highlighted the difference between Washington and Seoul over the threat perception and the focus of each capital. Washington perceived the global threat that all three states posed to the international system on different levels, while South Korea saw this policy as threatening to the Korean peninsula. From Seoul's point of view, pursuing a tough policy towards the DPRK would cause Pyongyang to follow a more extreme policy that might result in an escalation of tension on the peninsula.

President Kim tried to increase dialogue with the DPRK by changing the rules of engagement with it. He was also able to change the way the DPRK was perceived in the South. Nevertheless, a byproduct of the Sunshine Policy was increased tension between the US and South Korea over the US policy towards the North and increased anti-Americanism in Korea, as is evident in the survey polls (Chang and Arrington, 2007).

US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly's visit to Pyongyang in 2002 (Harrison, 2005; Pinkston, 2006) created an increase in the US and South Korea's threat perception. The outcome of Kelly's visit was that, according to US sources, the DPRK breached the 1994 Agreed Framework (IAEA, 1994) by developing an enriched uranium programme. The suspicion that Pyongyang was developing military nuclear capabilities increased the fear that the DPRK was not obeying its agreements and should not be trusted, leading to the conclusion that the US policy was justified. However, even after the North Korean nuclear test of October 2006, Seoul's threat perception of the DPRK did not correlate with Washington's. One of the reasons for the change was the Sunshine Policy. One of the important changes that Kim's Sunshine Policy made was to change the terminology that was used when the North Korean issue was raised. This began to influence the political dialogue in Korea. The idea that North Korea could no longer be seen just as an enemy state began to appear in the public sphere.

The public sphere is not the only place where the attitude towards North Korea has changed. The South Korean cinema has begun to change its sentiments towards North Korea over the last decade. While North Korea was previously portrayed on the Korean screen as the evil enemy, North Korea, particularly the ordinary citizens of the DPRK and the low ranking North Korean forces' soldiers, began to be portrayed in a more positive light in South Korean films throughout the last decade. Some movies may still portray North Korea and the leadership as the enemy but the North Korean people are not. Not all Korean movies demonstrate this change, but four popular South

Korean movies do: *Swiri* (1999), *Joint Security Area (Gongdong Gyeongbiguyeok)* (2000), *Heaven's Soldiers (Cheongun)* (2005), *Welcome to Dongmakol* (2005).

Generation Change

The Sunshine Policy and the economy are not the only reasons for the change in South Korea's threat perception. The generational change in Korea is another factor that has influenced it (Fairclough, 2004; Lee, 2000; Ward, 2003). Korean society has gone through a generation change since its establishment. The number of people in the 'Founding Generation', those who fought against the Japanese soldiers and occupation, and against the North Korean forces in the Korean War, is declining. The number of people who can remember the Korean War and who felt the threat of the DPRK 1950–1953 is decreasing. One of the factors that influence people's threat perception is memory. Although some researchers would argue that memory is composed of personal and collective memory (Greenberg, 2005; Han, 2005; Soh, 2003; Yoon, 2005), collective memory can be influenced by the state, which can decide how the public should remember history.⁴ An example of this can be seen in the demonstration against the statue of General Douglas MacArthur in Korea (Lee, 2005; Ryu, 2005; Yoon, 2005). The demonstrators perceived the statue to symbolise the US occupation of Korea. Another group, mainly Korean War veterans, demonstrated in support of the statue. Although the anti-statue demonstrators were only a minority they symbolize the change in Korean society.

Survey polls in Korea show a disparity between the older and younger generations towards issues such as Japan, North Korea and the United States. The biggest difference is in their attitudes towards the US. While the older generation tends to be more supportive of US policy and its presence in Korea, the younger generation is more critical of the US, mainly against its policy towards the DPRK. Polls of Koreans' threat perception of the DPRK reveal a process of an increasing gap between the younger and older generations. The older generation perceives the North Korean threat as higher than the younger generation. When one speaks of the generational change in Korea and the survey polls on threat perception, one should also mention anti-Americanism (Bong, 2004; Kim, 1989; Kim, 2003; Shin, 1996) as another relevant, if unmeasurable, factor.

Conclusion

South Korea is changing very rapidly. The Korean War, which influenced Korea's modern history, is now being perceived by the young generation as part of 'ancient history'. The changes in the political arena, the economy and the generational change

have influenced South Korea's threat perception towards the DPRK. The North is no longer perceived through the prism of the Cold War. North Korea is being seen as a potential ally and a state with future potential for unification. This change might lead to an increase in friction with Washington, which does not see eye to eye with Seoul on the DPRK issue. The changes in threat perception in South Korea are an important process of healing the tension between the two Koreas and preparing the nation for future unification.

Notes

1. Additional factors that allowed this process were the change of guard in China and the USSR.
2. The North Korean missiles can target US forces that are stationed in the East Asian theatre. Their ability to target the US mainland with the Taepodong-2 missile has not been fully tested yet.
3. The same question was raised about China: see Cha, 2002b; Johnston, 2003.
4. The Japanese textbook crisis is an example of the way the state decides to create the collective memory of its citizens (Jeans, 2005).

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
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LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND INTER-GENERATIONAL RELATIONS IN A RAPIDLY AGEING KOREA

DAVID PRENDERGAST

'Rules of obligation' surrounding the concept of filial piety have long informed some of the key structures and strictures of Korean society. What is now happening to these 'rules' and 'rights' is a subject of great discussion, especially as South Korea begins to grapple with the problems and realities facing a rapidly ageing society.

In July 2000 South Korea was officially designated as a 'greying society' when more than 7% of its population reached the age of 65 years or over. Only six years later this had increased to nearly 10% of the population, with expectations that the country would be reclassified as an 'aged society' in 2019, when this figure was projected to exceed 19%. This will then continue to rise. Considering a relatively high life expectancy of 74 years for men and 81 years for women and the lowest fertility rate in the world at 1.28 children per woman, predictions are that Korea will become one of the oldest societies on the planet during the first half of the twenty-first century. By 2050, well over a third of all Koreans will be 65 or over, but even more startling will be the growth in the numbers of oldest old, with more people turning 90 than



Government and private expenditure on health as a percentage of total GDP, 2005.

Source: World Health Organisation, 2005

being born (Howe et al, 2007). Adair Turner recently pointed out in his keynote speech at the World Demographic Congress that for many ageing countries the challenge is implementing an adequate pension system. For countries facing an age tsunami such as Korea, Japan and the Ukraine with low fertility rates but unlikely to realise significant immigration, he argues the situation is more serious. Whatever the situation in coming decades, it is clear that South Korea will have to invest a much greater proportion of its GDP on health than its current 6%.

What are the implications for older people in Korea? Chunghee Sarah Soh (1997:191) suggests that the nature and perception of retirement in Korea is gradually changing from a 'traditional life cycle model' to more individualised and diverse 'Western linear life course' trajectories. Like Sorensen (1986; 1988) before her, Soh also points towards the increased likelihood of people working after retirement. A decade later this view is very much supported by the evidence. In 2003–4 South Korea

Table 1: Distribution of the older population, 2005.

	Total pop	65+ pop	% of population aged 65+
Cities			
Seoul	9,762,546	710,844	7
Busan	3,512,547	303,936	9
Daegu	2,456,016	196,522	8
Incheon	2,517,680	178,728	7
Gwangju	1,413,644	101,180	7
Daejeon	1,438,551	100,905	7
Ulsan	1,044,934	55,849	5
Provinces			
Gyeonggi-do	10,341,006	752,603	7
Gangwon-do	1,460,770	187,994	13
Chungcheongbuk-do	1,453,872	175,580	12
Chungcheongnam-do	1,879,417	267,799	14
Jeollabuk-do	1,778,879	252,885	14
Jeollanam-do	1,815,174	320,750	18
Gyeongsangbuk-do	2,594,719	374,420	14
Gyeongsangnam-do	3,040,993	329,820	11
Jeju-do	530,686	55,403	10
Whole country	47,041,434	4,365,218	9

Source: KNSO

had one of the most economically active older populations in the world with over 31% of its seniors working in comparison to Japan at 20%, the USA at 14% and the UK at 5.5%. Soh's perspective is given some backing by Kweon Sug-in (1998) who reviews the decrease in the number of multi-generational co-residing families during Korea's modernization, a trend especially apparent in the 1990s. In 1980 approximately 81% of older people lived with a child, by 2004 this had fallen to 44%. The situation is made especially acute due to rapid migration contributing to a very unequal distribution in the relative numbers of older people in rural areas as demonstrated in Table 1.

The age ratio divergence between major urban areas and their surrounding provinces is quite striking. In 2005 18% of the province of Jeollanam-do was 65 or over, contrasting with 7% for its major city Gwangju. With geographical variations such as these in mind let us move to the local level and examine the residential patterns that emerged from a small survey I conducted in 2000 among older people in Buan County and Jeonju in the province of Jeollabuk-do.

From Table 2 a number of tentative insights about residential patterns arise.

- At 45.5% my findings suggest a relatively low rate of older-person-only households 45.5% in comparison to the national figure of 49% in 2000. This had risen to 56% just four years later (Howe et al, 2007).
- Elder-only households are more common in the country town of Buan than in Jeonju city—partly due to differences in housing prices and availability.
- Amongst widows of the city-based sample the historical preference to live with

Table 2: Residential Patterns of Elderly Men and Women in Buan and Jeonju (2000).

	Senior Only	Living Arrangements					TOTALS
		With eldest son	Second or other sons	With daughters	With unmarried children	Moves between children	
Buan Men	0	0	0	0	1	0	1 (1.5%)
Buan Couples	31	9	1	0	3	0	44 (67.7%)
Buan Women	2	6	8	2	0	2	20 (30.8%)
Buan Totals	33 (50.8%)	15 (23.1%)	9 (13.8%)	2 (3.1%)	4 (6.2%)	2 (3.1%)	65 (100%)
City Men	2	1	1	0	0	0	4 (11.1%)
City Couples	9	5	0	1	6	1	22 (61.1%)
City Women	2	6	2	0	0	0	10 (27.8%)
City Totals	13 (36.1%)	12 (33.3%)	3 (8.3%)	1 (2.8%)	6 (16.7%)	1 (2.8%)	36 (100%)
TOTALS	46 (45.5%)	27 (26.7%)	12 (11.9%)	3 (3.0%)	10 (9.9%)	3 (3.0%)	101 (100%)

Source: Prendergast (2005)

their eldest son *once* co-residence becomes necessary is more pronounced than in Buan where the choice of sons for those not wishing to migrate is more restricted.

- Residence with married daughters continues to be a little used option, despite the changes in the inheritance laws.

These patterns are interesting viewed in relation to the stated expectations of older people. When I asked participants living in elder-only households in Buan why they did not live with a child, many replied that it is more comfortable to live separately, reflecting a reluctance to move from a situation of relative independence and freedom. Some argued that life in children's households is too constraining whilst a few felt that they did not want to become a burden on their children, as with Mr. Lee, a 78-year old farmer living alone and working with his wife on a small farm in the Tong-jin district of Buan county:

No they can't farm. They go to work elsewhere. I don't want to be a burden on my son. Even now I send rice and vegetables to them. I won't go even though my son would take me into his home. I will die here. One day my son and my daughter-in-law tried to take us into their home, they bought a bed and decorated a room, but I did not go ... I can't promise strictly until the end, but now at present I won't.

The fact of children migrating to other areas was often cited as a reason for living alone by many participants. However, as common as the fear of imposition was the explanation that they did not wish to leave their lives, possessions, and friends for an uncertain life in the city. Others bluntly stated that they did not need their children and could manage well by themselves. Mr. Song, a retired elementary school principal, wryly explained that in his case he and his wife chose not to live with his son because 'it is convenient to live separately from our daughter-in-law'. A retired farmer I interviewed told of how he already sees his children regularly:

Once a month I go to Seoul to check my health, and then I visit all my children. I don't live with them as they live their own lives. However if I am dying I will go and live with them. Or if my wife dies, or I die, then we will go and live with our eldest son.

Many interviewees were keen to impress that whilst they preferred independent living, this might change with their circumstances, such as the onset of a serious illness or the death of a spouse. In many cases, this was not just a form of self-assurance concerning their future welfare but a desire to demonstrate that regardless of their current residential situation their children faithfully felt their obligations and displayed *hyo* (filial piety); co-residence as an option was available but not chosen.

In response to the question of which child they would choose to live with in the future, a large majority mentioned a preference towards their eldest son's household. As already seen, this expectation was supported in practice in Jeonju. In this case, my

survey findings support Sorensen's conclusions about the return to a stem formation at the end of a family life course, in spite of the high ratios of single generation elder-only households.

The situation in Buan is more equivocal, with widowed mothers who chose to live locally more likely to live with younger married sons than with eldest sons. This of course reflects a different range of circumstances and choices—in the absence of pre-established ties of obligation, developing commitments through property might persuade a particular son to remain in or return to the area.

Table 2 also shows a portion of older people living with *unmarried* children. At 16.7% the city-based sample was considerably higher than Buan at 6.2%. This is partially a result of urban unmarried children being *more* able to find work or access to higher education close to the natal household than their counterparts in Buan. It may also be a result of them being *less* able to find affordable independent accommodation due to the much higher cost of housing in Jeonju.

Older generations in Korea are still far from regarding themselves as passive recipients of welfare or the machinations of their children. Many parents are able to persuade their children to reside with them through the canny use of resources as in the following story of Mrs. Oh.

Mrs. Oh considers herself to be a housewife but has made a small fortune through private investments and real estate deals. She has three sons, the youngest of whom has moved to America. As she moved into her 60s Mrs. Oh decided that she would like to enter old age with her family around her. She and her husband therefore built a three-storey house in Jeonju and invited her two sons and their families to take a floor each. The idea was that the families would have some degree of privacy, but would share some meals, bills, and costs of living. Mrs. Oh also suggested that this arrangement would also allow her to help with the considerable demands of caring for her infant grandchildren, whilst in turn providing her and her husband with support in their later years.

Mrs. Oh actively created the conditions for this domestic arrangement—she had the means to select an expensive residential location, within close commuting distance of her sons' work. Few in Buan have a geographical advantage such as this, but many try to maintain some form of the stem family through retaining control of the family land and means of production. On the other hand, those who do choose to move in with one of their children often attempt to bring resources with them in the form of property, investment, or labour—as in the following account of a widow who decided to consolidate her assets in order to move in with her oldest son, at the expense of other family members.

Mrs. Yi lived together with her husband and his parents for 13 years until his father died. Soon after the death Mrs. Yi's mother-in-law decided that she wanted to sell the family house and move twenty miles away to be with her eldest son. Her explanation was that she and her husband had been too poor to help much with her oldest son's education

and the proceeds from the sale of the house would make up for this. This greatly upset Mrs. Yi who felt she deserved something after all the years of hard work she had put in caring for her parents-in-law. She exchanged some harsh words with her mother-in-law, but was dismayed when her husband simply kept out of the argument. Eventually in the interests of family harmony the eldest brother held a meeting and it was decided that the house would be retained and they could continue living there. Mrs. Yi says that she admires him for doing this, but still feels betrayed by her mother-in-law who would have gone ahead and sold the house, if such a fuss had not been made. Several years later, her mother-in-law asked if she could move back but Mrs. Yi ignored her request.

Other elderly parents living with a child described how they try to help out with the costs of living by working, as with one grandmother who sells seaweed and salt in the markets of Buan:

My son moved from Seoul to look after me when I got sick. He now works as a government official. He doesn't like me working in the market but I want to do so because I want to make regular money that I can put aside for him. My son does everything for me. He is a *hyoja* (filial) son. I have a rice field of about 600 *p'yŏng* that I will give to him after I die, and he will also have the money I save up by working here. All my money goes into my son's bank account because if I died and it was in my own name then my sons-in-law would want some of it.

Less obvious but equally tangible economic benefits of co-residence were occasionally outlined as in the case of parents who lost a spouse or child in the Korean War (1950–1953) and are now eligible for a range of government benefits ranging from pensions to extremely low interest mortgages.

Domestic work and childcare is another route through which many older people in Korea negotiate their status and role within the kin network. There is a tendency in Buan for some older people to invite young grandchildren to live with them, often for several years. This was occasionally explained as being a way for them to help relieve financial stresses on the young family, but more often informants suggested that this arrangement was made to allow children to enjoy life in the countryside prior to the important middle school years when access to the highest possible standard of education takes priority over quality of lifestyle.

The role played by the elderly in terms of childcare in Korea must not be underestimated, especially as more women enter the workplace and there is a shortage of skilled reliable or affordable professional providers of childcare. The services of mothers and grandmothers, whether on the husband's or wife's side, were thus frequently in high demand and it was not unusual to see adult children not only requesting their parents' aid, but competing with their other siblings for it.

It is fairly common to see older people rotating between the different households of their offspring as and when needed or for a change of scene. Most frequently this enabling role declines as infants get older or the younger section of the family

becomes more settled and financially independent—but there are frequently occasions when the aged parent is in demand much later in their grandchildren's development. Mr. Lee, a locally based lawyer who attended Jeonbuk National University in the late 1980s recalls how because of the distance from Buan, his father decided it best to rent a small house for him and his siblings whilst they studied.

At that time my grandmother came to live with me and make the food. When I went to Jeonju to university, my younger brother also came to go to high school, so she came to look after us. It was the cheapest way. Two brothers cost a lot and we would have wasted a great deal of money if she had not come. My father asked her to go with us. She was happy as she could make food for her grandsons, and then in the vacation she would come back to our village. She was proud of living in Jeonju.

Conclusions

Thus from the perspective of the older generations there are a number of alternatives concerning what route to take in the various stages of old age. The most common response was the iteration of the ideal stereotype of the filial eldest son and his wife who reside and look after their parents in old age. However, when examined further it became apparent that whilst this image of a standard set of rights and obligations influenced the norm, the patterns and preferences concerning care of the aged were much more complex, frequently depending on a variety of factors, including location, resource management, and parental choice. The majority of cases nowadays suggest that neither the eldest son nor his brothers tend as a rule to remain permanently in the parental household and it is no longer within the ability of a parent to demand a child stays. More commonly, people who wish their offspring to remain or return have to do so by developing commitments with attractive offers as with Mrs Oh. Many of those living alone liked the idea of being able to claim a right of residence with their children, especially their eldest sons. Whether or not this right actually exists, it is clear that many who did make the move to their children's households, found they either felt obligated or more comfortable if they were able to bring resources with them. Often these were material, but domestic labour, work and childcare were frequently seen as contributions of even more importance.

In addition, as Sorensen points out, the actual age of the retired parent is an important element in this analysis, especially in relation to the length of the working lifetime. As the general health and longevity of the population increases, it can be expected that the ability to postpone infirmity and dependency in old age will lead to a tendency for the stem family to reform at a much later stage in the life-course than was previously the case. Such a return to co-residence is much more probable following the death of a spouse, though this is not necessarily a determining factor. Stem family re-formation is also likely to involve a considerable re-negotiation and

contestation of the boundaries and definitions of power and authority amongst the family members; perhaps much more visibly than if the family had maintained a continuous stem formation. Worry and uncertainty about the prospect of re-entering joint family life was frequently evident amongst my elderly informants, though this tended to be more pronounced amongst those who felt they had least to contribute. Many postponed the move until much later in the retirement process or put it off entirely, whilst others attempted to improve their position in the new household by bringing in their own financial or material resources, labour or access to services.

This paper represents a small part of the ageing picture as it stood at the start of the twenty-first century in Korea when only 7% of the Korean population was over 65. As we have seen this is rapidly changing and the country is on course to become one of the most aged societies in the world. Gerontological and ethnographic research in Korea on subjects such as social, healthcare and pension revision, changing inter-generational relations, the experiences and expectations of ageing, and appropriate provision of home care and long term residential care has been developing but is still fledging in scope. Current efforts by academics, government and business urgently need to be supported, integrated and expanded as the age wave approaches.

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CHOSŎN LITERATI'S UNDERSTANDING OF 'WESTERN LEARNING' IN THE 19TH CENTURY BASED ON KANG HOBU'S *SANGBONGNOK*

SHIN IK-CHEOL

Introduction

While the Chosŏn dynasty's first contacts with *Sŏhak* (西學, Western Learning) occurred in the 17th century, it was during the 18th century that such exchanges began to be greatly invigorated. Such contacts with Western Learning were mainly carried out through the regular visits to Qing carried out by the *yŏnhaengsa* (燕行使, royal envoys to the Qing dynasty). To this end, the main window of exchange proved to be the Catholic churches situated in Beijing. These Catholic churches served as the epicentre for the conveying of modern scientific civilization and religion, with missionaries at the forefront of this movement. As this represented a habitual stop on their diplomatic course, royal envoys to Beijing during the 18th century were expected to regularly visit these Catholic churches, where they would have encountered Western civilization. These envoys were able to come into contact with various aspects of modern Western civilization such as astronomy, the calendar system, Western paintings, as well as alarm clocks, organs, fountain pens, matches, glasses, cigars, snake stone, bitter Chinese melon, wine, sponge cake, and automata devices.¹

However, these circumstances began to change completely from the 19th century onwards. There is a very strong likelihood that the Chosŏn government took steps to prohibit visits to the Catholic churches in Beijing following the Chinsan Incident (珍山事件) of 1791, an occurrence which is widely perceived as the only instance of Catholic persecution to transpire during the Chosŏn dynasty prior to the onset of the 19th century.² The emergence of *sedo* politics (in-law government) in Chosŏn during the 19th century resulted in the adoption of a hostile approach to Western Learning that was exemplified by the Catholic Persecution of 1801, or *Sinyu saok* (辛酉邪獄). The Western nations' attempts to compel Chosŏn to open its doors, by force of arms if necessary, resulted in the emergence of two major foreign disturbances (*yangyo*, 洋擾) during the mid-19th century. As such, we can see that the encounter between

Western nations and Chosŏn occasioned by the eastern expansion of Western powers during the 19th century was one that unfolded in a distorted fashion.

This study makes use of one of the *yŏnhaengnok* (燕行錄, ‘Journals of Travel to Beijing’) compiled during the early 19th century to analyse the literati elites’ perception of Western Learning during the 18th century.³ That being said, these *yŏnhaengnok* generally did not contain records of any visits to Catholic churches in Beijing. This apparent oversight can be explained by the fact that the government of Chosŏn rejected Catholicism as a heretical religion, and perceived the Catholic churches in Beijing as the epicentre of this heresy.⁴ As a result, reference is made solely herein to the *Sangbongnok* (桑蓬錄) written by Kang Hobu, a work which addressed Chosŏn literati elites’ interest in Western civilizations and Western Learning.

The background to the compilation of the *Sangbongnok* and the significance thereof

The *Sangbongnok* is an account written by Kang Hobu (1690–?) of a trip which he took to Beijing in 1727 in his capacity as the personal attendant to *Saŭn kyŏm tongjisa* (謝恩兼冬至使) Yi Segŭn. Therefore, this account can more precisely be described as a travelogue compiled during the first half of the 18th century. That being said, the specific manner in which this work was compiled helps to provide useful insight into Chosŏn literati elites’ perception of Western Learning during the early 19th century. Worried about the safety and well-being of his widowed mother, Kang Hobu paid her a visit after learning that he had been selected at the age of 38 to take part in the *Yŏnhaeng* which left for Beijing in 1727. At that time, his mother asked him to record all the things he saw and heard during his trip to Beijing. In 1741, some thirteen years after his journey, Kang Hobu produced a Korean version of the records he had originally compiled in Chinese characters during his trip to the imperial capital. As a result, Chinese and Korean versions of the *Sangbongnok* were in fact produced. However, the Chinese version of the *Sangbongnok* which can be found today is not the original one written by Kang Hobu. According to the preface to this particular version, the book had to be translated back into Chinese based on the Korean version of the *Sangbongnok* because Chŏng Suyŏn, a friend of Kang Hobu’s, had unfortunately borrowed the original copy and misplaced it.⁵ This Chinese version was translated by Kang Hobu’s great grandson Kang Chaeŭng. The inclusion of the inscription “崇禎甲申後九十七年己亥” makes it clear that this translated version was produced in 1839 (the 5th year of King Hŏnjong). In this regard, the Chinese version of the *Sangbongnok* includes numerous inscriptions, especially pertaining to the names of people and places, which were written in the native Korean script *Hangŭl*. This unique compilation process has made the *Sangbongnok* an invaluable

resource in terms of the study of the history of the Korean language, as well as of that of translation. In addition, pertinent insight into the Chosŏn literati elites' perception of Western Learning during the 19th century can be gleaned from this particular version as a result of the fact that Kang Chaeŭng also included his own opinions on some of the most important articles.

The recently uncovered *Sangbongnok*, which consists of 12 volumes encompassed in 6 books, has quickly come to be regarded as the main literary work produced as part of the *yŏnhaengnok* series compiled during the 18th century.⁶ Furthermore, the inclusion of additional entries by Kang Chaeŭng has resulted in this particular version of the book coming to be seen as a very useful tool with which to conduct comparative studies on the literati elites' perceptions of Western Learning between the 18th and 19th centuries. The additional entries which follow the records of the visits to the Catholic churches in Beijing are by far the longest, and their implications are quite complex. Nevertheless, this particular aspect represents the main focal point of this study.

Comparison of the literati elites' perception of Western Learning during the 18th and early 19th centuries

On 29 December 1727, Kang Hobu visited a Catholic church located inside the walls of the Xuanwumen (宣武門, Gate of Military Declaration) situated along the southern reaches of the Forbidden City (紫禁城). Before analysing the additional records on the subject prepared by Kang Chaeŭng during the 19th century, let us first look at the attitude displayed by Kang Hobu with regards to the visit he paid to this Catholic church in the 18th century. Of the various Western implements found there, it was the vivid imagery contained in the Western paintings that most caught Kang Hobu's eye.

All the paintings were so vividly and colourfully described that it almost looked as if the images in the paintings were in fact alive. While an image of Jesus Christ had been painted in the middle of the church's northern wall, the standing image of a beautiful lady had been rendered on its western wall. The vivid manner in which her hair ornament was depicted as drooping to one side as the lady cradled her hair with her hand made it hard to believe that she was just an image from a painting. ... On our way towards the entrance to the Western person's place of residence, we came across a wash painting on the inner gate which described a dog whose body appeared to be half thrusting out from the gate as he imposingly growled at any human who dared approach. All of us assembled at that time believed the dog to be alive. ... Herein lies the reason why Western paintings are referred to as divine works To me, while ghouls appeared to have embedded themselves in the images of persons found in the paintings, the animals also seemed to be possessed by some kind of evil spirits. Great ability is obviously required to produce

such paintings. Although it really looked as if a spirit had been incorporated into the painting, I was unable to figure out how this had been brought about. I was therefore forced to conclude that this was the work of a magical and talented ghost.⁷

Faced for the first time in his life with this realistic Western style of painting that featured vividly described images, Kang Hobu was so astonished at the realistic manner in which people and things were depicted that he professed to understanding why others had referred to Western paintings as 'divine works'. Meanwhile, unable to explain where this unique style of painting had originated, Kang was reduced to admitting that these vividly described images, which almost looked as if ghouls had been embedded, appeared to be the result of a magical and talented ghost. While the interest of the great majority of those who became *yŏnhaengsa* during the 18th century was pricked by aspects of Western Learning such as its paintings, astronomy, and the calendrical system, it was Western paintings that made far and away the biggest impression on Kang Hobu.⁸

As mentioned above, Kang Hobu produced a Korean version of his *yŏnhaengnok* in 1741. This Korean version contains some entries which cannot be found in the original 1727 version, which he compiled as he implemented his duties. This is evidenced by the following entry in which he introduced Western theories pertaining to astronomy:

The earth is round like a ball and floats in empty space, and there are humans living all over the globe in various regions of this world.... The high degree of advancement achieved by Western Learning is such that it has been able to explain principles of the universe and planets which people had heretofore been unable to comprehend. I do not feel uneasy or have any doubt about these facts... However, I was very surprised to learn that the galaxy was not composed of energy, but rather of an aggregation of stars.⁹

Kang's acceptance of the fact that the earth was indeed round and that humans lived in various regions all over the globe was a marked departure from the traditional notion of *huayi* (華夷, civilized-uncivilized worlds) in which China was perceived as the centre of the universe. Kang also went to great lengths to describe how the highly advanced nature of Western astronomy had allowed it to resolve astronomical issues for which traditional oriental astronomy had been unable to find a proper answer. His statement to the effect that this was in fact possible appears to belie Kang's positive perception of this reality. However, he also stressed the fact that it was difficult for him to accept the hypothesis that the galaxy was in fact an aggregation of stars. Kang Hobu adopted a very open-minded attitude towards the possibility that Western astronomy was in fact superior to the oriental variety. In addition, he described the spread and growing respect for Western theories in China, while also highlighting the fact that many Chosŏn people respected and adhered to these theories.¹⁰

Having looked at Kang Hobu's perception of Western astronomy and painting styles, let us now turn to the matter of his descriptions of Catholicism.

The Lord, who is said to emanate from a Western nation, is referred to as Jesus Christ (耶穌). The name Jesus means the saviour of the world in his native language. Those who revere him identify him as a foreign saint and regard him as the God of Heaven. They call him the Lord. ... The doctrine of this religion is based on the notion of purity in that it emphasizes the need to make efforts to remove desire and greed and to find the right path (道) so as to become a mountain god (神仙). This religion appears for the most part to be a combination of the principles of *Sŏndo* (仙道, Mountain Daoism) and *Puldo* (佛道, Buddhism). Amongst the first books I saw in the Catholic church were *Ch'ŏnju chin'gyŏng* (天主眞經) and *Ch'ŏnju yŏnŭi* (天主演義). The doctrines introduced in these works were very obscure, and were mostly unagreeable to me. Moreover, a look at the core of these principles and doctrines reveals them to be frivolous and capricious, and not worthy of being studied.¹¹

Kang Hobu understood the doctrine of Catholicism as being based on the abandonment of human desire and the becoming of a mountain god through the finding of the proper path or *to* (道)—this would seem to refer to the belief that a person who carried out good deeds will be admitted to Heaven. In other words, he perceived the doctrine of Catholicism to be a combination of the Buddhist quest to remove human desires and the Daoist notion of a mountain god. The royal envoys to the Qing dynasty (*yŏnhaengsa*) during the 18th century perceived Jesus Christ as an entity similar to the Confucian God of Heaven (上帝, *sangje*), and the theory of the Kingdoms of Heaven and Hell as being akin to the Buddhist notion of *In'gwa ũngbo* (因果應報, punitive justice).¹² As such, Kang Hobu's perception of Catholicism was very much in keeping with the general perception possessed by other Chosŏn elites who lived during the 18th century.

After having revealed his own opinions on Western painting, astronomy, and the Catholic doctrine, Kang Hobu proceeded to delve into the debate that emerged amongst Chosŏn literati elites over Western astronomy and the calendar system; or more precisely the debate between Kim Sijin and Nam Kŭkkwan over the introduction of the Qing dynasty's *Shi Xian* Calendar (時憲曆). To this end, while Kim Sijin argued in favour of the superiority of traditional oriental astronomy and of the Ming dynasty's *Datong* Calendar (大統曆), Nam Kŭkkwan emphasized the inherent advantages of the Western astronomy-based *Shi Xian* Calendar. After having introduced these two opposing theories, Kang Hobu then proceeded to add his own opinions on the matter. In this regard, although he recognized the brilliance of the *Shi Xian* Calendar as a calendrical system, Kang still supported the traditional concept of astronomy known as the *Ch'ŏnwŏn chibang* (天圓地方, earth as a square and the sky as a circle).

Such an examination of the extent to which Kang Hobu viewed Western Learning in a positive light also yields insight into Kang's scholarly and open-minded approach

to the issue. Such an open-minded approach can be found in not only the *Sangbongnok*, but in other *yŏnhaengnok* compiled by Chosŏn literati elites during the 18th century. However, as mentioned above, a complete change in the attitude towards such matters took place during the 19th century. In this regard, let us now analyse this matter based on Kang Chaeŭng's records.

With regards to the issues of astronomy and the calendar system, Kang Chaeŭng maintained that although he could not determine which calendrical system was in fact superior, some 200 years had passed since the introduction of the *Shi Xian* Calendar without any glaring errors having been uncovered to date. As such, he regarded the *Shi Xian* Calendar as being based on an excellent system. He then continued as follows:

Generally speaking, the customs and civilizations of barbaric nations cannot be compared to those of the *chung hua* (中華, Chinese civilization); moreover, it is only natural that the morals and learning of modern generations cannot measure up to those of ancient people. However, with regard to crafts and technologies, some implements invented by later generations have indeed exhibited more complex and ingenious attributes. Although the calendar system was invented by ancient sagacious people, as it is actually based on mathematics, it is, much like mind-reading (*simsul*, 心術) and the study of the way (*tohak*, 道學), in fact not related to the *sedo* (世道, manner in which the world is ruled) ... When Mr. Kim (referring to Kim Sijin) wrote the *Yŏkbŏppyŏn* (曆法辨) and Sayang chaegong (思養齋公, Kang Hobu) compiled his *yŏnhaengnok*, Catholicism had yet to take root in Chosŏn. Therefore, they could focus their energy on debating the merits of earth-related theories. .. However, from the early period of King Sunjo's reign onwards, Western Learning began its indomitable spread into Chosŏn, with everyone, from the *sadaebu* class all the way to the literati elites and commoners, finding themselves swept up, almost as if it were a mighty wave or powerful wind, by this new philosophy. Although the government subsequently introduced measures which strongly prohibited individuals from coming into contact with Western Learning, with any individual found to be in violation of the law immediately executed, such individuals never regretted having done so, and this even if their action meant potential death. The prisons were full of such people. About a hundred people have since then died because of this Western religion.¹³

Thus, Kang Chaeŭng viewed the customs of Chinese civilization and traditional morals and learning as being superior to those of Western civilization. However, with the calendar system serving as a prime example, he found himself forced to admit that in terms of crafts and technologies, Western civilizations appeared to be more advanced than Chinese civilization. While he recognized the excellence of the *Shi Xian* Calendar based on the Western calendrical system, he mitigated this assessment by stressing the fact that this system was in reality a mere technology that had no bearing on the study of *sedo* (the manner in which the world is ruled).¹⁴ As such, Kang believed that although Asian nations could adopt Western technologies, Asian morals and customs remained superior to Western ones. However, Kang even found himself beginning to seriously

reassess the veracity of this line of reasoning after having witnessed the Catholic Persecution of 1801 (*Sinyu saok* 辛酉邪獄). The absence of such threats during the 18th century meant that scholars such as Kim Sijin and Kang Hobu could focus on more mundane questions such as those pertaining to the calendar system and other earth-related theories. However, as mentioned above, the situation changed drastically during the 19th century. The above quotation makes it evident that the Catholic Persecution of 1801, in which approximately a hundred people were executed, provided the impetus for this rapid change in the perception of Western Learning.

The above quotation reflects the crisis mentality that prevailed within some segments of society, who feared that the spread of Catholicism amongst the general public posed a direct threat to the survival of the feudal monarchy system. Kang Chaëung appears to have been especially shocked by the fact that even when confronted with possible execution, unenlightened commoners refused to renounce their Catholic faith. In one particular entry, Kang wrote that while his failure to read any books on Catholic doctrine meant that he in essence knew very little about Catholicism, he could not bring himself to understand how this doctrine bewildered the public to the point where they were willing to die in its name. Some individuals even went as far as to state that Catholicism permitted the communal sharing of fortunes and women—such a belief appears to have been founded on rumours being spread at that time surrounding men and women's common participation in church services and the religion's promotion of other communal activities such as the management of commercial enterprises—and that some individuals were willing to go to the grave to protect such rights. However, Kang wrote that such logic was fundamentally flawed because while fortune and women may be important, they were not so to the point where one should be willing to trade in his life to protect them.

This sense of crisis created by the spread of Catholicism resulted in a curtailment of the open-minded attitude toward various aspects of Western civilization that had prevailed in the 18th century in favour of a much more closed-minded and negative approach to Western Learning. For example, as a result of its linkage to Catholicism, a more negative perception of Western painting emerged than had been the case during the 18th century:

I have heard that Westerners somehow appropriated the gods' painting skills for themselves, and that as a result, anybody who sees a Western painting begins to question whether the image they see before them in the painting is actually alive. This belief has been further reinforced by my perusal of an entry found in Sayang chaegong's records pertaining to his encounter with Western paintings while visiting a Catholic church in Beijing. This cannot be attributed to the ingenuity of the painting style alone. In my opinion, there is a special ghoulish embedded in the paintings which cannot be understood based on regular logic. Anyone who learns the tenets of Catholicism sees their minds become deluded, and this regardless of whether they were originally wise or foolish

people. Perhaps this is because the simple language and characters found in these books are supplemented by a certain kind of ghoul whose very existence is rooted in its ability to make people unable to process things in a logical fashion? I fear that the same kind of ghoul also animates the Western painting style. All in all, this is a very frivolous and capricious phenomenon.¹⁵

Kang Chaeŭng could not understand Catholic followers who refused to renounce their religion, and this even if such a refusal meant certain execution. By way of conclusion, he conjectured that a capricious ghoul had been embedded in the Bible which caused people to become deluded. Here attention should be drawn to the fact that he used Western painting styles as an example which he believed supported his conjecture. To this end, he viewed the realistic painting style found in Western paintings as being caused by the presence of a ghoul embedded in the paintings which rendered people liable to delusion.¹⁶

Kang Chaeŭng completed the translation of the *Sangbongnok* in 1839 (the 5th year of King Hŏnjong), the very year in which the *Kihae saok* (己亥邪獄, Catholic Persecution) occurred, an event that itself came on the heels of the *Sinyu saok* (Catholic Persecution of 1801). At the time of the *Kihae saok*, Kang wrote another entry in which he described what he had heard about Catholicism. This latter entry indicates a much more balanced understanding of Catholicism than in the past. Quoting others, Kang explained how the *Sinyu saok* had in fact been a plot to get rid of the Namin (Southerners) faction. To support his argument, he raised the fact that Kim Kŏnsun had been the only person from the Noron (Patriarch) faction to be executed, a decision which he argued had been made to avoid criticism that the government was leaning too much in favour of one faction. Kim was thus in essence sacrificed, and this despite the fact that his crime had not warranted execution.¹⁷ Kang Chaeŭng also stressed that the book (the Bible) did not feature any fundamentally flawed principles, promoted the doing of good deeds, and that the Catholic commandments were similar to those found in the Buddhist Scriptures. He however stated that the theory that one would go to Heaven after death, much like the theory of *Sarvajna*, led people to become deluded.¹⁸ As such, he argued that the reason why people were ready to die for their religion was because they believed in life after death. Likening the current spread of Catholicism to a giant wave, he conceded that even the most air-tight of prohibitions could not impede its progress. To this end, he maintained that it would be more desirable to permit the spread of Catholicism-related books, allow the general population to freely read these books, and induce discussions amongst prestigious scholars so that the people could see for themselves the misguided principles and reasoning on which this religion was based. In addition to the doctrine of Catholicism, he argued that other Western notions that could help to improve the public welfare, such as astronomy, geography, medicine and pharmaceuticals, fortune-telling, tree planting, and grain farming, should also be accepted.

Conclusion

Using the *Sangbongnok*, this study has analysed Chosŏn literati elites' perception of Western Learning during the 18th and 19th centuries. To this end, while 18th century literati elites viewed Western Learning with an open mind characterized by a genuine interest in various fields, this attitude underwent a profound and negative change during the early 19th century as Catholicism, which had been but one of many fields of interest during the 18th century, began to be an all-encompassing concern. While the use of Catholic persecutions by the *sedo* politics-oriented government of Chosŏn as an implement with which to maintain its power represented one major factor for this change in attitudes, the serious abuses of the feudal system during the final stages, and the inability of the neo-Confucian order which had held this system in place to respond to the spread of Catholicism, can be regarded as having been a more salient factor in explaining this sudden change in perceptions.

Notes

1. For more on this, please refer to 'The experiences of visiting Catholic churches in Beijing and the recognition of Western Learning reflected in the Journals of Travel to Beijing'. *The Review of Korean Studies*, Volume 9, Number 4. Seoul: The Academy of Korean Studies.
2. The Chinsan Incident, which took place in Chinsan, Chŏlla Province in 1791, refers to an occurrence in which members of the literati elite named Yun Chich'ung and Kwŏn Sangyŏn (Yun's cousin) implemented Catholic-style rituals during a funeral, while also burning the ancestral tablet for their mothers and refusing to engage in Confucian mourning rituals. The Chosŏn government ordered the local governor of Chinsan, Sin Sawŏn, to arrest and torture these two literati. They were then executed for having corrupted social morals and ethics, and for adhering to the heretical tenet of refuting both one's ancestors and the king (*mubu mugun* 無父無君), actions which clearly violated Confucian tradition.
3. The activation of contacts with the Western world occasioned by Chosŏn's opening up of its doors during the second half of the 19th century had the effect of greatly reducing the significance of the indirect contacts with the Western world which had occurred through the *yŏnhaengsa's* visits to the Qing dynasty. With this in mind, the scope of this study has been limited to the early 19th century.
4. Yi Kyugyŏng, *Oju yŏn munjang chŏnsan'go* (五洲衍文長箋散稿, an encyclopedia compiled by Yi Kyugyŏng during the mid-19th century), 'The Catholic church sent silver currency to the interpreter Yu to cover the expenses he needed to purchase daily necessities and to distribute to other church members.... In their criminal confessions, Father Na and Chŏng voluntarily admitted to being influenced by the Catholic bishop in Beijing, and that Yu Chin'gil had helped Westerners enter Chosŏn on three different occasions.' Although there are no records of any members of the *yŏnhaeng* having visited Catholic churches in Beijing during the early 19th century, one finds many references to visits which they paid to the Russian Legation, and to encounters with Western artefacts that included a statue of Jesus Christ. However,

even in these instances, the view of Western culture which comes across in such entries is a very negative one that borders on open hostility (Wön Chaeyŏn, 2003. 'Chosŏn envoys' visits to Catholic churches in Beijing and their perception of Western civilization during the 17–19th centuries (*17–19 segi chosŏn sahaengŭi pukkyŏng ch'ŏnjudang pangmun'gwa sŏyang insik*), in *Sŏse tongjŏmgwa chosŏn wangjoŭi taewŏng* ('The Eastern Expansion of the Western Powers and Chosŏn's Response'). Seoul: Handŭl Publishing.

5. *Sangbongnok*, Vol. 1, '編述四養齋桑蓬錄序', '英廟三年丁未, 我曾王考四養齋先生, 從行人遊燕京, 有記行日錄, 名曰桑蓬錄. ... 後其書爲公友人西岡處士鄭郡守壽延所借去, 未知何由而蓋逸未返璧. ... 幸家有諺本一通, 卽公嘗爲奉覽於慈庭, 而手自譯寫者也. ... 依其諺本翻作文字.'
6. Ko Un'gi, 2003. '*Sangbongnok*', in *Yŏnhaengnok haeje* (燕行錄解題). Institute of Korean Literature, Dongguk University.
7. *Sangbongnok*, Vol. 7, '圖畫皆流動發越, 精彩生活, 儼然若生人焉. 北壁中間, 畫天主神像, 西壁一間, 繪一美婦人起立像, 首飾一邊墮焉, 以手握其髮. 其狀尤逼真, 不覺爲畫中人也. ... 入洋人所居房時, 中門一邊, 以墨畫一犬而半出門吠人之狀, 一行皆以爲眞犬矣. ... 世稱洋畫爲神品者 蓋以此也. ... 以余觀之, 人有妖, 禽獸亦有怪, 而才亦有然者. 其畫誠如夢囈鬼化, 未可知其何以爲然, 眞可謂妖怪之才矣.'
8. Yi Segŭn, who was the deputy-leader of the *yŏnhaeng*, sent Kang Hobu to visit a particular Catholic church on numerous occasions in order to inquire about the possibility of having the resident Western painter prepare a portrait of himself. However, the Western painter in question respectfully turned down this request on the grounds that he had received an imperial order to carry out the task of painting a newly built Catholic church, which meant that he would effectively have no time to paint private portraits (refer to the entries for 11, 13, 22 and 25 January). Such entries make evident the high regard which the Chosŏn literati had for the Western style of painting.
9. *Sangbongnok*, Vol. 7, '地形如毬, 浮於空中, 四方上下, 皆有世界. ... 其術頗精於天文, 論天地運氣, 星辰度數者, 多有發前人所未道者云. 是則或無怪焉. ... 而但以銀河爲非氣也, 乃衆星云者, 殊可駭也.'
10. *Ibid*, '今則燕中人, 無不尊尚之, 我東之人, 亦往往有尚其道而從其說者.'
11. *Ibid*, '天主, 名耶蘇, 歐邏巴國人也. 名耶蘇者, 方語謂救濟世上也. 尊之者, 稱爲海外聖人, 以天爲主故, 又謂之天主. ... 其學術清淨, 以無慾爲工, 以得道坐化爲驗云. 蓋合仙佛, 而爲一者也. 嘗見其所, 著書有所謂<天主眞經><天主演義>等編, 其說往往神奇, 不無可喜, 而究其中, 畢竟誕妄虛幻, 不足一覽也.'
12. Sin Ikch'ŏl, 2006, *ibid*.
13. *Sangbongnok*, Vol. 7, '大凡風俗教化, 則夷狄難侔於中華; 道德學行, 卽今人不逮於古人, 固也. 而至於技藝術數, 卽後出者, 往往有尤巧者. 夫曆法, 雖古聖人所作, 而其實不過算數爾, 非如心術道學之有關於世道者也. ... 金公作曆辨之日, 思養齋公爲日錄之時, 所謂天主教術, 猶未及盛布於東國, 只以地球之說, 卞難其是非. ... 粵在純廟初, 洋學果大熾於我東, 自學士大夫文人才子, 以至閭巷之愚夫愚婦, 皆靡然從學. 朝家嚴立禁令, 現發則輒誅殛, 而至死不悔, 囹圄常滿, 前後死者, 以百千計.'
14. This quotation can be regarded as an example of the crisis mentality occasioned by the spread of Catholicism, which was perceived as a threat to the traditional monarchical order. The

traditional oriental perception of astronomy was based on the notion of natural calamities, a notion which stressed the fact that astronomy and a king's political fortunes were intricately linked to one another. Therefore, while the ability to read the astral tea leaves was regarded as an important quality which the king should possess, the power to predict the weather was also perceived as a vital attribute for a king to possess in an agricultural society. One of the most important missions which the *yŏnhaengsa* were tasked with during the 18th century was that of obtaining Western books pertaining to astronomy and the development of a better understanding of its calendar system.

15. Ibid. 蓋聞洋人於畫法，多奪神造，雖尋常墨畫，見之者疑其為活物云。以思養齋公日記中，往見天主堂條，觀之亦可證。此不但畫法之工，意者其中必有別般妖幻，有非常理可測者爾。今其學之，能令人無智愚，皆迷蠱其心者，無乃箇中有一段妖幻之套，在乎言語文字之外，而有非常理所可測與？其所為畫法之眩人者，同其類者歟，신(イ+蠱)妖且怪矣。
16. In fact, the possibility that a ghoul existed in these paintings had first been raised by Kang Hobu. Viewing Western paintings in a Catholic church in Beijing, Kang was shocked by just how realistic these paintings were. To this end, Kang Hobu wrote, 'To me, while ghouls appeared to have embedded themselves in the images of persons found in the paintings, the animals also seemed to be possessed by some kind of evil spirits. Great ability is obviously required to produce such paintings. Although it really looked as if a spirit had been incorporated into the painting, I was unable to figure out how this had been brought about. I was therefore forced to conclude that this was the work of a magical and talented ghost.' However, Kang Hobu's statement to the effect that, 'ghouls appeared to have embedded themselves in the images of persons found in the paintings, the animals also seemed to be possessed by some kind of evil spirits, ... Great ability is obviously required to produce such paintings', was made in connection with an image found in a Western oil painting, a style which is much darker and sombre than what is usually found in Oriental paintings. 'The work of a ... talented ghost' can thus be understood as the author's way of saying that such a painting could not have been created by humans.
17. *Sangbongnok*, Vol. 7, '其時學之者，閭巷小民外，其士族則南人為多坐死，及廢者甚衆。老論則建淳其著者—建淳卽清陰先生祀孫—。而或曰建淳自願棄其學 不當在死科 而從前南人死者已多 故嫌於偏黨之譏 不得已置辟云。'
18. Ibid., '惟其所謂登天堂一說，卽渠學之究竟處，其能令蠱惑民志者，似在此一款。'

CHOSŎN LITERATI'S PERCEPTIONS OF THE WEST IN THE EARLY 19TH CENTURY AS REFLECTED IN KIM KYŎNGSŎN'S *YŎNWŎN CHIKJI*

CHO YANG-WON

Introduction

The 19th century was a period that saw the growing encroachment of the Western powers in Asia, their eastward expansion characterized by attempts to use their influence to force Asian nations to open their doors. While Chosŏn faced numerous internal challenges, the Qing dynasty, then the most powerful Asian nation, found itself confronted with severe economic difficulties occasioned by the unfair trade practices being forced upon it. Furthermore, Qing and Chosŏn's prohibition of Catholicism created a situation in which Western Learning (西學 *Sŏhak*), which had been positively perceived up until the end of the 18th century, suddenly became a taboo amongst the literati elites. In this regard, Kim Kyŏngsŏn's departure for Beijing as a royal envoy can be regarded as having occurred at a point in time when negative perceptions of Western nations had become widespread in the East following the outbreak of a series of incidents of the above-mentioned variety. To this end, this study analyses the literati elites' perception of the Western world using the *Yŏnwŏn chikchi* (燕轅直指) written by Kim Kyŏngsŏn, a man who in his capacity as a royal envoy to Beijing had the opportunity to experience Western civilization first-hand.

The paper itself is divided into three parts. In Part I, a summary of the literati elites' perceptions of the Western world prior to the 19th century will be brought about, with an analysis of the manner in which Chosŏn literati perceived the Western world and its civilization. In Part II, a description of the international political situation and domestic environment that prevailed during the early 19th century is carried out in order to highlight the periodic circumstances under which Kim Kyŏngsŏn's visit to Beijing took place. In Part III, which is concerned with Kim's experiences while in Beijing, an examination of the way he perceived the Western world is conducted using his travelogue *Yŏnwŏn chikchi* (燕轅直指). To supplement these efforts, the *Yŏnhaengnok sŏnjip* (燕行錄選集 'Compilation of the Records of

Travels to Beijing')¹, a series of Korean translations of classical literature produced by the Korean Classics Research Institute, have also been consulted, as well as other studies pertaining to the *Yŏnhaengnok*.

I. Perception of the Western world before the 19th century

The *Chibong yusŏl* (芝峰類設 'Topical Discourses by Chibong'), written by Yi Sugwang (1563–1628) and published in 1614, can be identified as the first individual collection of works produced by a member of the Chosŏn literati elite in which the use of the term 'West' appears.² This *Chibong yusŏl* was compiled based on Yi Sugwang's own experiences during his three trips to Beijing between the end of the 16th century and the beginning of the 17th century. In Volume 2 of this 20-volume encyclopedia, entitled *Various Countries*, Yi included a separate section on 'Foreign Countries' in which he introduced cultural and geographical knowledge pertaining to 52 countries located in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. To this end, he paid particular attention to Portugal (佛浪機國), The Netherlands (南番國), England (永結利國), and Italy (大西國), whose customs and locations he introduced. However, Yi perceived Europe (歐羅巴國) as being the name of one of the nations located in the Western world, and also exhibited a limited understanding of the term 'West', which he perceived as denoting the countries located to the west of China.³

The perception of Chosŏn elites, which had heretofore been based on Yi's vision of the world, began to be broadened following the import of Giulio Aleni (1582–1649) of the Society of Jesus's *Chikpang oegi* (職方外記, published in 1623) in Chosŏn.⁴ The *Chikpang oegi* constitutes an enlarged edition of the materials from the Western world that is based on Matteo Ricci (1552–1610)'s *Kunyu wanguo quantu* (坤輿萬國全圖) and the world maps and atlases translated by Pantoja (?–?).⁵ The *Chikpang oegi*, which included detailed explanations as well as the location of Western nations which the *Chibong yusŏl* had failed to include such as Spain and Germany, had a great influence on Chosŏn's perception of the Western world.⁶ Nevertheless, this perception was limited to an awareness of the mere existence of the Western world from a conceptual standpoint, with no real notion of aspects such as trade, culture, and religion as they were practised in the West having yet been formed.

The first actual encounter with the Western world and Western civilization occurred in the form of the arrival on the shores of Chosŏn of Pak Yŏn (J. J. Weltevree, 1595–?) and Hendrik Hamel (?–1692) during the reigns of King Injo and Hyojong respectively. Thereafter, the scope of Chosŏn's perception of the Western world and civilization was further extended during the late 17th century as a result of the visits to the Catholic churches located in the Imperial Capital which were conducted by the royal envoys dispatched to Beijing.

These diplomatic missions to Beijing (*yŏnhaeng*) became the only window through

which Chosŏn could come into contact with the Western world and its civilization. Chosŏn elites' perception of the Western world became more diverse during the 18th century as the royal envoys to Beijing (*yŏnhaengsa*) began to make regular visits to Catholic churches and forge friendships with Western missionaries.⁷ Hong Taeyong (1731–1783) for one was known to have often visited Catholic churches, and to have shown a keen interest in Western science and technology. He was especially intrigued by Western astronomy and the calendar system, but also showed an interest in Western devices such as the astronomical clock and the compass. Meanwhile, during the late 18th century, Pak Chiwŏn (1737–1805) focused on the practical aspects of Western civilization, leaving behind detailed records regarding Western paintings and Catholic churches. Similar actions on the part of other royal envoys to Beijing, including visits to Catholic churches, resulted in the emergence of an overall positive perception of the Western world and scientific civilization within Chosŏn.

II. The domestic situation and international political environment at the beginning of the 19th century

The growing interest in the West fuelled by the spread of the positive perception of the Western world and civilization within Chosŏn during the second half of the 18th century, had the effect of entraining discussions on the merits of accepting Western science and technology.⁸ Although Western religion continued to be perceived in a negative light, the absence of any perceived threat emanating from such religions lent itself to the development of an atmosphere in which Western science and technology could be selectively introduced.⁹

However, the Chinsan Incident of 1791 (also referred to as the Catholic Persecution of 1791, or *Sinhae pakhae* 辛亥迫害) occasioned a profound change in public opinion. As a result of this incident, the Chosŏn government abandoned its moderate approach towards the Catholic religion in favour of a hard line policy that unconditionally prohibited the dissemination of Catholicism within Chosŏn. As such, the discussions being held at the theoretical level to the effect that the obnoxious customs of Western Learning could easily be proved fallacious through the mere promotion of Confucian notions, were suddenly replaced by heated debates over the fact that Western religion was not a simple heathen faith like Buddhism, but rather a dangerous philosophy which constituted a threat to the survival of the existing system. Furthermore, as 'Westerners' were perceived as the force behind the domestic Catholic upstarts, the debate soon began to revolve around the need to exclude Western civilization altogether.

As part of the Chosŏn government's new approach toward Western Learning, King Chŏngjo (15th year of his reign) ordered that all the books related to Western

Learning housed in the Hongmun'gwan (弘文館, Office of Special Advisors) be burned, an action which was followed shortly thereafter by the outbreak of the Catholic Persecution of 1801 (*Sinyu pakhae* 辛酉迫害). Nevertheless, the Hwang Sayōng Silk Letter Incident of 1801 can be regarded as the event which directly triggered the widespread suppression of Catholic followers in Chosōn.

The Hwang Sayōng Silk Letter Incident revolved around the discovery of letters written by a Catholic convert by the name of Hwang Sayōng to Catholic Bishop de Gouvea (?–1808) in Beijing. These letters included all the particulars of the Persecution and the measures which the government had taken in conjunction with this matter. More to the point, Hwang detailed the situation of the Catholic church in Chosōn, the emergence of Catholic persecutions, the process through which the *Sinyu pakhae* unfolded, and the forced confessions and deaths of martyrs. In addition, Hwang also implored Bishop de Gouvea to instruct the emperor of Qing to force Chosōn to accept Western missionaries. Moreover, he also suggested that in order to ensure freedom of religion, Chosōn should either be turned into a province under the direct control of Qing, or the West should launch a military invasion of Chosōn. Hwang's silk letters were perceived as a plot to overthrow the existing state system.

To remedy this situation, the Chosōn government began to concentrate its efforts on the search for and subsequent execution of Catholics. This incident not only resulted in the spread of a negative perception of the Western world, but also opened the eyes of the literati to the growing encroachment of Western powers.

Meanwhile, moves to exclude the West were also afoot on a regional scale. China for one suddenly found itself in the most precarious of positions because of growing demands on the part of Western powers for commercial trade, the unbalanced nature of such trade when it did occur, and the growing scourge of opium. To this end, the various moves made by Western powers became the main preoccupation in China. Unsurprisingly, the majority of the information conveyed by Chosōn's royal envoys to Beijing during this period was related to Western powers' economic exploitation of China. Such reports included examinations of how trade with Western countries in the late 1830s had resulted in China wasting huge amounts of silver currency.¹⁰ Such reports also pointed out how Qing had been losing thousands of silver coins every year as a result of the fact that Western merchants, rather than engaging in the barter of goods, were simply selling their wares within the Chinese market in exchange for silver coins, a practice which caused a serious run on China's supply of silver currency.¹¹ In addition, Qing's defeat at the hands of the British in the Opium War of 1840 promoted an awareness of the dangerous nature of Western powers within Chosōn and Japan alike, which in turn caused the emergence of a phenomenon in which relations with the Western powers were perceived as being based on tacit hostility. To this end, the crisis mentality created within Japan by China's defeat at

the hands of a Western power can be regarded as the impetus for the seclusion policy which it subsequently put in place.

A series of similar incidents unfolded in Chosŏn as well. The first British request for the signing of a commercial treaty in 1832 was followed in 1846 by the arrival along the shores of Hongju of a French fleet demanding an explanation for the murder of French missionaries in 1839. As such, the events of the beginning of the 19th century involving the Western powers can be regarded as having led to the formation of a serious crisis mentality within the East Asian nations, and to the onset of the perception of the West as a direct threat.

III. Chosŏn's perception of the West as viewed through the *Yŏnwŏn chikchi*

The author of the *Yŏnwŏn chikchi*, Kim Kyŏngsŏn (1788–?), who was dispatched in 1832–1833 as a member of the royal mission to Beijing, left behind a travelogue detailing his experiences while in the Forbidden City. In addition to his own experiences during the 6 months in which he stayed in Beijing, Kim also quoted many other records, such as Kim Ch'angŏp (1658–1721)'s *Nogajae yŏnhaengnok* (老稼齋燕行錄 'Nogajae's Records of his Journey to Beijing'), Hong Daeyong's *Tamhŏn yŏn'gi* (湛軒燕記 'Tamhŏn's Account of his Journey to Beijing'), and Pak Chiwŏn's *Yŏlha ilgi* (熱河日記 'Jehol Diary').¹² As it includes references to other records of travels to Beijing (*yŏnhaengnok*) compiled during the 18th century, the *Yŏnwŏn chikchi* can be regarded not only as a *yŏnhaengnok* which incorporates Chosŏn literati elites' perceptions of the Qing dynasty during the 18th century, but as a valuable historical source which introduces the differences between the perceptions of 18th and 19th century Chosŏn elites.¹³

Kim Kyŏngsŏn's *Yŏnwŏn chikchi* consists of three parts: the *Ch'ulgangnok* (出疆錄), or records of his journey from Chosŏn to Beijing; the *Yugwannok* (留館錄), in which the events that unfolded during his stay in Beijing are introduced; and the *Hoejŏngnok* (回程錄), which details his journey back to Chosŏn. However, as a detailed review of the overall contents of these records is regarded as being unnecessary, given the fact that the structure of this particular work is for all intents and purposes similar to that found in other *yŏnhaengnok*, the current study focuses solely on the records related to the West.

The following can be regarded as the most important records related to the West which can be found in the *Yŏnwŏn chikchi*. First, his account includes an in-depth description of the circumstances surrounding the appearance of a British ship in search of a commercial treaty along the shores of Chosŏn in 1832.¹⁴ At the time of Kim Kyŏngsŏn's departure for Beijing as a member of the royal mission, the political

situation in Chosŏn was rife with instability, and society was in disarray.¹⁵ We can imagine that given the chaotic circumstances which prevailed at that time, the arrival of a Western ship demanding the signing of a commercial treaty would have been treated as a very important occurrence. Halfway through his mission to Beijing, Kim Kyŏngsŏn heard about this incident from an official (*Hwangnyŏk chaejagwan* 皇曆資咨官) at the Hwanggajang, events which he proceeded to record in a detailed manner.¹⁶ This entry also included a summary of the knowledge pertaining to England which he possessed, as well as his own opinions on the matter. In addition, he also included letters and reports, maps, and a list of the gifts which the British submitted to the Chosŏn court. Moreover, in addition to descriptions of the structure of the ship and the sailors' names and places of origin, Kim also included information about the British royal family, its distance from Korea, and its institutions.¹⁷ In the section in which he described his own opinions on the matter, Kim addressed the issue of Western navigation techniques and ships' structures, which led him to conclude that Westerners' ability to achieve their 'goals' was in fact rooted in their advanced technologies.

The land in which British people live in is situated some 70,000 li from China. Nevertheless, this ship headed south through Africa before then heading north-east and reaching 'Aobi' (奧必). Although a great distance had to be travelled, these ships navigated by the British are very quick and comfortable and capable of navigating large oceans. We can tell that this was a well-planned voyage with predetermined goals.¹⁸

Kim Kyŏngsŏn understood these 'goals' as being the establishment of commercial treaties with various oriental nations. Moreover, he perceived them as being within the reach of the British because of the advanced navigation technology that they possessed. Given Kim's recognition of the fact that Qing trade with the British had been characterized by significant economic setbacks for the Chinese, there is a very high likelihood that his keen interest in navigation technology may have been linked to his belief that the securing of great national interests was closely related to such navigation technology. However, further analysis of this matter is greatly complicated by the fact that Kim did not include more details pertaining to his own opinion on trade.

Another record related to the West left behind by Kim pertains to the Catholic churches in Beijing. Unlike in the 18th century when interest in aspects of Western Learning related to scientific and religious matters was very high, the Chosŏn government had by 1832, when Kim Kyŏngsŏn's visit to a Catholic church took place, followed Qing's lead and prohibited the dissemination of Catholicism. On 22nd December of that year, Kim accompanied members of the *yonhaeng* on an outing outside the Yuheguan (玉河館). Having passed the Zhengyangmen Gate (正陽門) and reached the Xuanwumen Gate (宣武門), they came across a strange-looking house,

which they soon realized was in fact a Catholic church. His negative perception of Catholicism, which was at that time prohibited in China and Chosŏn, is clearly exposed in the following entry:

The Chosŏn and Chinese governments have prohibited us from coming into contact with Western Learning. Having heard that their religion possesses the power to make people subject to delusions, I did not even attempt to fix my eyes on or step into this particular space.¹⁹

However, his more positive opinion of Western science and technology can be seen in his statement to the effect that, 'given their mysterious and advanced nature, I believe that it is appropriate for us to observe, for reference purposes, their painting styles and various other implements.'

In the end, Kim did not visit the Catholic church, but rather contented himself with rehashing the contents pertaining to Catholic churches found in three other *yŏnhaengnok*, namely the *Nogajae yŏnhaengnok*, *Tamhŏn yŏn'gi*, and *Yŏlha ilgi*.

I hardly believe that I could describe the Catholic churches in Beijing any better than has been done in the *Nogajae yŏnhaengno*, *Tamhŏn yŏn'gi*, and *Yŏlha ilgi*, and this despite the fact that I am seeing this building with my own eyes. Furthermore, my visit to the Catholic church would be very similar to those described in these three books. Although I am including a summary of these three books, I hope that those who pass by this place in the future do not regard this action as a sign of laziness on my part.

This proves that Kim could not totally remove himself from the international political situation, or the domestic situation for that matter. As this event unfolded shortly after an attempt was made on the part of a British ship to open up trade with Chosŏn, Kim's criticism of Catholicism can to some degree be understood as having been based on his fear that Chosŏn would somehow head down the same path as Qing.

The next series of entries to which attention can be drawn is the so-called *Angnasagwan'gi* (顎羅斯館記),²⁰ or records pertaining to Russia. Kim proceeded to describe the knowledge he had been able to obtain about Russia during his visit to the Russian Legation as follows.

It appears that this country is located far beyond a huge desert. However, I do not know exactly where this country is located as I have never found any reference to it in any history books. Nevertheless, from what I was able to hear from these people, this country is vast, 30,000 li from east to west, and 20,000 li from north to south. It is adjacent to Vietnam and Okinawa on its south-eastern flank. On its north-east border, it abuts Mongolia, and it is surrounded by oceans to its south-west. While the distance from the outskirts of the desert to its western border is unknown, it is approximately 50,000 li from China in the east. If this country is as big as is claimed, then its territories would

dwarf China a few times over. As such, the current description is either an exaggeration or fabricated lies. In addition, there is also no way of knowing whether their borders are as they claim them to be.²¹

Kim perceived Russia more as a branch of the Mongol tribes than as an independent Western nation. In addition, unable to confirm the location and scale of this entity's territory, he betrayed his narrow-minded perception of the world by automatically assuming that what he had been told was either an outright lie or a gross exaggeration. In addition, he also included records of his conversations with officials from the Russian Legation who were known on paintings in Korea as Tök Noya 德老爺 and Hyök Noya 赫老爺, while also describing at length the Russians' appearance, clothing, and building style. He was so impressed by the Western-style portraits that he asked the Russians to paint his portrait. Hyök Noya listened attentively to Kim's requests, and the two built up a close friendship after the Russian treated his guest to a meal.

Kim only included a very short description of the Catholic church and of the statue of Jesus Christ which had been erected within the Russian Legation before moving on to another topic: 'as this country is in close proximity to the West and also worships Catholicism, it imitates Western institutions and enshrines statues of Jesus Christ'. This apparent oversight was also closely related to the domestic ban on any contact with Catholicism, an action to which Kim appears to have consciously avoided being linked.

Kim also weighed in on the issue of opium addiction amongst Chinese soldiers. His knowledge of the issue was based on a petition to the Qing government prepared by Ma Guangxun (馬光勳) which called for a ban on opium consumption. Once opium addiction became widespread amongst the military, the military's fighting spirit would be impacted to the point where such forces would only be military by name. To this end, it was necessary to thoroughly investigate and prohibit the use of opium. Kim also included his own opinion to the effect that opium was imported from the West, where addiction was rife.²² This can be regarded as a sign of his negative perception of the West.

Conclusion

This paper has analysed Kim Kyöngsön's perception of the West through his *Yönwön chikchi*. A look at the domestic and international situation during the relevant periods reveals that while the Chosön literati elites had a mostly positive impression of the West during the 18th century, this perception took a rapid turn for the worse during the 19th century. Kim Kyöngsön for one perceived the British request for trade with Chosön, which he identified as the root cause of the economic problems then faced by

China, as representing a serious crisis for his homeland. Meanwhile, he showed great interest in Western navigation and shipbuilding technology. As far as the Catholic churches in Beijing were concerned, Kim seemed content to express his interest in Western-style paintings and science and technology, while limiting his work on Catholicism to the mere act of quoting from previous works on the topic.

In terms of his visit to the Russian Legation, Kim appears not to have perceived Russia as a Western state, but rather as another branch of the Mongolian tribes, and as one that accepted and in many ways mimicked Western civilization. Such a perception is evidence that Kim still possessed a narrow-minded perception of the world as it related to the West. In addition, Kim also made use of a petition to the Qing government to highlight the serious impact on China's economy and military occasioned by the spread of opium. To this end, he added his own belief that Chosŏn should begin at once to take measures to prepare itself for a similar outbreak.

Kim's records represent a salient example of Chosŏn literati elites' perception of the West during this period. The spread of the negative perception of Catholicism caused Kim to hesitate between accepting Western science and technology and excluding it all together. This is clear evidence of the fact that Kim could not rid himself completely of the prevailing perceptions of the West and of the world, perceptions which were in large part shaped by the chaotic nature of the international and domestic environments, and in which the West was viewed as a potential threat.

Notes

1. Kim Kyŏngsŏn, *Yŏnwŏn chikchi* (燕轅直指), in Korean Classics Research Institute, 1976. *Yŏnhaengnok sŏnjip* (燕行錄選集 'Compilation of the Records of Travels to Beijing'), Vol. X.
2. The first reference to the term 'West' did not appear in any individual collection of works, but rather can be found in the *Koryŏsa*. *Koryŏsa* (高麗史 'History of Koryŏ'), Sega (世家), Vol. 44 (King Kongmin 7, 22nd year, July 1373), p. 857.
3. For more on Sirhak scholars' perception of the West, please refer to Wŏn Chaeyŏn, 1997. 'The Sirhak scholars' perception of the West during the 17–19th centuries (17–19 segi sirhakchaŭi sŏyang insik kŏmt'o)', *Han'guksaron*, History Department, Seoul National University, Vol. 38. See also 'Scholars' perceptions of the West during the Chosŏn era (*Chosŏn sidae hakchadŭlli sŏyang insik*)', *Taegu sahak*, Vol. 73. Taegu Sahakhoe.
4. *Chikpang oegi* (職方外記), one of the Chinese-language materials related to Western Learning, was originally brought back from Beijing by Chŏng Tuwŏn (1581–?) who travelled to the Imperial City as a member of the royal mission dispatched in 1631 (the 9th year of King Injo). Chŏng also brought back other books such as the *Ch'iyŏk yŏn'gi* (治曆緣起), *Imadu ch'ŏnmunsŏ* (利瑪竇天文書), *Wŏn'gyŏngsŏ* (遠鏡書), *Chŏlli kyŏngsŏ* (千里鏡書), *Sŏyangguk p'ungsokki* (西洋國風俗記), and the *Man'guk chŏndo* (萬國全圖). Yi Wŏnsun, 1986. 'Western Civilization: the introduction of Chinese versions of materials on Western

Learning (*Söyang munmul, hanyök söhaksöüi chöllae*), *Journal of the History of Western Learning* (Chosön söhaksa yön'gu), p. 63.

5. Ibid. pp. 122–4.
6. In addition, Italy was referred to as 意大利亞, the Netherlands as 法蘭得斯, England as 諸厄利亞, and Ireland as 意而蘭大; detailed explanations unlike those found in the *Chibong yusöl* were also included (Wön Chaeyön, op. cit.).
7. With regards to existing studies dealing with Chosön's perception of the West as perceived through the *yönhaengnok*, please refer to Sin Ikch'öl, 2005. 'Yi Kiji's *Ilam yön'gi* and Chosön elites' contacts with Western Learning (*Yi Kijüi Ilam yön'gi* (一菴燕記) *wa söhak chöpch'ok yangsang*)', *Tongbang hanmunhak*, Tongbang Hanmunhakhoe, Vol. 30); 'The influence of the Catholic churches in Beijing as reflected through the *Yönhaengnok* compiled during the 18th century, and Chosön elites' perception of Western Learning (*18 segi yönhaengnoke panyöngdoen bukkyöng ch'önjudang ch'ehömgwa söhak insik*)', in *Compilation of Essays Presented during the World Congress of Korean Studies*, 2006.
8. In this paper, I will use the terms 'Western religion (*sögyo*)' and 'Western science and technology (*sögi*)' separately, and the term 'Western Learning (*söhak*)' in cases where both aspects are referred to. This method was first used in Ch'oi Sökku, 1999. 'The Perception of Western Learning during Later Chosön (*Chosön hugiüi söhak sasang*)', *Kuksagwan nonch'ong*, Vol. 22; No Taehwan, 1996. 'Changes in the perception of the West during the first half of the 19th century and the movement to accept Western science and technology (*19 segi chönban söyang insiküi pyönhwawa sögi suyongron*)', *Journal of Korean Historical Studies* (*Han'guksa yön'gu*), Vol. 95. Han'guksa Yön'guhoe.
9. Ibid. p. 111.
10. *Il söngrok* (日省錄), the 3rd year of King Hönjong, August 15, *Kyöngsin*.
11. *Il söngrok* (日省錄), the 4th year of King Hönjong, *Muja*.
12. Kim Kyöngsön regarded Kim Ch'angöp, Hong Taeyong, and Pak Chiwön's *yönhaengnok* as having been the most outstanding. Kim was fond of conducting a comparison of these three scholars' records and then introducing his own opinion on the matter at hand. Whatever he did not directly experience, he complemented by quoting from the above-mentioned three compilations. 'The majority of those who visited Beijing left their own travelogues. Amongst these records, the most illustrious are those left behind by Nogajae Kim Ch'angöp, Tamhön Hong Taeyong, and Yönam Pak Chiwön.' Kim Kyöngsön, '*Yönwön chikchi* (燕轅直指)', in Korean Classics Research Institute, 1976. *Yönhaengnok sönjip* (燕行錄選集 'Compilation of the Records of Travels to Beijing'), Vol. X.
13. Chöng Hyejung, 2005. 'Kim Kyöngsön's voyage to Beijing and his understanding of foreign information at the beginning of the 19th century (*19 segi ch'o chosön sahaeng Kim Kyöngsönüi bukkyöng ch'ehömgwa oeguk chöngbo ihae*)', *Chungguksa yön'gu*, Vol. 37, p. 146. Chungguksa Hakhoe.
14. The British ship *The Lord Amherst* arrived at Monggümp'o, Hongju in July 1832 in search of a commercial treaty with Chosön. Kim Kyöngsön left for Beijing in October 1832, arriving in the Forbidden City in December. We can only imagine the extent of the seriousness with which Kim perceived this incident that occurred shortly before his departure.

15. During this period, Chosŏn society was in a chaotic state as a result of the spread of the evil practice of *maegwan maejik* (賣官賣職, selling off of official titles and ranks) and the failure of the state revenue system. In 1811, the capital area found itself in a precarious state as a result of the outbreak of the Hong Kyŏngnae Revolt. These problems were further compounded by the fact that the literati elites began to abandon their government posts and ranks and secluded themselves from the world. The possibility of revolts and uprisings was highlighted by the growing number of peasants who were forced to leave their hometowns in search of food.
16. Records pertaining to British ships can be found in the *Sunjo sillok* (純祖實錄), *Sŏngjŏngwŏn ilgi* (承政院日記), and *Ch'ungh'ŏng sunyŏng dŏngrok* (忠淸巡營謄錄).
17. These contents are included in the 'Records pertaining to England' (英吉利國漂船記) section of the entry compiled on 25 November 1832. Kim Kyŏngsŏn, op. cit. pp. 86–97.
18. Ibid. p. 96.
19. 22 December 1832, 'Records pertaining to the Catholic churches in the Western Gate Area (西天主堂記)', 'Records pertaining to the Catholic Churches in the Eastern Gate Area (東天主堂記)'. Kim Kyŏngsŏn, *ibid.* pp. 259–274.
20. 26 December 1832, 'Records pertaining to Russia (顎羅斯館記)'. Kim Kyŏngsŏn, *ibid.* pp. 303–308. Other terms used to refer to Russia in the *Yŏnwŏn chikchi* include 阿羅斯 and 俄羅嘶. Russians, who were regarded as a rather big-nosed branch of the Mongolian tribe, were also called 大鼻子.
21. 26 December 1832. *Ibid.* pp. 303–4.
22. Chŏng Hyejung, 2005. 'Kim Kyŏngsŏn's voyage to Beijing and his understanding of foreign information at the beginning of the 19th century (19 *segi ch'o chosŏn sahaeng Kim Kyŏngsŏnŭi bukkyŏng ch'ehŏmgwa oeguk chŏngbo ihae*)', *Chungguksa yŏn'gu*, Vol. 37. Chungguksa Hakhoe.

TRAVEL ACCOUNTS OF TWO BRITONS IN CHOSŎN KOREA: A.E.J. CAVENDISH'S *KOREA AND THE SACRED WHITE MOUNTAIN*

JO YOONG-HEE

Cavendish and Goold-Adams' voyage to Chosŏn

The late 19th century saw a marked increase in the interest in Chosŏn displayed not only amongst its neighbours such as Japan and China, but also in certain Western countries as well. The subsequent expansion in the number of Westerners who visited Chosŏn to experience first-hand this Asian nation was occasioned not only by the national political interests linked to Chosŏn's opening of its doors, but also to the other various opportunities, i.e. missionary work, business, and travel, which this decision made possible. This marked increase in the number of foreign visitors compared to the 18th century resulted in the introduction of more in-depth descriptions of Chosŏn, and of the impressions thereof, than had been the case in the past.

This study analyses British Captain Alfred Edward John Cavendish and his companions' descriptions of Chosŏn and its people during the late 19th century. To this end, his work *Korea and the Sacred White Mountain* (1893)¹ naturally serves as the main source of information on which this paper is based. This particular book not only describes various aspects of Chosŏn society and traditions as experienced by the author during his voyage, but also sheds some light on the lifestyles and perceptions of the people of Chosŏn as viewed through the eyes of a Westerner.

In 1891 Cavendish travelled to Chosŏn along with another British Captain named H.E. Goold-Adams. Having set sail from Hong Kong, they travelled through Shanghai before arriving at the Chosŏn port of Chemulp'o. Even prior to his departure, Cavendish was already aware of the time-frame within which his voyage to Chosŏn would have to unfold, a voyage which was ostensibly intended to achieve the goal of climbing Mt. Paektu. To this end, Cavendish had in effect promised his superior that he would return to Hong Kong within a certain pre-established period of time. Finding himself unable to climb Mt. Paektu within the time at his disposal, Cavendish contented himself with accompanying Goold-Adams as far as the town

of Poch'ŏn at its foot, thus leaving the task of completing the scaling of the sacred mountain to his partner. Cavendish subsequently made his way to the port city of Wŏnsan, where he boarded a ship and returned to his initial starting point of Hong Kong via Pusan and Yokohama.

Cavendish, having been forced by time limitations to abandon his goal of climbing Mt. Paektu, supplemented his own narrative of his voyage to Chosŏn by transcribing in exact detail Goold-Adams' account of his trek up the mountain. Cavendish's account also included references to the documents and records compiled by the British consul stationed in China, Charles W. Campbell, during the latter's own voyage to Mt. Paektu in 1889. In order to complement his descriptions of his journey, Cavendish also included pictures taken by Campbell, British Consul General in Seoul Walter C. Hillier, and a customs officer in Wŏnsan by the name of Brazier. What's more, he also inserted several genre paintings by a contemporary Chosŏn artist in order to help readers gain some insight into Chosŏn's culture and traditions.

Cavendish's journey to Mt. Paektu and back, which took him from Seoul to the foot of Mt. Paektu, and then on to the port of Wŏnsan from which he exited Chosŏn, unfolded over a period of 40 days, or more precisely from 5 September to 15 October 1891.² As travellers' progress was slowed greatly by the fact that the only way to proceed was on foot or by pony, the author most likely had the opportunity to experience various aspects of Chosŏn during his long trek to Mt. Paektu. However, the main goal of Cavendish's journey was that of climbing a mountain long regarded as being sacred by the people of Chosŏn. Thus, while planning to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the information collected by Cavendish pertaining to Chosŏn culture, customs, and history at a later date, I would like to analyse herein the aspects of Cavendish and Goold-Adams' Korean experiences that are directly linked to their journey to Mt. Paektu. To this end, an analysis of their hunting activities in Chosŏn, which stands out as the most cherished aspect of their journey, will be conducted. Moreover, through a review of their journey to the heretofore little-known—at least in the Western world—site of Mt. Paektu, an attempt will also be made to examine how these two British nationals described Chosŏn and its people.

Hunting experiences

Chosŏn's literati class continuously compiled minute records of the contexts surrounding their journeys to mountains. Such experiences were usually left behind for posterity in collections of travel records such as the *Wayurok* (臥遊錄 'Collection of Travel Descriptions').³ The travels of the Chosŏn literati class were focused on the cultivation of a broad-minded spirit and powers of meditation. However, from the outset of their voyage to Chosŏn for the purpose of climbing Mt. Paektu, Cavendish and Goold-Adams' main goal had been that of engaging in hunting. Amongst their

most valued targets was that of snaring wild game such as tigers and leopards. With their weapons always at the ready, the travellers were prepared to engage in hunting whenever possible. Cavendish appears to have been aware of the fact that their journey was fundamentally different from the travels or climbing expeditions traditionally taken by Chosŏn people. He had heard that along their journey Chosŏn men liked to stop and enjoy nature and various sceneries, a practice which had resulted in the bestowing of names such as *p'algyŏng* (八景 'eight scenic sites') on spots which were deemed of exquisite beauty while engaging in treks to famous mountains such as the Kŭmgang mountains.⁴ Cavendish and his companion's interest in hunting can to some degree be explained by their military background.

Cavendish and his companion were not the only foreigners who had a keen interest in Chosŏn's tigers and leopards and other wild game. In his account, Cavendish makes reference to the fact that an important number of pelts and live tigers were officially exported through maritime routes in 1890.⁵ Although his ardent desire to catch tigers is evident in his writings, he and his companion never came across any actual tigers or leopards during their journey. While he heard stories relating to the sudden appearance of tigers and leopards from several different quarters during his journey,⁶ his goal of hunting these fierce animals eventually proved to be a failure. The following passage offers insight into the author's general impression of his journey to Chosŏn, for which the possibility of hunting fierce animals had been a major incentive:

Our original object in going to Korea was to shoot tigers or leopards, for the tales we heard of their number, size, and ferocity, and of the beauty of their fur, made our mouths water; but the mysterious White Mountain lured us on to hasten to make its acquaintance, and partly on that account the shooting was somewhat of a failure.

Without doubt there is a great quantity of game in Korea, but there is only one way to get at tigers or leopards, and that is to let them come to you, and not you to go to them. The natives are so lazy, untruthful, and afraid of these animals, that no persuasion will induce them to act as beaters. In vain did we offer at length extravagant prices for the beasts. Even fifty dollars, with the bones and carcase thrown in, for each tiger we shot, would not tempt them. The bones and part of the body are greatly prized by the Chinese physicians, as imparting youthful vigour to old or worn-out constitutions. We also offered twenty-five dollars for a shot at a tiger, and ten dollars for the mere sight of one, but equally in vain. Although the people at Pochŏn strenuously denied the death of anyone there from tigers, and even the very existence of these beasts, yet Mr. Campbell, when he visited that village in 1889, was told that in the last year eighteen people had been killed by them, and that three tigers, one a confirmed man-eater, infested the district...⁷

Cavendish's deep sense of disappointment is clearly evident in the above passage. Campbell's account of the presence of numerous tigers in Chosŏn had been the main

factor which had motivated Cavendish's decision to travel to Chosŏn. However, he soon found himself hard-pressed to secure the cooperation of the local residents in tracking down these wild animals. He ascribed this situation to the fact that the local residents were 'too lazy, untruthful, and afraid of these animals.'

The local residents were not only unwilling to accompany the foreigners on their search for tigers, but also refused to provide them with any information pertaining to the great beasts. Whenever it appeared that Cavendish and his company were about to launch an actual search for the prized creature, the locals would suddenly decline to even discuss stories related to tigers. This can be regarded as the reason why the author stressed the 'untruthful' nature of the local residents. The episode which occurred when the group stopped near Anbyŏn on their way from Seoul to Wŏnsan can be regarded as a salient example of this phenomenon. During his sojourn in the area, the author heard first-hand accounts of tigers while accompanying local residents hunting for pheasants. Nevertheless, in the end, the local residents refused to provide any further evidence relating to the presence of tigers in the area:

They even pointed out the place to us, a low sandy hill partially covered with pine-trees; but when we announced our intention of going to look for the animal, they began to prevaricate, saying they were not sure on which hill or when it was last seen, and finally refused to come with us.⁸

Although the local residents' general fear of tigers was a factor in explaining their refusal to go hunting with the author and his companion, their decision to not provide the foreigners with any precise information pertaining to the great beasts was in part motivated by their awareness of the monetary value of tigers. This failure to kill any tigers was also related to the period of the year in which the journey took place. As Cavendish himself was also well aware, tigers usually descended from the mountains into the villages to get food during the winter season.⁹ However, as his trek had to come to an end before the onset of winter if he and his group were to achieve their other goal of climbing Mt. Paektu, there was a very real possibility from the outset that their attempt to hunt tigers would end in futility.

The author and his companions also attempted during their journey to engage in the relatively easier task of hunting birds. However, this endeavour also proved to be less than fruitful. The group regularly hunted pheasants, a relatively more common form of game, near the sites of the encampments or inns in which they stayed.¹⁰ However, these attempts also failed to yield many tangible results. This fact is clearly evidenced by the in-depth manner in which Cavendish described Goold-Adams' killing of two teal near Orich'un while on their way to Changjin, a mundane occurrence which he depicted as if it were an extraordinary feat.¹¹

On his way back to Wŏnsan after having successfully scaled Mt. Paektu, Goold-Adams encountered much easier-to-hunt flocks of birds while in Pukch'ŏng. At that

time, he was able to catch a glimpse of various birds such as swans, geese, and ducks that were concentrated on eating the remnants of the harvest in paddy fields.

Cavendish and his companion failed to snare any tigers. However, having decided to stay in Changjin for one more night in order to allow additional ponies to be delivered to them, they were nevertheless able to have one interesting hunting experience. At that time, the governor of Changjin informed the group that while there were tigers in the Changjin area and hunters could be found to hunt the great beasts, the general fear that such tigers instilled in these hunters made the holding of a deer-drive a more appealing and plausible option. For Cavendish, deer-driving proved to be a hunting experience that was unique to Chosŏn.

His suggestion to have a deer-drive in the afternoon delighted us, in the absence of anything more exciting, and gratefully accepting it, we sent him off again, while we had our luncheon in peace. What a drive it was! Outside the town we were met by six hunters with 'tiger-guns'; one of whom had a new one (there is a manufactory of these here), which he tried then and there by firing across the river in the direction of the town at a stone about a foot in diameter, which lay at the water's edge at a distance of sixty yards, and, amidst exclamations of admiration of his skill, he hit the mark. ... Climbing a thousand feet up the mountain above the Chang-gé road, we were posted some distance apart, and, after waiting half-an-hour, we saw the Prefect come out in his chair and take up a position to watch the sport in a field in the valley below. As I had seen quite fresh tracks of deer leading into a large patch of thin wood between us and the town, we anticipated at least the sight of an animal. Now began the beating of a gong and the blowing of the Yamen trumpet in the direction of the wood, and the two performers on these instruments constituted the beaters, though they did not enter the wood. After waiting two hours in vain, we were told the drive was over, and we gladly returned home to dinner.¹²

This deer-drive in Changjin proved to be Cavendish's most pleasant experience during his journey. His account does not contain any descriptions of the encounters with the people of Chosŏn he experienced during his journey which are more positive in nature than this particular one. Although this hunt ended without any animals being captured, Cavendish appears to have attached great significance to the fact that he was able, with the help of the governor of Changjin, to experience an organized hunt from the beginning to the end. The participants in the hunt implemented set procedures that included the appearance of hunters with 'tiger-guns' and the participation of beaters with gongs and trumpets in the deer-drive. For someone like Cavendish who had a marked preference for established formalities and refined matters, such an experience must indeed have been a pleasant one.¹³

Although Cavendish and his companion's journey to Mt. Paektu did yield some satisfactory experiences related to hunting, their failure to snare ferocious wild beasts such as tigers and leopards meant that one of the main objectives of their trek had

failed to be secured. Nevertheless, Cavendish went to great lengths to describe the hunting methods used in Chosŏn and the means through which traps were installed.¹⁴ In the annex to his account, Cavendish recorded the sorts of game available in Chosŏn, as well as the names and characteristics of the live game or pelts he had seen while on his journey.¹⁵ Therefore, this account, in which the author's strong interest in hunting comes through very clearly, represents a salient source of information about animal ecology and hunting during the Chosŏn era.

Mt. Paektu: The gap between sacredness and superstition

The descriptions of the features and characteristics of Mt. Paektu include the thoughts and experiences of both Cavendish and Goold-Adams. Unable to travel past the towns of Poch'ŏn and Karim situated at the foot of Mt. Paektu before having to head back to Hong Kong via Wŏnsan because of a tight schedule, Cavendish had to satisfy himself with looking at Mt. Paektu from afar. In order to ensure that the contents reflected the title of his account, *Korea and the Sacred White Mountain*, Cavendish borrowed the records compiled by Goold-Adams, who actually reached the summit (*Ch'ŏnji* 天池) of the mountain.

The ultimate goal of Cavendish and his companion was that of climbing Mt. Paektu. We can see from the title of his account that the author identified 'sacredness' as its most prominent attribute. Although Cavendish and Goold-Adams' main objective in travelling there was to hunt tigers, they naturally began to focus increasingly on the mountain's features as they drew closer to it. Considering the fact that tigers were more prominent in this area than in others, Mt. Paektu can be regarded as holding a special allure that distinguished it from other mountains. However, for Cavendish and his companion, Mt. Paektu's sacredness did not stem from the fact that tigers resided on its slopes. Rather, it was the varied scenery created by the magnificent geographical features of the mountain that allowed these individuals to experience its extraordinary uniqueness and transcendental nature. The reaction of the Chosŏn aides who accompanied Cavendish and Goold-Adams on their trek was a genuine fear that they had stepped inside the sacred realm of Mt. Paektu imprudently.

The records compiled by Cavendish and Goold-Adams not only reflect Chosŏn aides' perceptions of Mt. Paektu, but also those of the inhabitants who lived in the area around the sacred mountain. For his part, Cavendish believed that Chosŏn people's perception of Paektu as a sacred mountain was essentially rooted in the aura of mystery that hung over its features. To this end, Cavendish argued that the mysterious aura which the people of Chosŏn attributed to it emanated from its permanently white features. Chosŏn people clung to the strong belief that the white features of Mt. Paektu were the result of the fact that the mountain was covered with snow the year around.¹⁶ This sense of sacredness was further enhanced by the belief

that the snow in effect meant that the mountain never revealed its true features. For this reason, they might not have wanted to imagine a Mt. Paektu which was *not* covered with snow. For his part, Cavendish gazed upon Mt. Paektu from a distance of 33 miles away. Though he was able to discern that Mt. Paektu's white appearance was rooted in the presence of numerous pumice and ash trees, he realized that this would not change Chosŏn people's age-old notion that the mountain was permanently white with snow.

Fear was another factor that served to enhance the sacredness of Mt. Paektu in the eyes of the people of Chosŏn. This sudden sense of fear at the unknown world opening up before their eyes may have been a common emotion for those attempting to climb the mountain. Believing that entering its realm was akin to invading a sacred space, many Chosŏn people were afraid to go there altogether. The presence of numerous aides too frightened to enter the mountain's realm greatly complicated Goold-Adams' efforts to climb it. The records compiled by Cavendish and Goold-Adams include references to some of the steps taken to assuage the genuine fear which those aides experienced at the mere thought of climbing the mountain. Although one by the name of Yeung who also acted as an interpreter for these two British travellers was a relatively young and intelligent man of approximately 25 years of age, he nevertheless showed himself greatly fearful at the thought of ascending the peak.

The interpreter Yeung was evidently in a desperate fright at going to the mountain, accounting for it by saying there was no joss-house on the top, and that although once upon a time a Korean did get to the top, yet the Spirit was so offended at his presumption, that he caused his neck (other accounts say his leg) to grow a yard longer! Yeung gave me a farewell letter to his wife to take down-country, thinking his last days were come, and his bones would be left on the "White Mountain." This letter I sent on to Mr. Stripling at Soul from Won-san, but I never heard if Mrs. Yeung received it.¹⁷

Yeung's desire to convey a farewell letter to his wife in Seoul through Cavendish sheds some light on the degree of fear which regular Chosŏn people must have felt when confronted with the thought of climbing Mt. Paektu. The story of the Spirit's taking umbrage at the fact that someone had dared invade the mountain's sanctuary was no longer a mere legend for Yeung. As such, he reacted with fear at the thought of abusing the mountain's inviolable sacredness.

Before taking leave of Goold-Adams in a village called Karim situated at the foot of Mt. Paektu, Cavendish saw his (Goold-Adams') aides gladly purchase some rice at an over-inflated price. This action in effect represented one of the measures which the Koreans took to overcome the fear emanating from the mere thought of climbing Mt. Paektu. They believed that the smell of the rice which they planned to offer the mountain would assuage the rage of its Spirit.¹⁸ A detailed description of the ceremony dedicated to the Spirit of Mt. Paektu can be found in Goold-Adams' records:

Before, however, we could sit down to our magnificent repast, the spirit whose domains we were invading had to be propitiated; for this purpose the rice had been brought. A miserable little pinch was cooked, spread out on the trunk of a fallen tree, and allowed to remain there for a quarter of an hour or so, until half cold; my men in the meantime (though professed Buddhists) standing in front, muttering, shaking their hands in Chinese fashion, and now and then expectorating. Their incantations finished, the rice was brought back to the fireside and solemnly eaten. They explained to me that the Spirit being such, could not eat rice, and only required the smell, so there could be no harm in their consuming this tiny luxury.¹⁹

This ceremony was performed by Chosŏn people because it would to some degree help mitigate the fear they would feel when they entered the world of the unknown.

Nevertheless, the fear felt by the aides became increasingly palpable as they drew closer to Mt. Paektu. To a man, those who accompanied Goold-Adams believed that bad luck would befall them if they invaded its sacred space. Goold-Adams soon realized that even the relatively better-educated Yeung shared the other porters' sentiment. Goold-Adams grew increasingly disgusted with Chosŏn people's perception when he heard one of his porters say, "you have seen the mountain, and surely that is enough; you cannot possibly want to go to the very top."²⁰ In his mind, these people's fears of Mt. Paektu were rooted in silly superstitions.²¹

Meanwhile, Cavendish was once again reminded of Mt. Paektu's mysteriousness when he had the opportunity to view it from afar on his way from Poch'ŏn to Wŏnsan.²² In his opinion, the sacredness of Mt. Paektu, which he believed flowed effusively from its slopes, had led to the creation of numerous legends and myths, and had also motivated those who worshipped nature to seek residence around its slopes. On his way back to Wŏnsan, Cavendish came across three different shrines. While visiting them, he realized that on 4 August of every year royal envoys dispatched by the Chosŏn king performed ritual ceremonies for the mountain god and to secure the influence of their monarch. He also learned that the mythical ancestor of Chosŏn had originated from Mt. Paektu. As such, this represented a good opportunity for Cavendish to reconfirm the sacredness of Mt. Paektu, and to gain some insight as to why this mountain so dominated the people of Chosŏn.

For the people of Chosŏn, Mt. Paektu was a divine and sacred space that remained outside the realm of humans. Its sacredness was further strengthened by the awe with which they approached the thought of invading its Spirit's realm. However, for Europeans such as Cavendish and Goold-Adams, Mt. Paektu was a natural force which humans could interact with and even incorporate. Looking at the fear expressed by Chosŏn people, these two British officers must have thought that they had been captured by superstition. However, their superstitious behaviour, as witnessed by the two Britons, can also be viewed as another element of Koreans' humbleness before nature.

Conclusion

Cavendish and Goold-Adams' accounts may be utilized as good sources with which to analyse how Europeans viewed hunting and climbing in Chosŏn during the final period of the 19th century. Although unable to capture the game they had originally sought, the catch and Chosŏn hunting methods recorded by these two British nationals represent a unique account. In addition, this book makes it evident that the magnificent and solemn atmosphere of Mt. Paektu overwhelmed all travellers, regardless of whether they were from the Orient or the Western world. However, it also exposes differences between the British and the people of Chosŏn in the manner in which they approached the mountain itself. This can be interpreted as a reflection of the differences between Chosŏn and Britain, or even East Asia and Europe, in terms of their perceptions of nature.

Cavendish's account includes observations about the history and folk customs of Chosŏn. In this regard, there is a need to conduct studies on how, and from which standpoint, he and his companions viewed the features of Chosŏn society at the end of the 19th century.

Notes

1. The official title and bibliographical information for this book is as follows: Captain A. E. Cavendish, F.R.G.S., 1894. *Korea and the Sacred White Mountain: Being a Brief Account of a Journey in Korea in 1891, together with an Account of an Ascent of the White Mountain by Captain H. E. Goold-Adams, R.A. with forty original illustrations and two specially prepared maps*. London: George Philip & Son.
2. The journey of Goold-Adams, who successfully climbed Mt. Paektu, was longer than that of Cavendish. Goold-Adams had originally planned to take a steamship from Wŏnsan to Tianjin. However, violent storms at sea forced him to head back to Seoul via an overland route. He arrived in Seoul on 19 November.
3. Here, the materials housed in the Changsŏgak (Jangseogak) Library of the Academy of Korean Studies and Seoul National University's Kyujanggak Royal Library can be regarded as representative examples.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
5. According to Cavendish, 104 leopard and tiger hides, as well as three actual tigers, were exported in 1890. Cavendish, 1894, pp. 97–98.
6. The book includes several examples of this. For instance, he was told that tigers and leopards were often trapped during the winter season in the plains that separated Anbyŏn from Wŏnsan (*ibid.*, p. 97); that a tiger had devoured some of the chickens belonging to Brazier, the customs officer stationed in Wŏnsan (p. 98); while on his way to Seoul from Wŏnsan, a Russian traveller had shot a tiger who was chasing after an old lady in a snowy field; and that officials from the Russian Embassy in Seoul sometimes saw leopards during the winter season (p. 203).

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 202–3.
8. *Ibid.*, 1894, p. 77.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 67, p. 77.
11. ‘Next morning at 1 a.m. it began to rain, and a steady downpour continued all day until 8 p.m. G.-A. shot two teal (?Baikal teal), large handsome birds, male and female; steel-blue bodies, wings dark blue lightening to azure blue, with the two longest feathers tipped with 1½ inches of white, breasts white, and beaks scarlet; the male had a chestnut crest, the female’s head was steel-blue without a crest’ (*ibid.*, p.114).
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 128–9.
13. Cavendish described his encounters with Chosŏn commoners and their lifestyles as being unpleasant. He also tended to view the behaviour and thought of the Chosŏn people who accompanied him in a most negative of lights. In this regard, the formal cultural experience that made the most profound impression on him was far and away the deer-drive in Changjin.
14. *Ibid.*, p.100.
15. Cavendish recorded 43 kinds of animals which he had seen in pelt or other form, as well as 26 other kinds of animals whose existence he had been able to confirm. *Ibid.*, pp. 205–6.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 153–4.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 156.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 163.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 166, p. 173. Consequently, while Yeung and a hunter followed Goold-Adams to the summit, the others stayed in a Chinese dugout on the way to the top.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 185.

TRAVEL ACCOUNTS OF A KOREAN ENVOY IN LONDON: YI CHONGŬNG'S *SÖYU KYÖNMUNROK*

KIM SEUNG-U

Introduction

This study introduces the *Söyu kyönmunrok* (西遊見聞錄 'Records of a Journey to the West', 1902), a work which consists of a *kasa* (歌辭, a traditional Korean vernacular verse form) of approximately 400 verses. Moreover, efforts are made herein to analyse the general characteristics of this particular work. The *Söyu kyönmunrok* was compiled by Yi Chongŭng (1853–1920), an individual who was dispatched by the Taehan Empire (1897–1910) in 1902 to take part in a diplomatic mission to London. Up until very recently, this manuscript had remained in the possession of Yi's descendants. However, the decision on their part to release his work, along with two related pictures, in conjunction with Queen Elizabeth's visit to Korea in April 1999, has resulted in Yi's works finally coming to the attention of scholars. The great interest which the *Söyu kyönmunrok* has attracted can be traced back to the fact that it represents a first-hand account of the experiences while in the West of a man who was both a government official and a member of the literati elite.

Yi Chongŭng's experiences as a member of the diplomatic mission and the background to the compilation of the *Söyu kyönmunrok*

Yi Chongŭng, who could trace his ancestry back 11 generations to King Chungjong (1488–1544), began to serve as a high-level official in the Sijongwön (侍從院, Chamberlain's Court) in 1896, a period which coincided with the reign of King Kojong (1852–1919).¹ The Sijongwön was the office in charge of preparing the king's costumes, meals, and medicines. It was around this period that Queen Victoria (1819–1901) of England passed away while in her 64th year on the throne, and was subsequently replaced by her first son who became known as Edward VII. Having established diplomatic relations with Great Britain in November 1883, the government of the Taehan Empire decided to dispatch a condolence mission to attend Queen



The congratulatory mission for the enthronement of Edward VII in 1902.

Back row: Kim Chohyŏn, H. Goffe.

Front row: Ko Huigyŏng, Yi Chaegak, Yi Chongŭng.

Victoria's funeral and a congratulatory mission to the enthronement ceremony for Edward VII.

King Kojong appointed Yi Chaegak (1873–?), a 4th-generation descendant of Prince Sado (1735–1762), to lead the mission, and selected Yi Chongŭng to serve as his assistant. Meanwhile, Ko Huigyŏng and Kim Chohyŏn were chosen to act as interpreters. As H. Goffe of the British Legation in Inch'ŏn expressed his desire to accompany the group in an advisory capacity, the mission eventually came to consist of five people. Although the official date of the enthronement announced by the British government was 26 June 1902, the mission, aware of the long voyage across the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans that awaited them, left for London on 7th April.

From the moment he was selected to take part in the mission, Yi Chongŭng began to compile records of all the matters related to the congratulatory mission in Chinese characters. To this end, he went to great lengths to ensure that he left behind detailed records of the process through which the mission was organized, the objectives of the diplomatic mission, the customs and landscapes of the various countries which the mission passed through on their way to London, his various observations while in London, and of the return journey to Seoul. The diplomatic mission returned to Seoul on 20 August 1902. On 1 September 1902 some 10 days after their return, Yi Chongŭng produced a summary of the records he had compiled during his 140-day journey, which he called the *Sŏsarok* (西槎錄) or records of a sea voyage to the West.

The *Sŏsarok* represents a valuable material with which to analyse the diplomatic relations of the Taehan Empire. However, the document which has most attracted the interest of researchers in the field of literature is the *Sŏyu kyŏnmunrok*, compiled shortly after the *Sŏsarok*. On 29th September, roughly one month after the completion of the *Sŏsarok*, Yi sat down and began to write the *Sŏyu kyŏnmunrok*, which constitutes an account of his experience as a royal envoy to London written in *kasa* form. Although the two documents essentially deal with identical contents, each has its own characteristics in terms of the language style utilized and the mood

which is conveyed. The *Sōsarok*, which was written in a Chinese prose style, was compiled in order to convey Yi's journey to London and his observations during the journey in an exact and realistic manner. Meanwhile, the *Sōyu kyōnmunrok*, written in vernacular Korean (*hangŭl*), represents a summary of specific elements of this long journey and an account of the author's personal thoughts and impressions. These differing characteristics are also evidenced in the following statement found at the end of the *Sōyu kyōnmunrok*:

In terms of the coronation of the British King in the West, I have merely *summarized what I saw and heard* while I was presenting our emperor (Kojong)'s royal edict. If I had *described what I saw and heard in a detailed manner*, this would have amounted for the most part to hearsay. Only one out of ten accounts perhaps has been properly and truthfully recounted. Although certain clerical errors may be found, the focus when reading this book should be on the general meaning which I was trying to convey.² (emphasis added by the author of this paper)

As we can see from the above quotation, the *Sōyu kyōnmunrok* represents a 'summary of what he saw and heard'. Meanwhile, the reference to the 'description of what I saw and heard in a detailed manner' found in the next sentence is more reminiscent of the *Sōsarok*. Although the compiling of records in the manner of the *Sōsarok* may have represented an effective method to convey information in a factual manner, this method would have resulted in a certain degree of miscellaneousness in the way the words were rendered, which in turn would have resulted in a high likelihood that the reader would be left with a sense that he was hearing an unreliable account (hearsay). To this end, Yi appears to have felt that a brief summary of the contents which he regarded as being important was necessary. In short, the *Sōyu kyōnmunrok* was written in order to recount his own experiences in a shorter form while describing matters in an open-hearted manner.



Yi Chonggŭng in official attire.

In fact, it was quite common for royal envoys dispatched to China and Japan during the middle and late Chosŏn periods to leave behind records of their journeys in the form of a journal written in traditional Chinese or as a *kasa*. As we can see from Yi Chongŭng's example, there were also some instances in which both styles were in fact utilized. The *kasa* works which contain the experiences of those who took part in royal missions have been regarded as falling under the category of earlier *sahaeng kasa* (使行歌辭), and heated debates have been held over the characteristics of such works.³ While the *Sŏyu kyŏnmunrok* can be regarded as a work whose roots are grounded in the *sahaeng kasa* produced during the Chosŏn dynasty, the mere fact that this particular account deals with a *sahaeng* to the faraway nation of Great Britain in Western Europe rather than to the traditional adjacent nations in East Asia makes this work one with a unique significance. While the presence of numerous ancient documents and other forms of literature pertaining to China and Japan meant that much was known about these countries, as late as 1902 very little was known in Chosŏn about Western European nations, including Great Britain, with the notable exception of the fragments of information provided by intellectuals from the Enlightenment Group. As such, the *Sŏyu kyŏnmunrok* has drawn attention because it not only exhibits the last ebbing of the Chosŏn-era *sahaeng kasa*, but also constitutes a description of a Taehan Empire diplomatic mission's experiences in the West.

The composition of the *Sŏyu kyŏnmunrok* and the descriptions found therein

According to the *Sŏsarok*, the diplomatic mission which participated in the coronation of Edward VII set sail from Inch'ŏn across the Pacific Ocean, before eventually reaching the American continent. Thereafter, they traversed the Atlantic Ocean before finally arriving in Great Britain. Their return voyage to Chosŏn was effected through southern Europe and across the Suez Canal and Red Sea, before making the trek home across the Indian Ocean.

As this diplomatic mission essentially became a trip around the world, the conclusion can be reached that various matters and situations were experienced. The *Sŏyu kyŏnmunrok* represents a rapid glossing over of this trip around the world. As can be seen in the table, with the notable exceptions of the short description of the author's thoughts and impressions with regards to his dispatch as a royal envoy to London found in the introductory section, and another section on his thoughts and impressions after having returned to Chosŏn, the *Sŏyu kyŏnmunrok* consists of a pattern of 'journey–observations–journey–observations'. In terms of volume, Yi tends to focus less on the journey aspect than on the descriptions of his observations. Metaphorically speaking, the *Sŏyu kyŏnmunrok* is characterized by a hectic cycle in

Verses	Number of verses	Main contents
1–10	10	The background to his dispatch to London as a royal envoy
11–30	20	Departure from Inch'ŏn
31–37	7	Journey to Japan
38–52	15	Observations in Japan
53–61	9	Journey to Canada
62–94	33	Observations in Canada and the United States
95–99	5	Journey to Great Britain
100–291	192	Observations in Great Britain (London)
292–341	50	Return journey to Chosŏn and observations 1 (France–Italy–Egypt–Ferghana)
342–407	66	Return journey to Chosŏn and observations 2 (Sri Lanka–Singapore–Hong Kong–China–Japan)
408–422	15	Thoughts and impressions after returning to Chosŏn

which the reader must scamper from one place to another, only to stop and look around for a moment before taking off again, with this pattern being most pronounced in the section dealing with the author's observations in London (verses 100–291). This kind of descriptive method was designed to include in a compressed fashion the tedious aspects of the journey itself alongside the landscapes and panoramas of the places which the mission travelled through. This is precisely why the *Sŏyu kyŏnmunrok* is conveyed to its readers at what appears to be a breakneck pace. In addition, this breakneck pace is further augmented by the narrative tone and literary expressions utilized by the author.

Waterfalls in this valley/waterfalls in that valley
 Waterfalls in ten different valleys/combined in a flowing main valley
 Cracking here cracking there/from the sky to the earth
 A banging sound hits the opposite shore/spreading out over the mountains and valleys
 A new world of divine landscapes/is finally witnessed today. (verses 73–77)

The above passage is a description of a mountainous landscape which the author gazed upon while travelling by train across the American West. It comes from *Yusan'ga* (遊山歌), a song about mountain excursions that was very popular at that time. Although the mountainous landscapes of the United States did not mesh entirely with the emotions conveyed in the *Yusan'ga*, which transmitted a free-wheeling and passionate feeling of amusement, Yi's work appears to have incorporated this sense of excitement and delight. The other sections of the *Sŏyu kyŏnmunrok* are also filled with instances in which memorable locutions and pleasant emotions are conveyed in lieu of elaborate descriptions of the landscapes of foreign countries and in-depth

analysis of their situations. This trait is most evident in the author's descriptions of his observations while in London.

According to the *Sōsarok*, the diplomatic mission arrived in Liverpool on 5th June, before heading for London where they stayed for about a month. Having had various experiences in the capital city, they began their journey back home, leaving England via Dover on 7th July. After meeting Edward VII at Buckingham Palace, the members of the diplomatic mission participated in an official welcoming reception and enjoyed dinner with the monarch on two separate occasions. Some of the other activities in which they partook while in London included a sightseeing tour of downtown London and visits to the zoo, a circus, and Madame Tussauds. They were also able to get a first-hand look at the advanced institutions and administrative system on which England's state organizations and government agencies were founded, through visits to places such as the British Houses of Parliament, the Bank of England, a prison, and fire stations. However, the sections of the *Sōyu kyōnmunrok* dealing with this period are limited to descriptions of the welcoming reception and dinners hosted by the British royal family, and of the entertainment facilities in downtown London. This omission of the observations made while touring in state organizations and government agencies almost makes it appear as if the members of the diplomatic mission limited themselves to touring the palace area and downtown London. To this end, while observations related to state organizations and government agencies should be described in an analytical manner, scenes such as the palace and downtown London lend themselves better to the use of a more improvised and sensuous descriptive style. This can be regarded as the reason for Yi's adoption of a selective approach to the observations used in his work. Meanwhile, the observations described in the *Sōyu kyōnmunrok* are rendered in a pleasant and convivial tone.

Roads are paved with stones/trees are planted along the streets
 Not even an ounce of dirt is found/this is the world we have dreamed of
 People coming and going/rubbing elbows along the way
 Double-horse carriages and single-horse carriages/endlessly coming and going.
 (verses 144–147)

Five and six hundred beauties/bloom their flowers
 They must be from fairy tales/or queens of *yaochiyuan* (瑤池淵)
 Their beautiful scents stimulate noses/and astonish the eye
 At the doors of the rooms on each floor/thunderous music springs out
 Magnificence and splendour/can this be heaven on earth? (vv. 212–216)

The first passage refers to the scene on the streets when Yi first arrived in London. The deep impression which the well-organized roads and vivid districts made on him is clearly evident in this passage. Yi was so smitten with the scenery of London from the moment he first laid eyes on it that he described its clean streets, which

he regarded as not having an ounce of dirt, as an example of ‘the world we have dreamed of.’ In the second passage, which describes the reception at Buckingham Palace, a similarly extravagant description is employed. While the British ladies he met during the dinner reception were compared to figures from fairy tales and legends, Buckingham Palace is expressed as heaven on earth.

The use of such a pace and exaggerated rhetoric can be regarded as the structural and descriptive characteristics of the *Sōyu kyōnmunrok*.

Conclusion

As can be gleaned from the analysis presented above, the *Sōyu kyōnmunrok* does not contain or reveal any deep understanding or analysis of the West. Three years after Yi’s visit to London, the diplomatic sovereignty of the Taehan Empire was stripped away as a result of the signing of the Protectorate Treaty of 1905, which was followed a mere five years later by the loss of national sovereignty at the hands of imperial Japan. Yi Chongŭng’s work has been criticised in some quarters for having omitted to conduct a proper analysis of the Western imperialist powers in the *Sōyu kyōnmunrok* or to raise his concern about his fatherland at a time when its very survival was in question. However, in order for such criticisms to be more persuasive, detailed and in-depth studies on the background and contents of Yi’s work should be conducted, with a comparative analysis of the *Sōyu kyōnmunrok* and *Sōsarok* being of prime importance. The advent of studies on this work conducted from the above standpoint will contribute to revealing the characteristics of not only the *Sōyu kyōnmunrok*, but also of related genres such as the poems and songs, and *sahaeng kasa* written during the modern Enlightenment period. In this regard, some aspects of the analysis carried out in the present study have been carried out as part of an effort to achieve these goals. To this end, more in-depth analysis will be required in the future.

Notes

1. For more on the genealogy of Yi Chongŭng’s family and the British-Chosŏn diplomatic relationship, please refer to Kim Wŏnmo, ‘The dispatch of the Congratulatory Diplomatic Mission to London and the Chosŏn-British diplomatic relationship (*Han’gukŭi yŏngguk ch’ukha sajŏldan p’agyŏn’gwa hanyŏng oegyŏ kwan’gye*)’, *Tongyanghak*, Vol. 32, 2006. Dankook University Institute of Oriental Studies.
2. *Syōyu kyōnmunrok* (西游見聞錄), *T’ongjŏng* (通情).
3. These various characteristics were discussed in Ch’oe Kanghyŏn, *Korean Travel Literature (Han’guk kihaeng munhak yŏn’gu)*. Ilchisa, 1982.

A LOCAL INTELLECTUAL'S PERCEPTION OF THE WEST AS VIEWED THROUGH THE *HAEYUGA*

KIM YUN-HEE

Introduction

The *Haeyuga* (海遊歌) is a rather lengthy travel *kasa* written by Kim Hanhong (1877–1943) during the Enlightenment era. This work, believed to have been compiled in or around 1908, was first introduced to scholars by Professor Pak Nojun in 1991. The areas covered by the author during his six-year trip are not limited to Korea, but also include Japan and the United States. To this end, there is a need to pay attention to the fact that this work represents the first travel *kasa* in which the American landscape is described. Given the circumstances that prevailed at that time, the mere fact that the author was able to make his way to the United States is nothing short of remarkable. Even more astounding in terms of the history of Korean literature is the fact that he recorded his experiences during this voyage in the traditional Korean vernacular verse form known as *kasa*. This period was a particularly dark one in the tragic history of Korea, a period marked by the growing encroachment of Japanese imperialism and subsequent usurpation of national sovereignty. To this end, the author's anguish and agony over these historical realities come across very clearly in this book. Kim Hanhong did not undertake this trip in the capacity of a royal envoy or armed with an official title or rank; rather, he was a simple *hyangch'on* (local village) intellectual who resided in the countryside. Therefore, his perceptions, which come across very clearly in his work, were rooted in a relative sense of freedom and subjectivity. The present study consists of a review of the general characteristics of the *Haeyuga* based on existing studies, and of an analysis of local intellectuals' perception of the West at the beginning of the 20th century carried out through a perusal of the aspects of the Western world reflected in the particular work.

Travel route and the direction of consciousness

Kim Hanhong was 31 years old when he compiled the *Haeyuga* in 1908, a work which he completed after a six-year voyage. His travel route can be broken down to

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the domestic portion of his trek (Seoul–Chinju–Pusan), his travel abroad (Pusan–Japan–Hawaii–San Francisco), and the return trip (San Francisco–Japan–Pusan–home). While his journey to Japan began in 1903, he then stayed in Hawaii for most of 1904–5, before spending three years in San Francisco. As such, the great majority of the entries found in the early sections of the work deal with scenes experienced by the author while travelling around his homeland. This journey across the country enabled Kim to form an in-depth perception of his motherland's devastated reality. To this end, his awareness of the state of ruin in which his country now found itself was accompanied by deep feelings of resentment and grief. These emotions, formed prior to the onset of his overseas journey, are continuously embedded throughout the breadth of this work. Resentment and hostility towards reality and a desire for a new world served as the motivation behind the narrator's decision to travel to the West. When a literary licentiate by the name of 'Ch'oe' whom he met during his trek within Korea recommended that he travel to the United States, Kim accepted his recommendation without hesitation, and headed for America. The significant amount of grief and resentment that had built up inside him as he traversed his native country were suddenly channelled into this desire to experience a new world. His trip within Korea was punctuated by his repetitive criticism of the state of affairs, and his great inspiration to 'participate in society'. Such a stance was possible because he perceived reality not from the standpoint of a government official, but rather from that of a contemporary intellectual. Thereafter, he arrived in the United States via the port of Pusan and Japan.

During the final period of the Taehan Empire, Western civilization began to be rapidly introduced into Chosŏn as part of the Enlightenment policy. To this end, the United States was regarded as having achieved a relatively more advanced civilization, and a remarkable one at that. Therefore, the main impressions of the West reflected in Kim Hanhong's eyes must be regarded as those of admiration and wonder. His experiences in the United States unfolded in Hawaii and San Francisco. However, having already been bowled over by the wonders of advanced civilization during his stop-over in Japan, his impressions and emotions while in Hawaii do not come across as strongly. His stay in Hawaii was further dampened by the heart-wrenching news of the signing of the Protectorate Treaty of 1905, a development which so engulfed him with grief that he decided to quit his job in Hawaii and move to San Francisco. The kind of descriptive attitude he employed can be regarded as reflecting his tolerant perception of Western civilization occasioned by his sorrow and grief at the ruin of his own country. In other words, his perception of the world was closely related to his concerns and worry for his motherland, thus revealing the sense of agony felt by a Chosŏn intellectual who perceived securing the basis of his existence as a greater priority than experiencing a new world.

The events in San Francisco are depicted in a manner that betrays a more profound

experiencing of Western civilization. For example, Kim praises the advanced civilization of the United States through detailed descriptions of facts such as the absence of a monarchical system and the relative equality of the people. However, whenever he ponders about his own native land, a strong sense of resentment begins to permeate his writing. These feelings of resentment and indignation become even more apparent following his return to his hometown via Japan. The sections of the *Haeyuga* written following his return to Korea are characterized by stinging criticism not only of the brutality and atrocity of Japan, but also of the incapability of the Chosŏn government and its officials. This particular situation can be explained by the augmented sense of grief and mourning which Kim must have felt when gazing upon the state of ruin into which his homeland had fallen following his return from his stay in the West. As such, his perception of the rapidly changing West at the outset of the 20th century is one which oscillates between astonishment and grief. Let us now take a closer look at how this intellectual's experiences and grief were expressed through the literary genre known as *kasa*.

Literary Mode of Expression

(a) *Realistic expression of experiences*

Much like the great majority of travel *kasa*, the *Haeyuga* is filled with detailed descriptions of Kim Hanhong's observations during his journey. While the domestic journey constitutes the main theme of the first part of the work, the author adopts a more formalized and detailed approach to his descriptions of his journey to Hawaii via Japan. Here, additional attention is paid to his perception of the West, and to the descriptive expressions of his perceptions, which constitute the main focus of this study.

The most in-depth descriptions of Kim's perceptions of Western civilization can be found in the section of the work dealing with his experiences in San Francisco. In that particular section, which appears in the latter part of the work, the author conducts what amounts to a 30-verse comparison of American civilization, institutions, customs, and traditions with those of his own homeland. The description of America as a new world betrays his strong sense of astonishment. His gaze upon the advanced nature of aspects of America such as philosophy and thought, culture, economics, education, and its institutions is one filled with a profound sense of envy. He also pays special attention to the actual features of the United States, which he regards as standing in stark contrast to the situation in his motherland during the final period of the Taehan Empire, such as the development of a democratic spirit, economic growth, the advent of strong military power, a modern education system, and the social welfare system, all of which he describes in a detailed manner.

All the classes are equal, easy for everyone to follow their own path in life/all laws are regulated in a manner which facilitates commercial activities
 ... even in the tall buildings rules are fairly applied/fairness, honesty, customs, and fairly applied laws
 ... carriages and freight cars are transported in an organized fashion,
 no wanderers in sight.

Looking at the above quotation we can see that the author describes how, unlike the situation in his homeland, the United States does not have the social status system known as the *sanong kongsang* (scholars, farmers, artisans and tradesmen), and how the transparent nature of the regulations related to commerce greatly facilitates the task of conducting economic activities. The author also describes how fair laws are employed even in tall buildings, and marvels at the organized manner in which the transportation system characterized by carriages and freight cars is operated. His sense of astonishment reaches a crescendo with his use of the expression that this kind of place cannot even be compared with imaginary spaces such as Yama Loka or Bodhisattva World. Thus, we can grasp the extent to which the horizons of Kim's perceptions were expanded as a result of the sense of freshness and incredulity which he felt when gazing at the Western world.

A subjective gaze that is based on a sense of grief for his own country has been incorporated in Kim Hanhong's perception of the West, a perception that is contrasted with the devastation afflicting his homeland. In other words, we can surmise that embedded in the author's evaluation is a sense of grief that unlike the United States, which has been able to achieve astonishing development, his own country never got such an opportunity because it lost its sovereignty just as it started to open its doors to the outside world. As such, we reach the the conclusion that although on the surface the author's experiences are presented in a formalized and realistic manner, they are also inherently laden with a deeply engrained perception of the reality in his own country. This becomes even clearer when we analyse the section written following Kim's return home from his journey abroad, and the deep sense of grief he experiences when confronted by the reality of his homeland.

(b) Expression of subjective resentment

Another aspect of the *Haeyuga* which should be commented upon is the fact that there are several sections in which Kim Hanhong's experiences are formalized through the expression of subjective emotions. These, such as the sense of resentment he feels when faced with the grim reality of his own nation during his domestic travels; the sense of anguish he experiences during his journey to the United States because of his grave concern for his nation; the feelings of anger and hostility he senses building up within himself during his stop-over in Japan on the way home; and the

sensations of disillusionment and condemnation which he feels towards domestic politics following his return home, are expressed in a detailed manner throughout the ebb and flow of the journey. One example includes:

Vexatious, the loss of national sovereignty in the year of Ŭlsa/abolition of diplomatic legations
 Whom can I appeal to/overcome with deep grief and resentment
 In a hurry to pack my luggage/must board at night and reach my next destination.

This section describes the author's feelings while in Hawaii upon hearing that his country's national sovereignty has been usurped. His inability to overcome the deep sense of grief and resentment that has welled up inside him is expressed in a most desperate fashion. His sense of utter helplessness occasioned by an inability to find a place to appeal to over his nation's situation, and the profound resentment created by such a void, are described in the most vivid of fashions, as is his decision to pack up and leave for San Francisco. What's more, upon his return to Chosŏn, he laments the reality of his nation's ruin, while contemplating the question of, 'how did we wind up in this situation'. Furthermore, the expression, 'what have the government officials done to cause this situation' symbolizes the sense of indignation which Kim feels towards the incompetent government officials whom he blames for having caused the downfall of his nation. Thus, such feelings of resentment and grief permeate the *Haeyuga* in its entirety. The fact that the early and latter sections of the work are connected by these feelings of resentment and grief at the domestic reality only serves to further heighten its literary completeness. Of course, Kim Hanhong did not suggest any measures which could be used to resolve these problems; rather, his work can be regarded as a literary critique of contemporary reality which formalizes its grim aspects through the use of subjective space.

Conclusion

Travel *kasa* have been an integral element of Korean classical literature since the 16th century. While the majority of these works have been related to domestic travels, new civilizations and journeys, as well as cultural experiences, emerged as important elements of such literary works from the 20th century onwards. Viewed from this standpoint, although the *Haeyuga* was created within the traditions of existing travel *kasa*, the combined presence of the author's experiences pertaining to foreign civilizations and cultures, and his perception of historical realities, can be regarded as marking an expansion of the width and depth of the traditional travel *kasa* genre. The *Haeyuga* was created at a time of great turmoil in Korea, a period marked by the growing spectre of Japanese imperialism over the Korean peninsula and the Enlightenment policy. The significance of the formalization in *kasa* of the

experiences encountered in the United States and Japan can be perceived as lying not only in the broadening of the author's own perceptions, but also in his subjective analysis of the domestic situation. Most travel *kasa* related to the Western world came in the form of *sahaeng kasa*, which were essentially formal accounts of the experiences of royal envoys during their journeys to other countries to conduct official duties, rendered in a literary style. However, as the goals and motivations for the *Haeyuga* were very personal, Kim's gaze at the West and his own nation is in many ways relatively freer than those of his predecessors. Such a process has also made it possible to subjectively describe the resentment felt at the ruin of the nation, and to criticize this most unfortunate of realities. Given the volume of this particular literary work, the results of the present study can be regarded as being relatively minor. To this end, attempts should be made in the future through the use of more detailed and thorough analyses, as well as comparisons with other travel *kasa*, to identify the characteristics of the *Haeyuga* which render it a uniquely 20th-century travel *kasa*.

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PERCEPTIONS OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION AND LITERARY MODES OF EXPRESSION IN NEWSPAPERS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT PERIOD: EDITORIALS AND POEMS PUBLISHED IN THE *TONGNIP SINMUN* AND *TAEHAN MAEIL SINBO*

LEE HYUNG-DAE

Introduction

This study analyses the perceptions of Western civilization found in modern newspapers during the period 1880–1910, while also tracing the flow of the relevant literary modes of expression. More specifically, it focuses on the *Tongnip sinmun* (獨立新聞 ‘The Independent’) and *Taehan maeil sinbo* (大韓每日申報 ‘Korean Daily News’). Various debates and discussions have been carried out in the fields of historical studies and journalism alike on the theories of civilization and modernization that emerged during this period, as well as on the perceptions of Western civilization reflected in the media outlets of the day. However, to date, no study has been conducted which has attempted to analyse the perceptions of Western civilization, and the civilization and modernization theories which emerged during the Enlightenment period, from the standpoint of works produced in the classical poetry field of Korean literary studies. To this end, an attempt is made herein to conduct a preparatory analysis of national newspapers during the Enlightenment period in order to identify the general perceptions of Western civilization during this era, while also assessing how these perceptions of Western civilization were reflected and expressed in such literary works.

The perception of Western civilization reflected in the *Tongnip sinmun* and the move towards the transplanting of Western civilization

The forced opening of Chosŏn by Japan in 1876 also had the effect of bringing about the incorporation of the Hermit Kingdom into the capitalist world order. Amidst

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the jostling for positions of influence over Chosŏn being waged by the surrounding powers, Western civilization came to be perceived as an immensely powerful entity, with various modernization-oriented measures established as a means of overcoming the crisis occasioned by the growing encroachment of the Western powers in Asia. At the risk of oversimplifying matters, the main positions adopted in the 1880s by advocates of modernization with regards to the acceptance of Western civilization can be divided into two categories. These can be identified as the group led by the Chosŏn government which called for a continued focus on Confucianism and the acceptance of Western science and technology, or what can be called the 'Eastern ways Western technology (*tongdo sŏgi*)' approach to modernization. Meanwhile the other group, which advocated notions of civilization, was led by those at the forefront of the *Kapsin* coup of 1884. This latter group assumed the position that Western civilization was a universal concept, and as such focused their efforts on imitating and transplanting Western civilization into Korea.¹ To this end, while the former position was clearly reflected in the *Hansŏng sunbo* (漢城旬報) and the *Hansŏng chubo* (漢城周報 'Hansŏng Weekly', October 1883–July 1888), the latter stance held sway over at the *Tongnip sinmun*.

The compilation of the *Hansŏng sunbo* and *Hansŏng chubo* was carried out by an agency called the Pakmun'guk (博文局, Office of Culture and Information), and more specifically by government officials such as Nam Chŏngch'ŏl and Yŏ Kyuhyŏng. These Confucian scholars from the moderate branch of the Enlightenment group regarded the European nations as having achieved national prosperity and military strength, advanced human knowledge and wisdom through their can-do spirit, achieved cultural renewal, and as having explored universal principles as well as the properties of nature.² They also perceived the European nations as being civilized and superior to all other Asian nations but Japan in terms of their politics, institutions, academic theories, culture, and economies. These individuals also reprinted articles and editorials that had first appeared in Chinese and Japanese newspapers in which the origins of the development of Western civilization were analysed. Such articles claimed that the prosperity of Western nations was rooted in the notion of *sirhak*, or more to the point, in the combination of practical learning and science and technology that made it possible to communicate through telegraph wires, travel by steamship, enhance military power, and to develop all kinds of devices using chemistry. Moreover, they also emphasized the need for Western Learning, pointing out that while Asian countries continued to worship impractical fields of studies, these Western nations had seized the opportunity presented to them and achieved national prosperity and military strength; which had in turn allowed them to subject Asian nations to atrocious humiliations.³ Furthermore, although Confucian scholars currently regarded the study of Western Learning as being a shameful act, these two newspapers continued to adhere to a standpoint which combined a belief in the

importance of science and technology with the notion that everything originated from China. To this end, they argued that such scholars would be ashamed of the fact that they did not study Western Learning if they were to uncover the simple truth that this particular school of thought in effect had its origins in Chinese Learning.⁴ As such, we can surmise that the *Hansŏng sunbo* and *Hansŏng chubo* had a positive perception of the materials aspect of Western civilization, such as in terms of science and technology and institutions, and believed that modernization should be brought about by accepting Western civilization based on the notion of Eastern ways combined with Western technology.

Conversely, the *Tongnip sinmun* (April 1896–December 1899) exposed a deep-rooted belief in the universality of Western civilization and in the need to discard the absoluteness of Confucianism. Thus, in addition to calling for the acceptance of Christianity, which it regarded as the source of Western civilization, the newspaper also believed in the need to transplant the West's modern political systems, cultures, and customs as well as the technological aspects of its civilization. In other words, a comprehensive assimilation of Western civilization became perceived as the most urgent task with regards to the establishment of a modern nation-state. The *Tongnip sinmun*'s position has generally been understood as having been rooted in Chosŏn's first-hand experience of the power of Western capitalist civilization in the form of the victory of Japan, which had already accepted Western civilization, during the Sino-Japanese War. Moreover, this perception was also heavily influenced by the fact that pro-American intellectuals such as Sŏ Chaep'il and Yun Ch'iho, who had experienced Western civilization first-hand through their studies in the United States, were the main actors involved in the publication of the *Tongnip sinmun*. To this end, the motto of the *Tongnip sinmun* was civilization, military strength, and the independence of Chosŏn, and the editorials which appeared in the *Tongnip sinmun* regularly claimed that Western nations had already achieved their mottos. In this regard, the United States was represented as the ideal model of a civilized country. Although only rarely, the *Tongnip sinmun* did from time to time focus public attention on Western powers' imperialist encroachments on weaker states, and urged the government of the Taehan Empire to pay close heed to the moves being made by these Western powers.⁵ Nevertheless, it perceived Western nations as being the model for a universal civilization, and used ideological rhetoric to depict these nations in a positive light. For example, based on the degree of civilization achieved by a particular state, the *Tongnip sinmun* classified the Western nations into civilized countries (England, the United States, Germany, France, and Austria), modernized countries (Japan, Italy, Russia, Denmark, and the Netherlands), semi-modernized countries (Chosŏn, Qing, Thailand, Persia, Myanmar, Turkey, and Egypt), and barbarian states. It claimed that, 'a civilized country establishes laws and regulations, governs the state in a transparent and fair manner, provides freedom to its people, and maintains a level of stability and

prosperity that is comparable to the Yao-Shun (堯舜) Era'.⁶ The United States and European countries classified as being civilized were described as possessing a state system under which the democratic management of the state and human rights were guaranteed.

In addition, the *Tongnip sinmun* also introduced the state management strategies adopted by the so-called 'civilized' countries. To this end, while England was described as a country whose predominant naval power had allowed it to seize control of the seas and to exercise great influence over trade, and as one which was now pursuing the furthering of common interests through the continuation of the *status quo*, the United States was depicted as a country with no territorial ambitions. Described as a paradise, the US was said to rule the public based solely on the rule of law. Moreover, if an island in the Pacific Ocean desired to become a subjugated state, the United States would instead push it towards independence. What's more, it was a country willing to come to the rescue of any weak country invaded by a stronger neighbour, and this even if it meant that the US had to incur great human and economic costs. As such, these two countries were described as just and righteous countries.⁷ However, the inherent limitations of the *Tongnip sinmun's* perception of Western civilization and of its assessment of the international political situation become evident when we consider the fact that this period was one in which these imperialist countries were in reality engaged in a fierce competition with one another to expand their colonies.

Having adopted the United States and European nations as the model of an ideal civilized country, the newspaper went to great lengths to stress the urgent need to accept and transplant all aspects of these relevant countries into Korea, such as their religions, political and educational systems, customs, public health structures, and security systems. Therefore, the poems included in the *Tongnip sinmun* expressed in a clear fashion an optimistic view of a future world in which an independent Chosŏn has achieved a civilization similar to that of the civilized Western countries.

If you raise the national flag in the air/it will shine the world over and even overwhelm
 China
 Of all the independent countries, our independence is the best/
 America's customs and England's strong laws
 Take lessons from these countries/make efforts to establish the best country in the
 world
 Independence for all ages, generations, and for eternity
 (Pak Kiryŏm's *Aegukka*, *Tongnip sinmun*, 1 August 1896)

The above poem consists of a hopeful discourse in which Korea is regarded as having the potential to surpass China and become the world's best nation if it secures independence by achieving civilization and military strength through the learning of US customs and the strong laws of England. However, this kind of poem, which

was written from the standpoint of the other and based on a predetermined future, and although only a slogan, one that is devoid of reality, can be regarded as a form of Orientalism, in that the long historical traditions of the Korean nation are regarded as an illusion or those of a barbarian civilization. This was also the case in another poem, ‘Wake up, wake up from this 4,000 year-old dream’.⁸

The *Taehan maeil sinbo*’s perception of independent civilization and realistic expressions of Western imperialism

The efforts of the radical faction of the Enlightenment group, which had advocated the comprehensive acceptance of Western civilization at the expense of oriental traditions, were effectively dashed with the dissolution of the *Tongnip hyŏphoe* (獨立協會 ‘Independence Club’). It was at this juncture that the civilization theory was reformulated in editorials written by reform-minded Confucian scholars such as Chang Chiyŏn and Pak Ŭnsik of the *Hwangŏng sinmun* (皇城新聞 ‘Capital Gazette’, September 1898–September 1910). The core objectives of the *Hwangŏng sinmun* were to reveal a new approach to the acceptance of Western civilization, which was to be conducted through interactions designed to restructure and reinterpret the theory of Western civilization within oriental traditions, or conversely to interpret the oriental traditions based on the theory of Western civilization.⁹

The civilization strategy adopted by the *Taehan maeil sinbo* (July 1904–August 1910) and reform-oriented Confucian scholars such as Yang Kit’ak, Pak Ŭnsik, and Sin Ch’aeho can also be understood as both a compromise and an interaction between Western and oriental civilization. The *Taehan maeil sinbo* was founded at a time when Japanese encroachment on the Korean peninsula was at its zenith. This newspaper reached its apogee during the period in which Japan secured its supremacy over the Korean peninsula and began its full-fledged attempt to subjugate its neighbour, a period which commenced with the onset of the Russo-Japanese War. It hit another high in popularity in the aftermath of the actual incorporation of the Taehan Empire into the Japanese empire following the Protectorate Treaty of 1905. This period was also one in which the Patriotic Enlightenment Movement, whose objective it was to restore national sovereignty through the education of human resources, was at its peak. Therefore, amidst such circumstances in which the fate of the state was at stake, the *Taehan maeil sinbo* found itself being more focused on the internal dynamics of civilization than on the external imitation of Western civilization. This claim is supported by a look at Mun Ilp’yŏng’s *Theory of Civilization*.¹⁰ According to Mun, the energy of civilizations rotated like the sun, and this energy had originally emanated in the Orient before moving westwards to create what is now Western civilization. Therefore, as Chosŏn’s rites and music were well developed and had at

some point been more advanced than those of China, and its public strictly abided by the five moral imperatives (*oryun*), Korea would someday have the chance to create its own civilized world. Thus, the most important factors in the civilization process were education and enlightenment designed to awaken the latent national spirit. To this end, the main thing that Chosŏn should learn from Western civilization was the education needed in order to inspire the national spirit and patriotism. For example, Bismarck's implementation of an elementary school educational system contributed to the cultivation of the German spirit; Mazzini's focus on youth education had inspired the Italian spirit; and Washington's independent nature had inspired the US spirit of independence. Thus, based on these lessons, the *Taeahan maeil sinbo* adopted a strategy which called for the acceptance of Western civilization through education related to new knowledge and Western laws.¹¹ In other words, although the acceptance of Western civilization was tolerable, what mattered more was the internal motivation of the actors who accepted such Western civilization. Moreover, such acceptance should eventually result in the realization of an independent nation-state. The logic developed by the brains trust of the *Taeahan maeil sinbo* has been regarded as being connected to the emergence of the resistance-oriented nationalism sought in the struggle for survival after Korea was confronted with the brutality of Japanese imperialism.

Therefore, the aspect of Western imperialism captured in the poems included in the *Taeahan maeil sinbo* is not that of a Western civilization viewed through rose-coloured glasses as an ideal model, but rather the achievement of its objectives through the expansion of its military power.

Looking at the international scene, we can see that the Western powers have a tendency to favour imperialism. Some of these powers have decided to manufacture armaments and battleships this year. Others have established a provisional budget to be used next year to expand their military forces and military supplies as part of their preparations to launch wars designed to secure new colonies. Meanwhile, Korea is rife with spies. This situation is deplorable. (Commentary on current issues II, *Taeahan maeil sinbo*, 1 May 1910)

The narrator in the above article, whose tone is dark and woeful, is thoroughly focused on reality at that time. In depicting the tragic situation in Chosŏn he contrasts hordes of spies actively walking around even as Korea finds itself under the influence of a Western imperialism concentrated on preparing for wars designed to secure colonies, and under the military thumb of Japanese imperialist forces. Without making use of any specific literary rhetoric, the narrator manages to provide a realistic description of the general situation at that time. Although not quoted here, the *Taeahan maeil sinbo* also published other poems which made use of satire—some of which compared the imperialist powers to kites, wolves, or coyotes—to remove the mask of civilization and reveal the actual face of the imperialist powers.

Conclusion

Although this study has carried out a general analysis of the perceptions of Western civilization and literary modes of expression reflected in contemporary newspapers during the Enlightenment period, certain regrets persist. While a micro-level analysis of individual periods and media outlets would have revealed various differences and flows in terms of the perceptions of Western civilization, as well as with regards to the characteristics of the literary modes of expressions and aesthetic results linked to these perceptions, such an exercise has not been carried out in this presentation. This remains as a task for the near future. The full scope of the modes used to express the Western civilization reflected in Korean poems and literature will be exposed when comparative studies of the perceptions of Western civilization as reflected in traditional literary genres such as the *kasa*, Chinese poems (*hansi*), and short lyrical poems (*sijo*) produced during this period are carried out.

Notes

1. Chu Chino, 'The formation and establishment of civilization and modernization theories during the late 19th century (*19 segi huban munmyöng kaehwaronüi hyöngsönggwa chön'gae*)', in Institute of Korean Studies, Yonsei University, *The Acceptance of Western Culture and the Drive for Modernization (Sögu munhwaüi suyonggwa kündae kaehyök)*, T'aehaksa, 2004; Kim Tohyöng, 'The development of civilization and modernization theories during the early period of the Taehan Empire (*Taehan cheguk ch'ogi munmyöng kaehwaronüi paljön*)', in *ibid.*
2. '各國近事: 亞細亞洲總論', *Hansöng sunbo*, 8 March 1884.
3. For more on the *Hansöng sunbo* and *Hansöng chubo*, please refer to Kim Minhwan, *History of Korean Journalism (Han'guk öllonsa)*, Nanam Publishing, 2005; Ch'a Paegün et al., *The 100-year History of Korean Newspapers (Uri sinmun 100 nyön)*, Hyönamsa, 2001; Kil Chinsuk, 'The implications of the theory of civilized-uncivilized worlds as reflected in the *Tongnip sinmun* and *Maeil sinmun (Tongnip sinmun Maeil sinmune suyongdoen munmyöng/yaman tamnonüi üimi ch'üngwi)*', in Korea Cultural Research Institute, Ewha Woman's University, *The Acceptance of the Concept of Knowledge during the Enlightenment Period and Changes Therein (Kündae kyemonggi chisik kaenyömüi suyonggwa kü pyönyong)*, Somyöng Publishing, 2005. The passage above was cited from Kil Chinsuk's paper.
4. '私議: 廣學校', *Hansöng chubo*, 11 October 11 1889.
5. For example, see 'The emergence of a crisis', *Tongnip sinmun*, 17 June 1899. 'The degree of Western encroachment in the East has so increased over the past 10 years that we are rapidly approaching a crisis situation in East Asia.' The newspaper also introduced reports first published in Western papers to the effect that Western powers such as Russia, Germany, England, Italy, France, the United States, and Japan intended to conquer China and carve it up amongst themselves, arguing that, 'although this situation is occurring in China, it is closely related to the crisis surrounding the very survival of the Oriental world'.

6. 'Country Rankings', *Tongnip sinmun*, 23 February 23 1899.
7. 'The strategies of countries around the world', *Tongnip sinmun*, 27 February 1899.
8. Yi Chungwŏn, 'Tongsimga', *Tongnip sinmun*, 26 May 1896.
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ECONOMY OF LOVE AND GRATITUDE, OR WHY DO ELDERLY SAKHALIN KOREANS CARRY ON SUPPORTING THEIR ADULT CHILDREN AND GRANDCHILDREN?¹

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This article is about love, help and compassion. It provides an account of inter-generational support that goes against the widely publicised and encouraged practice and understanding of filial piety (Sung Kyu-taik, 2005); it goes against the image of the elderly as a dependent, passive generation waiting to be helped; and finally it calls for a wider approach to the problem of inter-generational exchange of support in Korean society.

When elderly Sakhalin Koreans were finally allowed to return to South Korea, I expect few people, apart perhaps from they themselves, considered the impact of the repatriation on the relationship between generations and the possible exchange of support and care. When I began my research in September 2005 I expected the main question to be the provision of care by the children. However, contrary to stereotypes of inter-generational relationships and filial piety in Korea, it turned out that one of the main issues that the elderly were dealing with at the time was the provision of support for their children and grandchildren. This I thought demanded some attention. In the article below I am going to present some of the narratives that I collected during my fieldwork, and possible explanations for this pattern of exchange. However, before I present my argument, allow me to provide the reader with some background information about this little known community.

Brief history of migration and repatriation of the Sakhalin Koreans

Most Sakhalin Koreans are descendants of the Koreans who were forced to move to Sakhalin by the Japanese from the second half of the 1930s up to the end of the Second World War. In the early part of the mobilization the men were encouraged to sign a two-year contract to move and work on Sakhalin in the coal mines. However at

the end of the two-year period they were still needed in the mines and most were not allowed to return to Korea. They were, however, allowed to bring some members of their families over from Korea to Sakhalin, for example parents or siblings. During the second part of the mobilization, particularly towards the end of World War II, the men were simply forced to go to Sakhalin. By 1945 approximately 150,000 Koreans were moved to Sakhalin (Choi Ki-Young, 2004; National Folk Museum of Korea, 2001).

At the end of the war Japan withdrew from Sakhalin, control of which it had lost to the Soviet Union, but most Koreans were left behind on the island. This was mainly due to two factors. First of all, the Soviet Union, exhausted by the war, needed the labour force and was not eager for the Koreans to leave, so it blocked the repatriation of Koreans and initially also of the Japanese. The second factor was the attitude of the Japanese government towards its former citizens of Korean descent. While during the late 1940s Japan made an effort to repatriate ethnic Japanese people from Sakhalin, it claimed that Koreans lost their Japanese nationality in accordance with the Cairo Declaration (Choi Ki-young, 2004), and Japan held no responsibility for their welfare. The additional difficulty was that many of the Koreans became stateless people: no longer Japanese citizens, with no Korean passports, especially after the Korean War, and often unable or unwilling to obtain Soviet citizenship.

The Koreans on Sakhalin, but also Koreans in Japan, campaigned for repatriation to Korea. However despite many efforts, permanent repatriation only became possible in the 1990s, and even then it was permitted only for the select few. It was only in the late 1990s and in the year 2000 that a larger group of 1352 Sakhalin Koreans was allowed to return to Korea. Their repatriation was co-funded by Japan and Korea. While the Japanese Red Cross paid for the cost of the travel from Sakhalin and the building of the apartment complex near Seoul where some 900 Sakhalin Koreans settled, the Korean government provided the land on which the apartments were built and the living allowance that the Koreans received. Crucially for my research, despite the efforts made by the Sakhalin Koreans, only the first generation, in other words only the elderly people, was allowed to return to Korea permanently.

What is understood by the first generation in this case has not been static. Initially these were only people born up to 1935, but at first, when it was discovered that only the first generation was allowed to return, people were reluctant to move away from their families in their old age to what now seemed like a foreign country. As a result the first generation was redefined to include people born up to 1945—this means that some of the now middle aged and elderly children of the forced labourers were allowed to settle in town an hour's train ride from Seoul. However, once the whole apartment complex was filled with people, the first generation was redefined again, and now it again includes people born up to 1935. While only the elderly were allowed

to move to Korea permanently, the children are allowed to visit for a maximum of 3 months at a time (or 1 year if the elderly require care).

The community

In South Korea, Sakhalin Koreans live in a dedicated apartment block an hour from Seoul. The apartment complex is designed for some 900 people and consists of eight accommodation blocks, administration and a community centre, where music classes, concerts, health checks and other events are organized on a regular basis. The apartments are designed for two people, and are quite comfortable. The elderly receive a living allowance from the Korean government. During my fieldwork a couple was receiving an equivalent of \$700 per month, and a single person received \$400, which taking into the account the cost of living in Korea is not a lot of money, especially in winter when the heating bills go up. Despite that, some elderly manage to provide substantial support for the children and grandchildren left behind on Sakhalin, which is what I am going to discuss in the article.

I cannot watch her suffer

It was a cold January Tuesday, but the usually empty administration building was full of people. Elderly women wrapped in woollen shawls brought over from Sakhalin, men with warm hats or caps on their heads.² They were queuing at the weekly money exchange, organized by one of the Korean banks. They were waiting to buy dollars. It was a good time to do so, as the American currency was at its all time low, but why did they need dollars? The few younger people present, depending on the stage of their visit, were either selling dollars in order to have some money while waiting for the first pay cheque, or they were buying dollars to take or send home. But why the elderly? Winter was not a time when the elderly usually visited Sakhalin. Who on earth would want to go there in winter??

In this queue of people I came across one of my best informants, Grandfather Dmitri (73).³ “Selling or buying?” he asked. “Just checking the exchange rate”, I said, “and you? Not going to Sakhalin are you?” “No, no, no. I’m just buying dollars to send to my granddaughter in Moscow. To buy, what you call it ... a printer.”

Later that day we sat down in the deserted *noin bang*, and carried on talking about the granddaughter. She was the pride and joy of Dmitri’s life. She was so smart and clever, and whenever they would see each other on Sakhalin she would spend so much of her time with him. Dmitri said:

You know, these dollars that I bought today, I will send them to Russia through my wife’s sister. She is currently in Seoul, working in a shop, but she will be going to Sakhalin soon.

So we'll send the money through her. I have three children, two sons and a daughter, but I guess I help the daughter and her daughter the most. I mean, take the granddaughter. She is studying in Moscow, in one of the best universities in the country. I know that she is studying very hard, and that life in Moscow is very expensive. And you know, now in Russia some people are very rich, but not my granddaughter. So when I imagine that other female students are dressed in new, fashionable clothes, and my girl can't afford to buy a new scarf or whatever, my heart bleeds. It hurts to imagine such a thing. So I have to help her! Besides she is smart. If she was not smart I would not help her. Why would you help a stupid person? The last time we talked she said that she needs to buy a printer, so that's what I will help her to do.

Being generous was considered a virtue by elderly Sakhalin Koreans. The term was used to praise children and people, and questioning somebody's generosity also spoke of condemnation and moral decay. People would disapprovingly say, "Since we moved here people became stingy", and then follow this with a story. In the case described above we can see that Dmitri is behaving like a good person, like a good grandfather should. But the force that appears to activate his generosity is not just rational consideration of what it means to be a good grandfather but love for his granddaughter and a compassion for her situation. Compassion was an argument frequently used by my informants, both male and female, to justify their actions—it was out of compassion that they helped, it was out of compassion that they moved away, finally it was out of compassion that some were planning to return to Sakhalin. Only sometimes were formal rules described, but then usually it was within a discourse of tradition and how things were in the past. Compassion served both as a mechanism and motive for being generous, as well as justification of one's action.

The notion of compassion, and worrying about others, though particularly children and grandchildren, was ubiquitous. It was explained to me that it was only natural that parents should worry about their children, adult or not, as even if they are doing well something is always going on, either at work or at home; and it was natural for children to worry about their parents, though less so than parents worried about them. Again this was seen as to be expected, by both generations, as the children by now had their own children and often grandchildren to worry about.

But in fact decisions regarding support at times of need are not based on empathy only. What I observed among Sakhalin Koreans was that within the same narrative both empathic, emotional, care-based arguments and very rational, justice-based arguments would be used. For example in one case elderly parents helped their wayward son (he had a gambling problem, and lost two apartments due to gambling debts, including the apartment left to him by his parents): out of compassion for the grandchildren, but after a prolonged discussion, the decision was made to help him buy a mechanical digger with which he could learn to earn a living and value work, rather than to help him buy a flat. Similarly, Grandfather Dmitri (see the narrative

below) distributed help not only according to how much love and compassion he felt for his children, but according to how much he saw his children as deserving or in need of his help. No matter how much he loved his children, he did have a definite idea of what a fair division of help was.

Compassion itself can also be seen as rational and growing out of life experience, as well as immediate emotional engagement and closeness with the people obtaining support. After all only a fool, after a long life experience, would not be able to understand such and such struggles, for example of providing for a whole family. That awareness translated itself into a certain pattern of action and obligations. Or as Grandfather Dmitri put it, “if you know that your children are hungry, you have to help them.”

Compassion does not happen every time simply out of a good heart. It would be a mistake to think that decisions based on compassion are not in some way rational. Psychologists have shown that in fact emotions and especially empathy and compassion are invaluable in making such decisions (Pizarro, 2000). Emotional responses, just as values, are after all shaped to some extent by the culture within which one lives or is brought up (for example see Lutz, 1986; Lutz and White, 1986), and within a particular context make a lot of sense. The same happens with compassion. Emotions are evaluative not only as reaction to particular situations but also as part of a moral discourse (White, 1990). Similarly, compassion is not just about feeling for the other, but also evaluating his or her situation in a wider context. Compassion is in fact a very complex concept as it combines elements of emotions, evaluation and a moral value. This makes it very rich in meaning, both within discourse and everyday practice.

Distribution of help—justice, common sense, need and love

Grandfather Dmitri continued:

I have three children but I give the daughter the most. I mean last year, me and my wife, we gave about 8,000 dollars to the children. Out of that I gave \$5,000 to my daughter. My oldest son was a little upset that I gave her so much. He thought it was unfair. That was because his son also went to the university in Moscow and he wanted me to recognize that the grandson was also a clever child. He wanted me to give the grandson some money “*na dorogu*” (for the journey in Russian). So I gave him \$1,000 to shut him up and keep the peace between him and the other children. My oldest son is a very rich man. He owns a business of his own and earns a lot of money. He told me that he spends \$2,000 a month on utility bills alone, so you can imagine how much he is making. But he wanted money for the grandson! But it is my daughter who needs our help most. She is a nurse, and her husband died, and she is bringing the granddaughter on her own. She works so hard, but nurses earn a pittance and she is poor. So we help her. And her older brother helps her from time to time too.

My youngest child, also a son—well he is a bandit that one. He just can't keep a job. He worked in the factory where I used to work, but that was closed down, and since then he does not have permanent work. He works in one place, then he gets bored and leaves it. And he's got a small child. He is not responsible at all. When we left Sakhalin for good, I left him our house and a new car. And guess what he did—he smashed the new car, last year, and nearly killed himself! Why should I help him if he cannot manage what he already has got? During my last visit I gave him \$1,000. I could have given him more, but he would just drink it all or spend on some stupid stuff. He should learn how to work!! Well, you know, in secret I actually also left a \$1,000 with the oldest son, for the youngest one. So when he comes begging for help, he does not go hungry. But I don't want him to know about that money, or he would just demand it all at once!

Fair distribution of support (and gifts) can be a headache, as there are competing notions of what 'fair' means, and at the same time giving support is one of the few avenues opened to expressing one's love for one's children over a long distance. In the example above Grandfather Dmitri wished to distribute his support according to the notion of fairness based on need and deserving. It was not left unchallenged by his eldest son, who although not in need, thought that he also had a claim on his father's help. That the son's reaction was not unique or unexpected, can be judged from the fact that women planning gifts for their children and grandchildren would try to be as supportive to each person in equal measure: thus some felt guilty that they were only able to buy a computer for one set of grandchildren and not the others, while another elderly woman would buy the same fishing equipment for all her sons, even though only one was mad about fishing. The jealousies that unequal distribution provoked were as much about the things given as about the parent's love. And yet at the same time, monetary support was usually distributed towards the child (or other kin) in greater need, even though parents usually claimed to love all the children the same.

However, support was given not only when it was needed. Sometimes it was given out of what was seen as a kind of morbid common sense. 'You can't take it all with you' was almost a mantra with which people justified the giving of support. Grandfather Chung (75) argued:

Me and my wife—well we manage to save about 200, and sometimes 300 dollars per month. We are old and we do not need much. Pretty much the only thing that we buy is food. We saved enough money to pay for our funerals, and to pay for the children to come to the funeral, there is also some money set aside for medical costs. So why else would we keep more money? It does not make any sense. I could die tomorrow, and I can't take it with me. So it is better to give it to the children, even though they protest at our gifts. At least they can put it to some good use, spend it on the grandchildren or something.

Grandfather Dmitri put it more succinctly:

There was this old man here. And he needed an operation. So one year he spent 10,000 dollars on his operation, but next year he needed another operation. He had cancer, or something. I don't know. He wanted to live so much. But after 6 months he died anyway. And I think it was stupid and wrong for him to spend so much money on himself. It would have been far better if he gave it to his children. After all, at this age you can't expect to live for a long time after an operation. I would never do such a thing as he did. I would rather give the money to the kids. In any case, didn't he know how hard it is to live on Sakhalin?

Care and reciprocity

I thought that perhaps people were actively helping their children because they were expecting some form of reciprocity, particularly care, in the future. However, this turned out to be more complex than that. Again Grandfather Dmitri provided me with an interesting insight:

My wife still works, I only stopped recently. Last year I was still working. I stopped because I'm old. How long can you work for? I decided that I needed some rest. Maybe I'll find some work later on. It is lucky that I am still quite healthy. My wife complains of joint pains, but still works. That's good. That keeps her busy and keeps her moving. But others here! You don't see them. Sick, old people hiding in their flats. They don't go out anymore. I keep telling all the guys to learn how to cook. Some don't even know how to cook rice! What will they do if their wife dies? There are some widowers here, and some don't know how to cook. Who will look after them? Will the children come over? What are they thinking of expecting the children to come over and look after them. The children have their own lives, their cares, their own children. They can't just drop everything and come and boil some rice! Me and my wife, we had a serious conversation about the future. I mean, what future? All of us could die just the next day. But anyway we talked and we agreed that if one of us dies, then the other should return to the children. You can't expect them to come permanently here, and they would be worried. In any case, when I get really old, I don't want to go to the nursing home. It is like the army there! Get up at 7, eat at 8, go to the loo at 9! I don't want that. If I live to be really old I will go back to Sakhalin and live with my eldest son. Even before we came to Sakhalin he was asking me to move from the village to Yuzhno-sakhalinsk, to live with him. He is rich, he can afford to look after us. In any case it is natural that he should look after us. It would not be strange to him, as his grandmother (my mother), lived with us almost throughout our married life.

Grandfather Dmitri was by no means exceptional in that he kept supporting his children. Many men and women of his age group did. He was, however, quite exceptional in that he openly expected his son to be willing to look after him. Most elderly were very adamant in stating that they did not want to be a burden on their children and did not want to be looked after. At least not until the last, final days, as

after all it would be nice to have your children by your side as you die. People were afraid that if their children had to look after them, this would mean some deprivation for the grandchildren, also it was recognized that care is very difficult to combine with full time work. Moreover, it was firmly stated to me, if they remained on Sakhalin or elsewhere in Russia, they would not be able to live on their retirement pension, and would have to ask their children for assistance. And not just once in a while but every month. That, I was told by some people, would be unbearable.

In South Korea, while the trend for living separately from your children is growing (Kweon Suk In, 1998:187), it is very much the children who are expected (especially by the state) to look after their elderly parents. This is officially justified by the state as part of Korean Confucian tradition of filial piety, but I suspect is just a strategy for solving the problem of elderly care, in the rapidly greying Korean society. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that most South Korean elderly, unlike the Sakhalin elderly, do not receive a retirement pension. Filial piety and the care for the elderly, in Korea is often discussed and expressed in terms of reciprocity (Janelli, 2004; Sorensen, 1988; Prendergast, 2005). While people might no longer refer to the reciprocity for the 'gift of life', but rather reciprocity for care received as children, some argue that the idea of looking after the elderly as part of reciprocal relations remains strong, although the prospect of inheritance is also not without its influence (Prendergast, 2005). Sakhalin Koreans seem to turn this on its head. Not only do many of the younger elderly continue giving more than they receive, for the most part they do not expect their adult children to reciprocate. They wanted the children to express their gratitude, but other than that the money—as most help took the form of money—was simply to be used wisely. The giving was very much about being compassionate and generous, rather than in anticipation of future care. Even in the case of Dmitri, who after all did expect his eldest son to look after him (or at least be ready to do so), he expected care from the child to whom he gave the least: after all it was the youngest one who received the family house, and it was the daughter who received most of the current help. Here the expectation of care was built on something completely other than reciprocity. In part it could be portrayed as tradition—as after all he was expecting care from the eldest son, in part it was seen as a natural thing to do—as this is what the man grew up with, and finally he was financially the most capable of the three children to provide care. The notion of reciprocity did not enter the calculation at all.

Contrary to that argument, however, I did encounter the view that duty and reciprocity was part of everyday life, and to some extent part of the inter-generational exchange. Some people, though very few, were planning to return to Sakhalin later on in life, precisely in order to receive support from their children, and they would refer to the idea of reciprocity and duty when justifying this, rather unusual for

the settlement, position. However inter-generational reciprocity also had another dimension that was not directly expressed in the language of duty.

Grandmother Lara (69), one of my closest informants and in a way my adopted grandmother, was planning to return to Sakhalin. She would certainly return after her husband's death. She loved her husband dearly, but he was in his mid-80s and she knew that she would outlive him. She would go mad, living here all alone. In any case she wanted to return to Sakhalin while she could still be useful for her children:

You see I miss them. I want to go there, and cook for them. (*Lara was an amazing cook.*) I want to help them with everyday things. I am old, and sick, but while I can do something for my children I want to be able to do that. So that when I am really old and sick my children will love me. I do not want to return to Sakhalin when I am no longer of any use to my children and grandchildren. They would accept me of course, but it is difficult to love a person who was absent for a long time, and then suddenly returns and expects love and attention.

There are several important points here. One is that contrary to now classic writing on the gift (e.g. Mauss, 1990) reciprocity is expected to work within a relatively short period of time. Usually when inter-generational relations in traditional Korean society are presented in terms of reciprocity, there is a considerable time delay involved between the time when both children and parents need a lot of assistance, as after all it takes time for the children to grow up, and the parents to grow old (Sorensen, 1988). The second, in my view more important point, is that what one is dealing with can almost be called economy of gratitude and love. It is gratitude and love that is expected in return for help, more so than any material return (see Candace Clark, 2004 and Hochschild, 1989). And it was the breach of the economy of gratitude that sometimes caused a conflict between generations, rather than lack of material reciprocity.

The gifts and help from the Sakhalin elderly were not so much a part of reciprocity, as they were a part of remaining in their children's and grandchildren's everyday life and retaining their memory and love. The gifts maintained the relationship, nourished it. The aim of the gift was not some future exchange, but the person who received it (Ledeneva, 1998; Frow, 1994), though that of course depended on the people and the gifts involved. One has to recognize, that apart from being an element of compassion or exchange of support within a family, as described below, the generosity of elderly parents had another aspect, namely that giving was a great source of satisfaction and sense of self worth (Kim Hye-Kyung et al., 2000). I was told on several occasions that the adult children objected to the parents' work and gifts. The elderly were chided—"you should rest!" But nonetheless they continued to work (see also MacKinnon, Gien and Durst, 2001).

The elderly provided all kinds of support. Some gifts were seen simply as gifts—

to make people happy, and to make sure they remembered about each other. But other gifts took the form of the provision of support. Even money took on different meaning depending on the circumstances. Sometimes it was simply seen as gift, especially if the receivers did not need it, or it was given to grandchildren as a reward for being good students. But sometimes the money given by the elderly was a matter of survival for the recipients, and in such cases it was also deemed by the elderly as natural and obvious that they, provided they were capable, should help. Such assistance from parents to adult children is not uncommon in Russia, where parents support their own children long after the children set up their own families (David Anderson, 2004:20) and the senior members of the family (especially in urban areas) are expected to sacrifice themselves in order to support the younger ones (Caldwell, 2004). The ethos among the Sakhalin Koreans (and one that is also reflected in literature on Russia, for example see Barsukova, 2006) was that the person who is in need should receive help from the person who is capable of giving help, particularly a family member, with no reciprocity expected where it could not be given. At the same time people did feel somehow obligated and certainly grateful for the help received. But once a person was seen as capable of doing something for others, it was seen as very wrong for him or her to refuse to help. One of my younger informants who was a carer deeply resented the fact, that he, as the most successful of his brothers and sisters, helped them out throughout his life, with no expectation of reciprocity and very often out of his own initiative, but now that he needed some help his siblings refused to cooperate, even though by now they could make an effort.

Assistance especially among kin is and was also important in Korea (Kim Hogarth Hyun-key, 1998; Sorensen, 1988; Brandt, 1971; Chun Kyung-soo, 1984; Prendergast, 2005; Kendall, 1996), and parents in South Korea do carry on helping their adult children to some extent, especially in the early part of their married life. The difference between past and present was that in the past for the most part mutual assistance was exchanged within the patrilineage, and now the importance of affines is growing (Kim Song-Chul, 1998). Sakhalin Koreans also involved all types of kin in their network. I was told that on Sakhalin, in the beginning there were so few kin, that every kin, no matter how distant, from whichever side of the family, became very important, but when explaining their generosity to their adult children they would argue that they do it because this is how it is in Russia. There, in Russia, the grandmothers were supporting the grandchildren 'for ever'. When Asian tradition was mentioned (and it was called by them the Asian tradition), it was to argue that elderly parents continue to support their adult children because the Asian tradition encourages dependence—'that children should not become independent as soon as possible, as American children do.'

However despite the fact that a lot of the younger elderly helped their children, and that it did fit into the expected and accepted mode of behaviour, it was not seen

in terms of duty. Elderly parents, I was told by one of my informants, “do not have a duty to help their children. Your duties to your children are to raise them, educate them, marry them off and help establish a household. But by the time you are old, that is already done. So you do not have any duties to your children.” This view was not unexpected. But what surprised me was the view expressed by the elderly Sakhalin Koreans, that the adult children do not have any duties towards them, because everything (assistance with hospital visits, some very limited household assistance, etc.) has been taken care of by the administration of the settlement. The only duty that was explicitly expressed was for the children to attend the funeral of the parents. Or sometimes I was told that it is important for the children to live well and be good people, that this was their duty towards their parents. One may argue that by stating the lack of practical duties of children towards their parents, the elderly absolved them from condemnation, as due to the distance between them it was very difficult to provide any sort of assistance. I was inclined to think that this rather reflected a very practical and pragmatic approach to life. It shows how changing circumstances and therefore changing needs impact on ethical norms: you do not expect or demand help where it is not needed. I was told by some people that on Sakhalin, while there were very few inter-generational households, the children were expected to help their parents when the parents needed help. And yet in the context of other conversations it became apparent that the elderly had some very practical problems on Sakhalin—for example bringing coal to heat their flats, removing the snow or simple lack of money. So regardless of the expectation, not all the elderly were helped by the children. This again was not necessarily seen as a shortcoming on the part of the children, but rather a result of internal migration on Sakhalin and the fact that the children and their partners were very busy working and looking after their own families.

Tradition, obligation and change

Grandfather Dmitri:

My father died very long time ago, when I was a young man. But my mother lived for a long time, and most of the time she lived with us. I am the eldest son you see, and in the past it was the tradition among Koreans that the eldest son should look after the parents and all other members of the family. Anyway, as I say, she lived with us for most of the time, and she died in my arms. Why most of the time and not all the time?? Well, that was her own fault!!! You see, when I got married, and my wife moved in, my mother was still running the household. So me and my wife, well—we gave her all our earnings. Every month we would give her everything. But there never was enough money in the house! When I wanted to go out for a drink with the lads, I asked her for money—and there never was any. I did not understand what was going on?? At that time I earned a decent salary, so did my wife. I finally lost patience when one day there was not enough

money for me and my wife to go to a cinema. Cinema at that time was very cheap! It was the cheapest form of entertainment. So I confronted my mother! And you know what the truth was?? There was not enough money for us, because she kept giving our money to all my siblings, who by then had moved out from the house! I said—why on earth should I be supporting them? They are adults, they are working! That is enough! From that time onwards I gave all my money to my wife, and told her to run the house. Very soon there was enough money for everything, for example for a scooter. My wife is an excellent housekeeper. But my mother felt insulted. And so after a while she moved to one of my brothers, then one of my sisters. She would stay a while with all of my siblings, but at the end she came back to us. That is because my wife was very kind to her, and we looked after her the best!

You know, after all these years, I wanted to combine *chesa* for my father with that of my mother. It is a lot of work, especially for the woman of the house, to prepare everything. But my wife would not allow that. She did not want to insult the spirit of my mother. You have to respect your parents, you have to remember them. Even if all you put on the table is a glass of water.

It would appear, then, that mothers helping adult children (both sons and daughters) were not just a fairly recent phenomenon brought on by the shortages around the period of *perestroika* and afterwards (as some of my informants said), but something already existing in the Sakhalin Korean community relatively early on. Dmitri's mother probably never learned to speak Russian properly and her contact with the culture would have been limited. It could be argued that in helping all her children she was doing what the household of the senior brother is supposed to do—help all the siblings, and after all she was running the household of her eldest son. The idea that the eldest brother should help his other siblings was something that the parents of my elderly informants encouraged, but something that some of the eldest brothers resented, and as one can see sometimes rebelled against. Which brings me to the question of how much force specific moral prescriptions such as 'help your siblings' or 'help your parents' have. Here what I want to point out is that within everyday discourse of a good life and moral values, particular situations will be evaluated from different points of view and using different moral discourses, and so the obligation to help siblings will be balanced and limited by the obligation to support one's own family. Or in other situations claims to help will be made on various grounds—if the 'language of duty' does not work, the 'language of compassion' should. People might challenge certain norms, they might reinterpret them *et cetera* in order to adapt them to the changing reality of life. But at the same time, people do come to accept the responsibilities that come to them with their position.

While the notion of choice, negotiations and reinterpretation of kinship is quite popular among modern studies of kinship, particularly related to obligations between various members of the family (Strathern, 1992), choice does not always seem to be an option. One summer evening I accidentally met with Grandfather Dmitri as he

was walking to a PC *bang* (internet café). While I knew that he had a computer and enjoyed playing computer chess I was quite surprised to see him on his way to an internet café:

It is because of my nephew, he explained. You see my nephew, he asked me to register him on an internet game. He wants me to get him a password. It is really strange but you need a Korean ID number in order to be able to obtain the password. Anyway I did that, and I even bought a mobile phone so that they could send it to me (and I don't need the mobile for anything else). And I gave my nephew the password and he tried to log in, but it does not work. Do you have any idea why? I spent so much money on that—I had to buy a mobile, then I had to go to the PC *bang*, so much money! But I could not say “no” to my nephew you see. After all an uncle is an uncle!! I could not say no. Especially as I am the senior uncle of the family.

The example with the computer game is perhaps a trivial one, but the problem of obligation is not. That people do negotiate their obligations, interpret them in different ways and finally sometimes refuse to meet them is obvious, but that does not mean that obligations do not have a certain power. If they did not, they would not have to be negotiated nor would the refusal to meet them cause condemnation and conflict, though that of course would depend on the particular obligation involved and its context.

Conclusion

No single explanation can be given as to why elderly Sakhalin Koreans continue supporting their children. Even within a single case study one can explore different possibilities. What I wish to show is that when discussing inter-generational exchange of support in Korean families one needs to move beyond the themes of reciprocity and children supporting their elderly parents. The practice and reasoning behind exchange of support, particularly one provided by the older generation, is more complex than merely reciprocity and duty, although these also feature in the discourse.

What deserves further attention is the role of emotions in arguments concerning everyday morality. Emotions, being less bound by talk of rules associated with the language of duty, provide a flexible tool with which to practise kinship in a changing world. Moreover I believe that the role of emotions in exchange of support is not a recent phenomenon in the Sakhalin Korean culture, but can be traced back to pre-war Korean society. Just as it is argued in the film *Unreliable People*⁴ that Koreans living in Kazakhstan managed to preserve ancient songs and some old linguistic forms, it could be argued that Sakhalin Koreans display practices that come from pre-war Korean society, and are not merely influences of the Russian or Soviet culture, though of course Soviet culture did have an impact. Proving this point, however, would require further research.

At the same time, I would argue, duty cannot be disregarded as a force in exchange of support, but what has to be remembered is that duties too are subject to circumstances and change. One has to recognise then that both duty and emotions play a role, and interplay with each other, in the practice of being a good parent and child.

Finally, what the generosity of the Sakhalin elderly repatriates illustrates is the balancing of the relationship with their children over a large distance, and the use of distance itself in managing their cares and obligations towards family members remaining in Russia. The distance is used to limit not only the extent to which the elderly have to help their children, as it is more difficult for the children to claim the help of their parents when they are out of sight and a long distance away, but also to limit the extent to which the children have to help their parents. At the same time generosity is maintained in order to demonstrate the attachment between family members, to maintain a distant presence and to allow for a demonstration of love. That is a matter of choice and one that goes beyond people's notions of obligation and duty. This makes the generosity much more powerful than everyday assistance between kin that is both taken for granted and cannot be refused.

While the elderly argue that the children have few if any obligations towards them, they are aware of the fact that towards the end of their days, they might either need a lot of help financing their health care, or in fact they might need day to day assistance from their children,⁵ whether on Sakhalin or in Korea. Being cared for by their children demands risk and sacrifice, be it on the side of the elderly or the children, as it either means that children are risking their work and family life on Sakhalin by spending extended periods in Korea, or that the elderly have to move back to Sakhalin, and have to give up their flats, pensions and the company of their peers in Korea. It is also inevitably linked to being a burden. Through their generosity, and use of distance, the elderly manage the economy of love and gratitude in such a way as to lessen the impact of being a burden on themselves and on their kin, yet at the same time secure love as well as care.

Notes

1. This article would not be possible without the generous support from the Korea Foundation.
2. Sakhalin Koreans maintained that this is how you can tell them apart from local South Koreans. South Koreans were deemed not to wear hats in winter, whereas Sakhalin Koreans did, because this is what they were used to on Sakhalin.
3. Russian pseudonyms are used through out. Just as it is common for Korean students to use English names when studying in the UK, the Sakhalin Korean elderly had Russian-use names, with which they would introduce themselves to me. Russian names were also used by

the elderly in conversation with each other. In fact sometimes they would know the Russian names of their friends, rather than the Korean ones. The interviews were carried out in Russian.

4. Chung, Y. David (dir). (2006). *Koryo Saram—The Unreliable People*. A documentary film about the Soviet Koreans in Kazakhstan. Directed by Y. David Chung, filmed and edited by Matt Dibble, Executive Producer Meredith Woo.
5. Among the Sakhalin Koreans it is particularly the daughters, and not the daughters-in-law, that take on themselves caring for their parents in their old age. If sons look after their parents, they look to their sisters for help, rather than their wives, as a woman's loyalty is seen as first to her own parents, and only then to parents-in-law.

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FROM ETHNICALLY-BASED TO MULTIPLE BELONGINGS: SOUTH KOREAN CITIZENSHIP POLICY REFORMS, 1997 TO 2007

YOUNG JU RHEE

Introduction

In today's increasingly interconnected world, citizens and non-citizens residing in nation-states are struggling to balance their increasingly fluid sense of belonging in and out of territorial and cultural boundaries. Nation-states strive to address these issues with mixed success. South Korean citizenship has evolved from an exclusive, specifically highly ethnicized and politicized form, to a more inclusive policy at least at the legislative level. There are still major challenges to South Korea becoming an inclusive society toward its diversifying population. This research examines the effectiveness of ethnically-based citizenship policies in the contemporary world by focusing on the impact of the legislative changes to South Korean citizenship between 1997 and 2007 on its citizens and non-citizen residents. To explore this, I will provide an overview of the citizenship-related legislation following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, particularly the 1997 and 2005 amendments to Korean Nationality Act¹, 1998 Aliens Land Act, 2002 Domicile Notification Act, and 2005 Overseas Korean Act, and its impact on my case study groups. The two case study groups, the overseas Chinese (*huaqiao*²) and Korean-American (*chaemi kyop'o*) residents of South Korea, though each a very small population, have been specifically chosen for this research because they exemplify the different principles of the *jus sanguinis* (blood-based) versus *jus soli* (birthplace-based) definitions of citizenship in South Korean society.

This paper shows that despite recent changes in legislation, three major obstacles persist to reform. Foremost, while claiming to address the root inequalities in access to citizenship, the government initiatives for reform are motivated by a neo-liberal policy orientation in order to position South Korea to better compete in the global economy. This has resulted in legally unfounded legislation that has been inconsistent in implementation by the national and local government. Secondly, public bias based on ethnic conceptions of citizenship and who is a member predominates. There

continues to be preferential treatment toward co-ethnics, particularly for *chaemi kyop'ŏ* with the privileges of 'quasi-citizenship'³, while the marginalization of the *hwaqiao* community and other non-ethnic Koreans persists. Thirdly, immigrant understanding of citizenship increasingly focuses on the material advantages citizenship confers rather than viewing it as an exclusive relation between the individual and the state. Hence, this study shows that while legislative progress has been significant, there is a disconnection within and between government initiatives and public cultural norms. This reality presents a disjuncture between citizenship as an ideal as conceived in law or status and how it is practised by its state, citizens, and non-citizens.

Ethnically-based Citizenship Policies

A series of national and transnational political changes since the 1970s has generated a growing interest in the study of citizenship. Large-scale post-war immigration and the need to integrate a large and often growing resident population of third country nationals created pressure for nationality law reform in many Western countries. The essential liberal-social rights versus civic republican approach to citizenship provides the basic framework for theoretical citizenship debate, particularly on balancing issues of rights and duties. Works on ethnically-based citizenship are more readily available as comparative studies of countries in Europe. These show the evolution of nationalism, nation-state, and citizenship, and that in the past it was common among western liberal states to have based its citizenship on the *jus sanguinis* principle. Today, such states have progressed to a combination of *jus sanguinis*- and *jus soli*-based citizenship. There is an abundance of literature on the emergence of multi-cultural societies, particularly on post-national forms of citizenship, neo-liberal-based theory being particularly relevant to the orientation of this paper (Ong, 2006; Brysk and Shafir, 2004; Delanty, 2000). Citizenship studies specific to South Korea and Asian countries unfortunately are still limited but there exist works on South Korean citizenship by Chulwoo Lee (2005, 2007), Jeong Inseop (2004), Seungsook Moon (2005), and Sungmoon Kim (2007), which have established important groundwork in this field. While this paper focuses on formal citizenship given that it is beyond its scope to discuss both the formal and substantive citizenship aspects in depth, the importance of citizenship as a process and not just an outcome should still be noted. The struggle to gain new rights and to give substance to the existing ones is seen as being as important as the rights themselves.

South Korean migration history shows that it has primarily been an emigration country. With the exception of the *hwaqiao*, only since the early 1990s has the demography of South Korea diversified ethnically, with approximately 1.28% non-ethnic Korean foreigners in 2007. In South Korea, ethnicity takes the form of 'territory nationality' through which its citizens view themselves to be an ethnically


homogeneous population that belongs not simply to a distinct ethnic group, but to a distinct nation or nationality due to historical circumstances (Brubaker 2004:148). It is therefore important to establish an understanding of South Korea's claim to ethnic homogeneity as this has been the premise to its highly exclusive and ethnically-based citizenship policies. While contested amongst scholars, ethnic homogeneity is widely assumed by the general public in both North and South Korea, and most Koreans do not question its validity. Some scholars even insist that Korea is one of the few 'one-ethnic nation-states (*tanil minjok*)' in the world as the Han ethnic group comprises over 98% of its Korean population (Diamond and Kim, 2000:27; Paek Namun in Pang, 1992:124; Lim, 2006:236). Other scholars (Grinker, 2000; Pai, 2000) argue that one cannot assume that Koreans' ethnic composition is so homogeneous. In either case, from a modernist or constructionist approach, Korean national identity based on ethnic homogeneity should be understood, as in the case of other countries that demonstrate this, as a product of particular historical processes and nation-building. Myths of its origins, experience of colonialism, civil wars, and fast industrialization can be some of the historical processes that tie South Korea's conflated sense of 'one race'⁴ to its nationhood (Shin, 2006:3). Whether constructed by the state or driven by the general public's cultural notion of 'one race', the belief in ethnic homogeneity continues to have real social and political significance. This belief has allowed its past closed borders,⁵ and its stringent citizenship and immigration policies are reinforced by the biased perspectives of the general public against non-ethnic Koreans.

The question is then whether South Korea, given that such *jus sanguinis* norms are strengthened by the feeling of territorial nationality based on ethnic homogeneity, will be able to move toward a citizenship policy that is a combination of *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* principle. After all, there is a general trend away from ethnically selective toward non-ethnic universalistic immigration policies across Western liberal states (Joppke, 2005) that recognizes and tries to address the socio-economic realities of immigrant populations in their host states. This trend is also emerging in some Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea through significant legislative reforms, given that their market economies cannot be sustained without accepting foreigner workers, both skilled and unskilled (3-D jobs).⁶ However, it is unlikely that South Korea will go to the extent of liberalizing its immigration, citizenship or naturalization laws in order to re-define membership into a more universal form in the near future. To exemplify this struggle, the following sections describe two case study groups, the *huaqiao* residents and *chaemi kyop'o* residents in South Korea, to show the actors and issues that are barriers to the legislative reforms.

Case Study Group I: Overseas Chinese Residents in South Korea (*huaqiao*)

Korea’s rapid development process as a modern state has had a significant impact on the relationship between the *huaqiao* residents and South Korea. There are approximately 40 million overseas Chinese worldwide, estimated at a net earning worth 500 million US dollars, and over half of them reside in Southeast Asia (Pieke, 2004). Known for their strong sense of heritage, many *huaqiao* have identified more strongly as Chinese than with their host state, creating tensions even in multi-cultural societies, particularly evident in Malaysia and Indonesia. It is interesting to note that the *huaqiao* in South Korea are the exception to having the economic power that other *huaqiao* have been able to amass around the world. Hence even before discussing anti-*huaqiao* discrimination within South Korea, it is important to point out that the *huaqiao* of South Korea are in many ways alienated from the rest of the *huaqiao* community throughout Asia. This is primarily due to the fact that amongst the approximately 21,806 *huaqiao* (0.04% of the total population)⁷ in South Korea, a majority are from Shandong (90%), followed by the Jiangsu and Zhejiang regions. Shandong is in the northern region of China and they speak a very different dialect from the more southern region-originating *huaqiao* (Guangdong region among others) who are predominant and closely networked in Asia as well as throughout the

Figure 1: Demographic Change of the Huaqiao in South Korea.



Source: Annual Yearbook of Immigration Office, Ministry of Justice of Republic of Korea (1985–1994), (1995–2005)

world (Jeong Yongrok, 2002).⁸ Given ethnicity is a unifying factor for the network of *huaqiao*, a different language really sets the *huaqiao* of South Korea apart.

As with any minority group, the population change of *huaqiao* shows that they were susceptible to the changing economic and political circumstances of the Korean peninsula. The turbulent Korean history can be noted through, for instance, the dramatic fall of *huaqiao* population between 1940 and 1945, from 63,976 to 12,648 when the economic hardships during the Japanese colonization and clashes with Korean people were particularly difficult for the *huaqiao* community and many migrated. Since many *huaqiao* from North Korea migrated to South Korea just before the division of the Korean peninsula in 1953, the numbers increased slightly but decreased again during the beginning of the Rhee Syngman administration (1948–1960) due to its marginalizing policies against this population (Park and Park, 2003:19). It is estimated that there were as many as 82,661 in 1942, however this population has steadily declined, resulting in a decrease of more than fifty percent from the 1940s to 1970s. It is interesting to note that this minority *huaqiao* population decreased despite the overall prosperity that came about during the period of the 1970s and 1980s. Interestingly, though 21,806 are registered as legal aliens in 2005, the immigration office predicts that only 18,000 live in South Korea and the rest are either studying or living in Taiwan or elsewhere and are thought to be a ‘floating population’.⁹

*a. 1997 South Korean Nationality Act*¹⁰

The Nationality Act of 1948 stipulates three conditions to granting South Korean nationality at birth: (1) one whose father is a national of the Republic of Korea; (2) one whose mother is a Korean national, and is him/herself a South Korean national, provided that the person’s father is unidentified or stateless; (3) one who is born in the Republic of Korea, and is a South Korean national provided that both the parents are unidentified or stateless (Lee J.Y., 2007:269). This law was partly amended in 1962, 1963, and 1976. The amendments strengthened the non-recognition of dual citizenship, eased the procedure of citizenship restoration by ethnic Koreans, removed some restrictions on naturalized South Koreans, and specified the child’s right to choose its own citizenship. However, these amendments did not affect the main features of the 1948 Nationality Law, which remained intact until 1997. These *jus sanguinis*, ethnically-based South Korean citizenship provisions indicate that a child born, for instance, to a *huaqiao* father and Korean mother were only granted the father’s nationality. Based on this patriarchal system, even if this child was born in South Korea, he or she could not gain South Korean citizenship unless he or she naturalized.

In 1998, revisions to the South Korean Nationality Law were promulgated, and

Table 1: Acquiring South Korean citizenship.

	Total	Naturalization	Recovery of Citizenship
2001	1,650	724	926
2002	3,883	2,972	911
2003	7,734	5,986	1,748
2004	9,262	7,261	2,001
2005	16,974	12,299	4,675
2006	8,125	7,477	648
2007	10,319	8,536	1,783

Source: Annual Yearbook of Immigration Office, Ministry of Justice of Republic of Korea, 2007

the most significant change brought about was the gender equality applied to the once patriarch-based citizenship. As a result, as long as either of the parents were Korean citizens, the descendant could attain Korean citizenship. Hence even in the case of a child born to a Korean national mother and foreign father, the child is granted South Korean citizenship. As in the case of South Korea, in a growing number of countries the principle of gender equality¹¹ has increasingly been applied to *jus sanguinis* as well, so that the child can be given the citizenship of either parent. Such developments in relation to gender equality under the citizenship law were the main legal mechanism for the expansion of dual citizenship (Faist, 2007:14).

The 1997 reforms also brought about improvements to the long-term foreign residents in South Korea, most significantly allowing them to renew their F-2 visa every five years instead of every two years. The naturalization process also became more lenient. In the past, fewer than 10 foreigners were naturalized every year in South Korea from 1948 to 1985 (Choe, 2006:102). While Table 1 shows a notable increase in the number of people who have either naturalized or recovered their Korean citizenship in the past five years, and most significantly between 2004 and 2005, the *huaqiao* interviewed noted that there are significant bureaucratic hurdles and inconsistencies in processing the paperwork for naturalization. Moreover, since South Korea forbids dual citizenship, the *huaqiao* in South Korea have to give up their Taiwanese citizenship before naturalizing into South Korean citizenship, implications of which will be further addressed in the section on multiple belongings.

b. 1998 Foreigners Property Ownership Rights

Prior to 1968, based on the 1962 Foreigners Property Ownership Law, foreigners were not allowed to own property in South Korea. The 1968 amendments (Foreigners

Property Ownership Law Act 5544) allowed foreigners, including resident aliens such as *huaqiao*, to own only 200 *pyong* (approximately 6,600 square feet) of property for residential purposes, and 50 *pyong* (1,650 square feet) for commercial use. This limited the type and scale of business that the *huaqiao* could engage in. Although this was an improvement from previous restrictions which did not allow foreigners to own any property, the limited amount of property disadvantaged *huaqiao* business owners in ways that did not affect Korean competitors in the same market. Restaurants and small drugstores continued to be the dominating businesses in this community.

In 1998, with the inception of the Kim Dae-jung administration (1998–2003), all major restrictions on foreigner property ownership were lifted. Rather than this resulting from the recognition of *huaqiao* or other long-term foreign residents' rights, the 1998 amendment came about in response to the 1997 Financial Crisis and the need to stabilize its currency and market. The Korean government made a concerted effort to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and to improve trade relations with the growing markets of mainland China. With this opportunity, and the rise of the Chinese economy, *huaqiao* ventured into more businesses including travel agencies and export trade businesses with the PRC. Based on my fieldwork, there is particularly an active *huaqiao* travel agencies' association in South Korea that did not exist prior to 1998. There are 42 members of the Korea Huaqiao Travel Association. The pre-existing travel businesses, including guided tours for Taiwanese, the airline industries and others, had to re-orientate their business to the PRC market after diplomatic relations with the PRC became official in 1992.

c. 2002 Domicile Registration Act

Beginning April 2002, by-laws allowing long-term residents to gain permanent residency (F-5) were enacted, resulting in approximately 8,000 *huaqiao* gaining permanent residency (*Yeongam Ilbo*, 11 November 2007). The *huaqiao* ethnic minority group who had always been known as '100-year guests' could finally be permanent residents in South Korea. However, the idea of permanent residency was not just an issue of immigration policy, since it raised questions of property ownership, medical insurance and social security benefits. In particular, voting rights for permanent residents was a major issue that politically withheld the adoption of this amendment.¹² The 2002 Domicile Registration Act allows *huaqiao* and other non-ethnic Korean residents who are over 19 years old and have had permanent residency for more than three years to participate in local elections beginning with that which was held on 31 May 2006.

While the adoption of permanent residency has brought about positive changes such as voting rights, this domicile registration system also has its flaws. The identification card issued to permanent residents cannot be used in on-line banking

or to shop on-line, and given how internet-oriented South Korea is, this has proven to be a major inconvenience. Nor can one use this identification when using personal cheques at stores or restaurants. Despite the fact that there are equal opportunities to open up credit cards or financial transfers based on one's financial standing, because bank employees are still suspicious of this identification card (and not a Resident registration card), many *huaqiao* interviewed had experienced discrimination and inconvenience. For instance, according to a 2003 Korean Human Rights Commission report, 79% of the 700 *huaqiao* interviewed felt discrimination when purchasing or registering on-line, 77% when job interviewing, and 58% at banking and other commercial services.¹³

While such citizenship reforms show steady efforts to improve *huaqiao* status in South Korea, the actual pieces of legislation are primarily driven by neo-liberal policies rather than intended to address the culturally-rooted problems of marginalized ethnic minorities. Other examples of this include, for instance, the 8th Overseas Chinese Business Conference¹⁴ and other government-initiated efforts such as the re-building of Chinatowns¹⁵ that have not involved the core of the *huaqiao* community but have commercialized *huaqiao* identity as a mere tourist attraction. In this sense, these are not necessarily initiated to improve their status or include them into mainstream society, but are more based on the government and private corporations trying to benefit from the 'China boom.' To make these Overseas Chinese networks and Chinatown re-building efforts more beneficial to the *huaqiao* in South Korea, this community has to have ownership over the projects.

Also, despite the fact that the South Korean government has tried to highlight the economic opportunities that the *huaqiao* community can bring, little effort has been made to develop the *huaqiao* as individual human resources. The biggest complaint expressed by the *huaqiao* interviewed is that the *huaqiao* curriculum is not recognized in South Korea. While limited, these schools receive financial support from the Taiwan government and follow the Taiwanese curriculum. Many of the *huaqiao* families interviewed felt that for cultural as well as financial reasons they were not able to provide their children the comparative advantage to succeed in the South Korean educational system. Chiang, a male (16) student attending *hangsung* school said:

“In a country like South Korea that emphasizes networks made in schools and educational achievement, attending a school that doesn't even have an accredited curriculum makes me feel like a delinquent student, much less a member of any society.” (Interview in Pusan, September 2004)

Yet the root of the problem does not lie solely in the South Korean government policies toward the *huaqiao* community. Some scholars observe that in comparison to *huaqiao* networks abroad, the *huaqiao* in South Korea are a weak community

that lacks unity and organization (Park and Park, 2003; Yang and Lee, 2004). The *huaqiao* have also been criticized for ostracizing themselves, particularly by choosing to remain ‘denizens’. Nevertheless, the potential strength of associational networks and active citizenry is available in the *huaqiao* community at least based on the number of associations.¹⁶ With growing interest in foreign migrant workers’ rights and minority issues in general in South Korea, the *huaqiao* organizations can take this opportunity to lead the efforts and also become more unified with the common interests of ethnic minority group issues. In this sense, *huaqiao* members of South Korean society also need to see themselves as agents rather than those victimized by historical marginalization. Particularly, with growing numbers of *huaqiao* being descendants of intermarriages, they are better equipped to adapt to Korean culture and assimilate into the host state.

Case Study Group II: Korean-American Residents in South Korea (*chaemi kyop’o*)

With the liberalization of the Korean economy, particularly beginning with the Kim Dae-jung administration, an increased number of ethnic Koreans began to return to South Korea to seek job and investment opportunities. Such entry and economic activity by overseas ethnic Koreans was encouraged by the South Korean government. This period was soon after the 1997 Financial Crisis, and the government was implementing drastic reforms and had favourable policies toward overseas Koreans and foreigners in general to attract their presence. After all, Christian Joppke points out that while it is in the foremost interest of the state to contain and ‘integrate’ domestically and see the state as a primarily territorial unit, the characteristics of the global age and the population’s increased mobility across borders make it also in the interest of states to retain ties with their members, even those who no longer reside in the territory (Joppke, 2005:227). Yet South Korea’s past exclusionist immigration policies were not only to limit non-ethnic Korean foreigners, but also to some extent to regulate this diaspora’s influence. This was due to the fact that much like other diaspora groups in relations with their kin-state, the Korean diaspora, particularly Korean-Americans, have been influential in the democratization process of their kin-state by pressuring the past Korean military regimes and authoritarian governments.

As of 2005 there is an estimate of 18,409 Korean-Americans residing in South Korea (South Korean Immigration Office Yearbook, 2005). Other sources estimate that there are as many as 22,000 Korean-American dual citizens (due to US citizenship attained at birth) in South Korea (Jeong, 2004:31 from *Chosun Ilbo*, 21 March 2003). Despite these estimated numbers of Korean-Americans in South Korea, their presence is fairly new and tracing a history of this population is difficult. In this case study

group, the distinction should be made between overseas Korean nationals (*jaeoe gungmin*) and Koreans of foreign nationality (*oeguk gukjeok dongpo*). Overseas Korean nationals are those who have permanent resident status in a foreign state or live in a foreign state with a view towards permanent residence. They may still retain Korean citizenship, but have been removed from Korea's Resident Register (Lee, 2007b:105). In comparison, Koreans of foreign nationality are or have been abroad on a short- or long-term basis but may well continue to hold residency and culturally remain closely tied to South Korea, thus maintaining *de facto* dual citizenship. There is a growing number of Koreans with foreign nationality residing and essentially rooted in South Korea but having foreign citizenship for the material advantages conferred through such multiple belongings. The Overseas Koreans Act is intended to apply to those who return to South Korea for short-term professional or personal reasons, rather than to the Koreans with foreign nationality of the latter group mentioned above. Yet from a legal standpoint, there is no difference between the two groups of Koreans in terms of their legal status as Korean-Americans. However, the cultural backgrounds of these two groups vary and thus the intentions and experience of their residence in South Korea also differ. The Overseas Koreans Act as addressed below is often criticized for simultaneously addressing these two groups despite such qualitative differences between them (*ibid.*).

a. 2005 Overseas Koreans Act

In August 1999, the bill for the Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans was passed by the Korean National Assembly. This Act provided a special immigration status for particular members of the Korean diaspora, and treated them preferentially compared to other foreigners with regard to some economic and social interests (*ibid.*:97). Of the overseas Koreans who return to South Korea to reside for varying lengths of time, those from countries such as the U.S. and Japan were given preferential treatment, while more restrictions would be applied to overseas Koreans from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This was due to the fact that the application of this law to overseas Koreans was limited to those who went abroad after 1948, when South Korea was established as an independent country, as the Republic of Korea. For instance, ethnic Koreans from China were excluded because the majority of them are descendants of those who moved to mainland China to protest Japan's colonization between 1910 and 1945, or those who fled widespread famine in the second half of the nineteenth century. In fact, the latter group, which comprises 50% of all co-ethnics, were not counted as overseas Koreans until the early 1990s because South Korea did not normalize its diplomatic relations with these countries till then. As a result, the main beneficiaries of the law were Korean-Americans, the majority of whom left the

country after liberalization. While unintended, such historical circumstances and the cut-off year of 1948 created a hierarchical categorization of overseas Koreans, not only bringing about criticism of discrimination among them but also raising questions about the definitions of rights and duties of Korea's own citizens as well as foreign nationals residing in Korea. A constitutional complaint was filed even before the law was promulgated, and the Constitutional Court ordered the National Assembly to take legislative measures to rectify this constitutional flaw by the end of 2003 (*ibid.*). In November 2003, the National Assembly rejected the amendments to the bill and decided that the Overseas Koreans Act should be applicable to all overseas Koreans and not made specific to the 1948 cut-off date.

Some Korean government officials and law experts indicated that the problem was not simply resolvable by granting all overseas Koreans the same status. The debate on the definition of those covered by the Overseas Koreans Act exemplified the different perspectives of the various national government branches. The Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Labor were proponents of the bill, with an interest in having stricter control of ethnic Koreans from the PRC entering South Korea. However, on a diplomatic level, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) warned that without revisions to the Act, South Korea would appear 'narrow-minded' and 'overly nationalistic'. MOFAT was particularly careful not to cause friction with the PRC, which maintains a tight grip over minority groups and specifically requested Korea to exclude ethnic Koreans with Chinese citizenship while the country was contemplating the 1999 change to its Overseas Koreans Act. The fact of the matter being, as Sung Nak-in, Professor of Constitutional Law at Seoul National University reiterated Chinese Ambassador Lao Bin's words, "these people are foremost Chinese citizens, before being ethnic Koreans" (*Digital Korea Herald*, September 2003) and they should not be treated any differently from other Chinese people in Korea.


In terms of the general public's view on this issue, based on a National Survey conducted in 2003 on the revisions to the Overseas Koreans Act, a majority of the Korean population surveyed agreed (77.4%) that CIS- and China-based ethnic Koreans should be included in this Act, although when questioned on the Overseas Koreans Law, only 15.3% knew of the specific revisions and the issues in the debate.¹⁷ Confirming this, while there was active debate on the Overseas Koreans Act amongst policymakers and scholars and significant coverage of the topic in the media, the fieldwork interview participants showed a lack of familiarity with the actual provisions of the Act.

b. 2005 South Korean Nationality Act

The revision of the 2005 South Korean Nationality Act came after the Grand National Party (*Uridang*, conservative) had for some time lobbied to introduce more

stringent screening measures that would disadvantage those people who forfeit their South Korean citizenship just to avoid military service. Based on the revised bill that took effect in May 2005, a male with more than two nationalities is not allowed to give up his Korean citizenship unless he finishes the obligatory military service. This goes to show that in legal status, dual citizenship does not exist for Korean nationals. Even if one attempts to evade military conscription by acquiring foreign visas, green cards, and foreign citizenship(s), he is still subject to certain restrictions under the Korean Military Laws, which often supersede all other Korean laws. This revision was introduced not to discuss the matter from a legal and long term policy perspective, but to blanket this topic with nationalist sentiments¹⁸ that could cool down the public's criticism over the issue. The passing of the bill sparked an explosion of people renouncing their South Korean citizenship in the weeks before it became a law. During the two week grace period, 1,820 Korean male nationals gave up their citizenship (*Munhwa Ilbo*, 11 May 2005). Faced with the question to be or not to be Korean, a growing number of co-ethnics with dual citizenship opted for the latter, renouncing their Korean citizenship.

In order to understand the changes of the 2005 South Korean Nationality Act in relation to the *chemi kyop'o*, and to some extent, the *huaqiao* case study group, it is important to examine how the South Korean legal system and policies address dual citizenship. Dual citizenship is part of a trend of porous boundaries of national citizenship in liberal democracies (Hansen and Weil, 2002:34) and in emigration countries (Faist, 2007:20). Worldwide, there is a general trend toward dual citizenship, particularly as the growing network of diaspora is able to have a multiple sense of belonging between home and host states. While global trends show increasing acceptance of dual citizenship, allowed in approximately 90 countries, South Korea does not recognize it (Jeong Inseop, 2004:144). While security concerns in relation to North Korea may present the legal and political settings for why it is not recognized, the reasons for not allowing dual citizenship for South Korean nationals is also culturally rooted on two broad levels. First of all, membership in South Korean society is still largely dominated by ethnically-based definitions, and bias against those who are non-ethnic Korean citizens still persists (Choi et al, 2004; Shin, 2006; Kim, 2007). Secondly, the debates and changes regarding South Korean citizenship¹⁹ revolve around societal problems that have arisen due to those who seek dual citizenship or forfeit South Korean citizenship in order to avoid military service. The reasons for such criticism stem from the fact that the general public regards the chance to gain or forfeit dual citizenship as primarily based on socio-economic class differences, resulting as the privilege of the wealthy and influential. While this may be true to some extent, such emotionally driven reasons against dual citizenship actually perpetuate the misunderstandings of it. My Gallup Survey on the general public's attitude toward dual citizenship shows that a significant number of those

Figure 2: Forfeiting of Korean Citizenship by U.S. Residents or Citizens.

Source: Annual Yearbook of Immigration Office, Ministry of Justice of Republic of Korea, 2005

questioned feel that this government policy, set to discourage those who try to forfeit their South Korean citizenship to avoid military service, is justified (59.3%).²⁰

It is interesting to note the renunciation and forfeiting of South Korean citizenship by those who hold residency or citizenship with U.S. citizenship, where the numbers close to doubled between 2004 and 2005 when the laws were revised. Of those who applied to forfeit South Korean citizenship, 159 (41.1%) of their parents were academics and the remainder were children of parents employed in international firms. Also, 374 (96.8%) persons were ‘dual citizens’ of Korea and the U.S., 7 of Korea and Canada, and 5 of Korea and other countries (www.hani.co.kr, 17 May 2005). One interview participant, Mr. Y (43, Korean, academic with U.S. residency, balancing life in Korea and the U.S. to realize opportunities of education and careers for his children), states:

My son was born in the U.S. while I was studying for my doctorate, and I would like for him to choose his US citizenship over Korean when he is older. It is not just about avoiding military service, but to have the option of better education and job opportunities in this global age. I do not know any parent who would not want to give his child that opportunity.

Overall, according to Dr. Lee Chulwoo of Yonsei University, this May 2005 revision of the South Korean Nationality Act is full of loopholes and requires a rational reassessment. The motive behind the revision is, as mentioned earlier, emotionally driven, and aimed at preventing the avoiding of military service by

those who have dual citizenship, but it is legally unfounded. Moreover, because of the emphasis placed on military service, women are excluded from the citizenship debate because they do not have to serve in the military.²¹ Also, foreigners who have naturalized into Korean citizens and other minority groups are excused from military service. On a broader level, other forms and meanings of citizenship, including that of those who do not have to fulfil military service, tend to be given less significance because of the fact that military service dominates the citizenship debate. Another problematic aspect to the revisions is the fact that parents are making the decision for their children on the matter of citizenship because technically 21 is the legal adult age in South Korea, when in fact military service can begin at age 18. However, there is little debate among politicians and the media over the age limit, reflecting Korean society's willingness to allow parents to make decisions for their children who should be independent citizens (Lee, 2005).

Multiple Belongings

As noted in earlier sections, an increasing number of South Korean citizens, denizens, and immigrants are seeking to balance their multiple belongings without necessarily seeking full membership in one country, some due to necessity and others based on choice. Such exercise of citizenship is defined in terms of citizen to citizen relations based on association in and across borders, rather than that based solely on legal status to membership of a particular nation-state. As a consequence, traditional ties between citizen and the state will increasingly wither and become replaced by more fragmented loyalties that explain lifestyle politics (Lagos, 2002:4). Despite the legal opportunities for naturalization, both *chaemi kyop'o* and *huaqiao* residents of South Korea seek to be maximal rights-based residents rather than fully-fledged citizens. These aspects can be best observed through the issues of educational opportunities and military dodging that underscore decisions on renunciation or naturalization of South Korean citizenship.

Harsh economic realities in a globally competitive market have resulted in increasingly neo-liberal attitudes toward citizenship which are prevalent among both privileged and marginalized citizens. Citizenship of certain countries, usually those of western liberal democratic states, are seen as more advantageous while others limit life opportunities. This shows how changes to ethnically-based citizenship policy are not merely a minority rights issue in which policies should be improved to benefit the non-ethnic Korean residents who are unjustly marginalized, but challenged by the fact that an increasing number of people—both privileged and marginalized—no longer equate their sense of belonging with citizenship. Aiwha Ong uses 'flexible citizenship' to refer especially to the strategies and effects of professionals seeking to both circumvent and benefit from nation-state regimes by selecting different sites

for investments, work and family relocation (Ong, 1999:112). However, such opting to gain or give up citizenship based on neo-liberal and calculated socio-economic reasons often times strays from the civic and substantive aspects of citizenship. The danger of such exploitation of citizenship is that without the sense of belonging to the political community and its needs for an active, engaged and committed citizenry, citizenship becomes merely a tool, undermining its foundations that are essential to democracy and development. This also widens the citizenship gap in horizontal inequalities between citizens, as well as weakening the vertical relations between the state and its members (Shafir, 1998). This gap in understanding between state and citizen, as well as the citizenship gap between socio-economic classes, will persist unless the substantive aspects of citizenship are properly addressed.

Methodology

The selected time frame of 1987 to 2007 coincides with the democratization process of Korea (the military regime ending in 1986), and with special focus on the beginning of several significant citizenship-related legislative reforms during the post-Asian Financial Crisis years starting with the 1997 Korean Nationality Act. This decade-based study shows how historical circumstances have had consequences for the evolution of ethnically-based citizenship policies in South Korea, particularly with the emergence of universal or other inclusive forms of citizenship. The fieldwork was based on two visits to South Korea between 2005 and 2006, and continuous document analysis. Document analysis of legislation and immigration data provided important background information on the past and current situation. Updating analysis on media polls and surveys relevant to the research topic also provided important background observations. A qualitative methodology of semi-structured interviews was then employed to comprehend working-level approaches from ministry officials and national assemblymen. Scholars both at universities and research institutes were consulted to gain more understanding of the theoretical and legal perspectives to citizenship issues in South Korea. Activists from a number of advocacy groups that promote the interest of *huaqiao* and *chaemi kyop'o* including their small business network organizations, semi-government agencies, and selective NGOs that advocate legislative reforms were consulted to provide greater insight into the working level issues of citizenship.

Thirty *huaqiao* found primarily through the Overseas Chinese Association, twenty-five *chaemi kyop'o* residents in South Korea located through the American Chamber of Commerce, and two Korean-American churches were interviewed. Some of these participants were interviewed on more than one occasion. Five focus groups where the participants discussed more specified citizenship-related topics were then conducted as a follow up to these interviews. In October 2007, through Gallup

Korea, a phone survey comprised of ten objective and one subjective questions that I devised was conducted to 200 Korean citizens between the ages of 21–59. ASCII data and Cross-tabulation quantitative data analysis method was used to analyse this material. This survey was useful in furthering my understanding of public opinion on citizenship issues. All these fieldwork methods had their limitations because the people selected for interview reflected only a small percentage of the case study population and the sample was therefore not representative, but was still helpful in addressing my overall research questions.

Conclusion

Various works on citizenship studies indicate the general trends of liberal democratic states abandoning ethnically-based policies and moving toward more residence-based inclusive or universal notions of citizenship. However, the explorations of this research on South Korean citizenship show how difficult but necessary change can be in newly industrialized countries such as South Korea which is still largely ethnically homogeneous, historically patriarchal, and in the process of establishing its democratic systems and practices. This thesis shows the tension between South Korean evolving ethnically-based citizenship policy and the reality of today's state and citizens' shared as well as conflicting ways of understanding and exercising citizenship.

The legislative reforms since 1997 aptly describe the changes the state has made, necessitated by the realities of South Korea's diversifying population and economic motives. However, this study finds that major barriers stand against the implementation of such reforms at the institutional level, ethnically based public perception, and understanding of citizenship by its immigrants. Examining the two case study groups, *huaqiao* and *chaemi kyop'o* residents, exemplifies the various challenges facing South Korean society as their legal status has become more equal, but their practice of citizenship becomes more variegated. As South Korean society becomes increasingly ethnically diverse as well as comprised of more interest groups with different agendas, South Korea will have to face its consequential socio-economic impacts by reframing its notions of nationality, citizenship and sense of belonging to be better suited in the contemporary world. Closing the gap in the understanding and exercise of citizenship between the state and citizens, and the legal and cultural notions of Korean citizenship will be integral to this process.

Notes

1. The current citizenship legislation promulgated on 24 May 2005 reflects the 7th round of reforms, with 20 amendments since its first proclamation in December 1948. Four major changes have been made, including citizenship legislation that reflects gender equality, a child's right to choose his/her own citizenship, prevention of dual citizenship, and amendments for more specific naturalization processes.
2. Although the romanized version is *hwagyo* in Korean, or described as *hanhwa* by some scholars, I will refer to the overseas Chinese under the anglicized version *huaqiao*.
3. Quasi-citizenship describes a legal status generally of permanent residents who have the same rights as a full citizen, such as security of residence, equal rights in all aspects of social life, and a right to return after a prolonged stay abroad. The exception to rights of full citizenship is usually participation in elections and military service.
4. Similar to the German meaning of nation *Volk* or *Volkschaft*, the racial self-image of the Korean nation invoked a sense that Koreans were members of an extended family.
5. The Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910) forbade trade except in the government-controlled seasonal markets that were held in border areas, and those who crossed borders without permission were arrested and beheaded until the nineteenth century. (Lee, 1999 in Choe, 2006:93).
6. 3-D jobs refers to 'dangerous, dirty, difficult' jobs often performed by migrant workers.
7. This population, also referred to the 'old' *huaqiao*, needs to be distinguished from the 'new' *huaqiao*. The 'old' *huaqiao* are 2nd- or 3rd-generation overseas Chinese and hold Taiwanese citizenship, and do not include the PRC citizens who have come to South Korea since the 1997 immigration policy reforms. Also to note is that this case study group does not include the *chosŏnjok* (ethnic Koreans from the PRC), though there is some debate as to whether they should be included in the 'new' *huaqiao* category.
8. Although it is difficult to categorize the overseas Chinese population, there are primarily five groups based on place of origin, dialect or trade: Cantonese (Guangdong Province), Hokkien (Fujian Province), Hakka (Guangdong and Fujian coastal areas who then moved to other countries), Hainanese (Hainan Island), Teochiu (Guangdong Province but with sub-dialect), and Yunnanese (jade trade, near the Burmese border).
9. An example of a 'floating population' as popularized by Aihwa Ong is the 5–700 members of Yantei Huaqiao Association who move back and forth between their retirement homes in the Shandong Yantei region and South Korea. Compared to their denizen status without full healthcare in South Korea, the cheaper cost in living and homeland culture in Yantei are attractive reasons to split their time between the two places.
10. Korean Nationality Law 2-1-1, Act 5431. When referring to citizenship law, most South Korean legal documents refer to it as nationality law rather than citizenship law. Therefore, despite the distinction between citizenship and nationality, I refer to legal acts as nationality law.
11. In 1957, the New York Protocol revised the status of women, thereby allowing them the right to retain their own citizenship, independent of their husbands.
12. The various legal rights demanded for the *zainichi* by the Kim Dae-jung administration

(1998–2003) in bilateral meetings with Japan could not move forward without discussing the voting status of the *huaqiao*, and helped bring about the amendments to voting rights promulgated in July 2004.

13. Korean Human Rights Commission Report, 2003. ‘Human Rights Status of Hwakyō Residents in South Korea’ (in Korean) conducted by Park Kyung-tae et al., Sung Gong Hwe University.
14. The 8th Overseas Chinese Business Conference was held in October 2005 in Seoul and was organized by business leaders and strongly supported by the Korean government. With approximately 2,500 Chinese and 500 Korean business people involved, the main goal of the conference was to examine opportunities to link the overseas Chinese financial and trade network with Korean companies that have technologically advanced products and educated human resources.
15. Chinatowns in Inch’ōn, Taegu, Pusan, and Seoul are in the process of being revived, along with the creation of another in Ilsan (a major suburban town of Korea).
16. There are approximately 100 *huaqiao* community organizations, relatively large in numbers. *Hwakyō hyōphoe* (Overseas Chinese Association) is the most important of these, through which the network of *huaqiao* in South Korea are able to get administrative support.
17. National Survey by Hangil Research & Consulting (11 November 2003) on the revisions to Overseas Koreans Act (*Chaeoe tongp’obōp kaejōng kwallyōn chōn’guk min yōron chosa pogosō*).
18. National Assemblyman Hong Joon-pyo led the November 2004 bill with restrictions on the renunciation of South Korean citizenship without having fulfilled military service.
19. Korean Nationality Act No. 6523 amended December 2001; Immigration Control Act No. 4592 amended December 1993. Ministry of Justice, www.moj.go.kr
20. A Gallup Korea Poll Survey on citizenship issues was conducted in October 2007 with questions devised by the author. (Refer to the section on Methodology for greater details.)
21. Refer to Seungsook Moon’s *Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea* (2005) which discusses the specific forms of military recruitment, because the form of recruitment shapes the relationship between the nation state and its gendered citizens.

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DPRK RENEWABLE ENERGY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS

TRISTAN WEBB

1. Introduction

This essay aims to focus on two tasks: that of collating in one account exactly what sustainable development¹ projects are happening in the DPRK energy sector and who is involved in them, and secondly, in light of the DPRK's call for regional engagement in this area, analysing what the prospects, motivations and implications of such engagement from the regional powers might be. It will assume the reader's familiarity with the general energy situation in the DPRK; those who wish more than the basic summary provided here might read Hayes' and Von Hippel's works, which include excellent accounts of the nature and roots of current DPRK energy difficulties.

1.1 Background to the DPRK energy sector

The DPRK economy industrialised during a period of alliance with its socialist neighbours, the Soviet Union and China. Technical assistance in energy production, materials for power plants, financial loans, and vast quantities of cheap oil were all readily available to the DPRK energy sector under this umbrella of friendship. To a significant extent, the DPRK economy formed its chief characteristics around such energy assistance. Development activities in the rural economy, such as water-pumping, rice-planting, and fertiliser production became increasingly dependent on cheap hydrocarbons. In competition with ROK industrialisation, scant consideration was given by development planners to energy efficiencies, and energy-intensive industries were promoted in the race to develop a strong military economy capable of defeating the ROK.

The end of the Soviet Union, worsening economic relations with China, and extensive flooding shocked the economy in the early 1990s. Without Soviet oil and

unable to afford global market prices, many sectors of the economy could not maintain production. Flooded coalmines became inoperable. As Soviet-assisted power plants aged, spare parts could not be found and maintenance became difficult. Increasingly internationally ostracised, the DPRK lacked and still lacks the resources to redevelop its economy away from its former dependencies. The current situation is such that the DPRK energy sector, which once fuelled an economy to rival the ROK, is devastated and dependent on international humanitarian assistance.²

The DPRK energy sector faces problems at every stage: generation, transmission, and distribution. With significant flood damage to its mines, poorly maintained equipment and lack of electricity to power that equipment, coal production is now severely limited yet remains the country's primary energy source. Coal that is produced is burnt in very inefficient and polluting power plants, and transmitted across a national grid whose wires are decaying and which loses around 16% of total energy production (Von Hippel and Hayes, 1995). The inefficiency of the process means that energy is available to the end user at limited times and is of variable quality. The user—be they industrial, residential or otherwise—has little incentive to use what little energy arrives sparingly as energy is heavily subsidised. To meet basic energy needs, many households use firewood. This is being used at a rate 35% higher than it is being replenished, and is unsustainable (Von Hippel and Hayes, 2007). As hill cover erodes for firewood usage, landslides and flooding become more severe and nutrients are washed away from the soil, harming agricultural production. This is exacerbated by declining chemical fertiliser application (due to lack of coal to produce the fertiliser and oil to transport it across the country), which has fallen to between 20% and 30% of 1990 levels (Williams et al, 2000). The urgency of these points has been recognised by the DPRK (DPRK Delegation, 2006a).

1.2 Sustainable development policies and projects undertaken by the DPRK

To date, P'yŏngyang has initiated a number of policies and projects aimed at improving the sustainability of its energy sector:

- Non-Conventional Energy Development Centre set up in 1993
- National Action Plan issued in 1993, 'focusing on sustainable development [...], the development of New and Renewable Energy and in particular wind' (DPRK Delegation, 2006b)
- Non-Standing Renewable Energy Committee formed in 1994
- Law on Energy Management passed in 1998, legislating for the State to promote 'the active development and the utilization of the renewable energy and its appliances in organizations, institutions and households.'[sic] (ibid.)
- 2000, the government instructs wind turbine production to be executed

‘for its important role in greenhouse gas mitigation and national electricity supplement’ (ibid.)

- A photovoltaic-powered 50-household test case set up in P’yŏngyang (Liu, 2004)
- Decentralised biomass power stations set up in the countryside
- Research institutions to develop methane technology established, introducing applications of this for households and farms
- Interest expressed in engaging in Clean Development Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol
- The government is actively encouraging local construction of small, decentralised hydro-dams and increased efficiencies of existing hydro-plants (DPRK Delegation, 2006a)
- Policy to only upgrade extant thermal power stations, with a moratorium on new plants
- 2MW prototype tidal power plants set up in Hwanghaenamdo, with plans being drawn for a 20MW plant
- National wind atlas to be completed by the end of 2008

As of 2004, the total installed wind turbine capacity amounted to just 3MW, mostly made up of small stand-alone systems below 10KW. The government is currently undertaking a three-stage strategy of national wind development, aiming at 500MW of wind-generated power by 2020. For comparison, the ROK’s wind turbine capacity at the close of 2006 was just 173MW (Global Wind Energy Council, 2007). The stages of the strategy are:

- 2006–2010: a 10MW prototype farm to be created, with turbines of 600KW capacity
- 2011–2015: three large wind farms of 100MW capacity to be created, drawing from the lessons of the first stage and to be implemented ‘with the cooperation of the international organizations and other NGO groups and communities’ [sic] (DPRK Delegation, 2006)
- 2015–2020: onshore and offshore wind farms to be actively pursued

From this survey, we can see that the DPRK does not lack strong goals for sustainable development in the energy sector. However, as DPRK delegations have noted, in the DPRK ‘fundamental study on wind energy is conducted relatively in depth, but its industrialization is still premature’ (DPRK Delegation, 2006b). It seems that the DPRK is unable to meet its sustainable energy goals by itself, essentially because it lacks appropriate training, technology, and expertise. This represents significant engagement possibilities with the DPRK for international bodies, NGOs, and neighbouring states alike. As shall be explored, some organisations are already engaging with the DPRK in this field. The DPRK seems very keen to promote such collaboration (as noted above, it’s a central part of the second stage for energy

development), and there are positive benefits for regional states to get involved as well.

2. The suitability to the DPRK of sustainable energy development

‘Coal which is one of the primary energy resources in our country is getting inferior in quality and the condition of mining becoming more unfavorable. It makes the prospect of meeting long-term energy demands gloomy’. (DPRK Delegation, 2004a)

It may seem surprising to imagine the DPRK—traditionally painted as a backward, polluting, Stalinist regime—pursuing sustainable energy development, but in fact such a policy approach is well suited to current DPRK policies and the DPRK situation.

2.1 Freedom from oil dependency

P’yŏngyang sees diversification of energy resources as ‘the main path for the long-term energy security of the country,’ and renewable energy as the ‘relatively most feasible and reliable’ route (DPRK Delegation, 2006b). The DPRK has had bad experiences of relying on oil, primarily because it has none of its own to see it through times of adjustment.³ The first bad experience was in the 1970s, when it tried to emulate the ROK’s export-led development strategy. Having purchased expensive technology and materials from overseas, spiralling OPEC-induced oil prices from 1973 cost the country dear, and left it unable (or unwilling) to repay its loans, and unable to further pursue this economic development strategy.

The second shock came after the Soviet Union and China withdrew their supply of oil at friendship prices (until 1990, trade was often done in barter (Oh, 2003)). The DPRK economy, dependent on cheap energy, was unable to convert to operation at global oil prices, paid for with hard currency. The subsequent economic collapse reveals the extent to which the economy was then dependent on the energy support of the USSR and China, and in part explains the difficulty the DPRK has had (to this day) in transitioning its economy away from this reliance. Add to this the ‘pariah’ status of the DPRK on the international stage, and it quickly becomes apparent why the DPRK fears reliance on an expensive, volatile energy resource for the future, and favours oil substitutes (such as biogas for heating, and hydro- and wind-turbines for electricity generation) instead.⁴

2.2 Unviable route of nuclear power

The DPRK has heavily argued for its right to a civilian nuclear programme, and pushed for international support for the development of Light Water Reactors (LWRs). The LWRs have been domestically important for the DPRK leadership in securing

legitimacy, and as a litmus test for the sincerity of the US in fulfilling its promises (Hayes and Von Hippel, 2007). The LWRs are very unlikely to contribute to solving the DPRK's energy crisis either in the short- or mid-term however, for compelling political and technical reasons.⁵

2.3 Abundance of renewable energy resources

Amongst possible energy sources, P'yŏngyang regards renewable energy as 'relatively most feasible and reliable in consideration of its technology and its abundant resources' (DPRK Delegation, 2006b). In cooperation with other parties (see section 3), and under its own efforts, the DPRK has conducted feasibility surveys for solar, wind, and further hydro developments. It has found that conditions are excellent for wind, solar and tidal power generation.⁶

2.4 Military target factor

As the engine of an industrial economy, the energy sector has important military target considerations. Oil refineries and intensive generation plants are at heightened risk from aerial bombardment. In terms of military security, the reliance of the DPRK on LWRs would leave the economy very exposed in the event of a limited, strategic air strike by the US. Such an attack would not only deprive the economy of much of its power at a single stroke, but would also pose massive radiation risks for the land and population (Sailer, 2004). It would also require massive reinvestment to repair the facilities and a long time to bring them back on grid. Besides nuclear, other power plants carry similar, but less significant, military risks: the destruction of a large hydroelectric dam, for example, could be extremely damaging for both the economy and immediate area.

2.5 The cost of alternatives

As outlined earlier, every stage of the energy supply line—generation, transmission and distribution—has degenerated due to lack of appropriate fuels, maintenance, and spare parts. Alternative energy sector development paths based around nuclear reactors, regional energy grid link-ups or natural gas pipelines will require a total overhaul of the DPRK transmission and distribution network to be able to connect to and integrate the new energy supply. The massive investment and stability in relations (the DPRK is in no way capable of transforming its energy sector in such a way alone) required by these energy options only increases their risks and decreases their feasibility. A sustainable development path, meanwhile, can proceed on a step-by-step basis and provide immediate improvements to the energy sector. Hayes and von Hippel (2007) have estimated the cost of incorporating the currently incomplete

LWRs into the DPRK energy grid system at between three and four billion USD, against an estimated two billion USD for upgrading extant energy components, improving efficiencies, and implementing mass renewable energy systems.

2.6 Benefits of an off-grid system

Liu (2004) proposes a renewables-based off-grid solution for rural areas and an on-grid system for urban areas. Off-grid solutions for rural areas might include the extension of biogas schemes for cooking and domestic heating in order to take the pressure off dwindling forest stocks, Combined Heat and Power (CHP) plants, and locally produced energy through wind turbines, small hydro projects, and photovoltaic systems. An off-grid system such as this would be physically sustainable, as it relies on abundant locally sourced resources that do not detriment the local environment. It would also be socially sustainable, as it would be able to provide a more consistent supply of energy and thus be better able to meet basic human needs. Furthermore, an off-grid rural energy system would save central government large amounts of resources, as the alternative would be to replace outdated rural transmission lines at considerable expense and, if training were provided to the local population during installation, would require little central expertise or funding for maintenance. Liu recommends that the savings made by enabling an off-grid solution for rural areas be channelled into funding concentrated on renewable energy parks for urban areas.

2.7 Environmental benefits

P'yŏngyang is increasingly aware of the environmental damage inflicted by previous development. In 2003 the UNDP and UNEP co-published a 'State of the Environment' with the DPRK's National Coordinating Committee for Environment, in which it was confirmed that one of the four long term policy priorities in the DPRKs energy strategy was:

to minimize the environmental impact of energy generation and use [...] and secure environmental sustainability by promoting a switch to the use of renewable energy use [sic] (UNEP, 2003).

This is presumably in response to the very serious condition of much of the DPRK's forest, water, and air supplies, as identified in the report, which now threaten DPRK development (e.g. the lack of firewood for rural heating appliances).

3. NGO experiences of sustainable development engagement

'The main barrier in the activities of the DPRK for the rehabilitation of its energy system and energy security is the lack of funds and technologies'. (DPRK Delegation, 2004a)

The DPRK needs external investment to make significant developments in its economy and energy sector: it lacks the necessary technology, expertise, and components to develop. Not-for-profit, non-state actors have already started to provide such investment. Three of the most significant independent organisations providing such technical and financial support have been the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Environmental Education Media Project (EEMP), and the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development (hereafter 'Nautilus'). This section outlines the areas in which these organisations have proactively engaged with the DPRK energy sector, and the unique benefits such organisations can bring to engagement.

3.1 UNDP involvement

The United Nations Development Programme has been supporting projects in the DPRK since it first opened its P'yŏngyang office in 1980, though operations have been suspended since March 2007 over allegations of financial mismanagement. Its engagement with the DPRK energy sector has been to promote regional sustainable development programmes with the aim of alleviating poverty (as in involvement with the Greater Tumen Initiative), assisting the DPRK in complying with its international obligations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and promoting localised energy development projects to assist those who are effectively 'off-grid'.⁷

The Small Wind Energy Development and Promotion in Rural Areas (SWEDPRA) project built on previous DPRK commitment to renewable energy and the 1999 UNDP survey 'Renewable Energy Development for Rural Electrification Project'. It aimed for the "development and widespread implementation of small-scale wind energy systems (SWES) to replace part of the current fossil fuel use in the DPRK."⁸ The project funded the creation of wind maps, wind-energy education, the development of domestic and foreign markets for domestically produced SWES, technical assistance in SWES development, and assistance with national policy formation.

UNDP energy engagement with the DPRK cannot be said to be primarily politically motivated, and aims to improve the living standards and prospects of the people of the DPRK through sustainable development. Its approach has been to work through the DPRK State, assisting it in complying with international standards and helping to improve its capacity to initiate and sustain sustainable energy projects.

3.2 *EEMP involvement*

The predecessor to the Environmental Education Media Project (EEMP) was founded in 1997. One of EEMPS' goals is:

'directed at getting as much information as quickly as possible into the hands of those groups and organizations that can use it to increase public awareness and promote more sustainable approaches to development.' (<http://www.eempc.org/profile.php>)

As part of this, it has made efforts to act as a catalyst for wind-energy adoption in the DPRK. It differs from UNDP projects in that instead of developing nascent DPRK turbine production capacity, it is aiming to introduce German/Chinese turbines. This certainly meets EEMP's goal of delivering 'as quickly as possible' and avoids the problem of poor current domestic production capacity. However, importing the turbines is not a long-term sustainable solution, and it may be difficult for the DPRK to source the highly developed parts for turbine repairs, maintenance, and further rollout. If the project goes ahead with sourcing Chinese turbines this problem may be somewhat mitigated.

EEMP started its involvement with the DPRK energy sector in 2002. EEMP held talks with Nordex (a large international turbine producer) and visited the DPRK several times in 2003 to survey conditions and exchange information, which was reciprocated by a DPRK energy delegation visit to Nordex's Chinese plant. Later that year the DPRK NGO 'Pyongyang International Information Centre [*sic*] of New Technology and Economy' (PIINTEC) was founded, and it was with this organisation that EEMP engaged. Negotiations over site monitoring, conditions assessment and financing between PIINTEC and EEMP continued through 2004, culminating in plans for an initial trial scheme involving five windmills (Liu, 2004).

The potential role of PIINTEC as a conduit for future sub-state level engagement opportunities is considerable. Its aim is:

'to provide an opportunity for exchange and cooperation in the fields of economy, technology and science between universities, research institutes, enterprises, individuals and NGOs of the DPRK and other countries.' (DPRK Delegation, 2004b)

PIINTAC is now the principal organisation with which EEMP engages, and presumably will be for future NGO engagement activity in this area too.

3.3 *Nautilus involvement*

The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability was formed in 1992 and was the first cooperative engagement for development between the DPRK and a US NGO (Von Hippel and Hayes, 2001). Nautilus' mission is:

'to improve global problem solving by applying and refining the strategic tools of cooperative engagement to fundamental problems undermining global security and sustainability.' (<http://www.nautilus.org/admin/mission.html>)

In 1997, Nautilus toured a DPRK delegation through energy workshops around the US. At the end of the visit they agreed to establish the 'US-DPRK Pilot Renewable Village Energy Project' with the aim 'to meet humanitarian energy-related needs in rural end uses such as household lighting, medical clinic energy needs, agricultural water pumping, and food processing energy needs' (Nautilus, 1999). Seven US-made wind generators were installed which support sixty households, a school and a clinic in the village of Unhari. Finding available DPRK national energy demand and supply datasets to be inadequate, Nautilus has collaborated with the ROK's Korean Energy Economics Institute (KEEI) to produce the necessary surveys, part funded by the US Department of Energy. These are open-access and offer unparalleled insights into the DPRK energy sector.

Since the collapse of the Agreed Framework in 2002, Nautilus has moved away from applied capacity building projects with the DPRK, and towards engaging with the DPRK in international conferences and workshops.⁹ Examples of these are the Asian Energy Security forums and energy grid workshops, both set up by Nautilus. DPRK delegations have made significant presentations at these events, and they have provided an invaluable opportunity for DPRK experts to engage with their international counterparts on a professional and personal basis.¹⁰

3.4 The benefits of NGO engagement

Because NGOs can be independent of state-political motivations, they are able to continue engagement even when state-political relations turn sour. For example, despite the Bush doctrine and the 'Axis of Evil' accusation, and the collapse of the Agreed Framework and regional tensions over DPRK nuclear weapons, the UNDP, Nautilus and EEMP continued building positive relationships and developing energy cooperation with the DPRK. Meanwhile, the ambitious KEDO Light Water Reactor (LWR) project ground to a halt, because it was dependent on continued cordial state relations.

While states are obliged to limit the development of personal relationships to the progress of inter-state relations, NGOs have a freer hand. In working on the Unhari project, Nautilus invited their DPRK colleagues to the US in 1997 for a two-week tour of workshops and meetings. On this tour the DPRK delegation met with a variety of energy professionals and Department of Energy officials, and were briefed by the World Bank on renewable energy programmes. This was the first meeting between a DPRK delegation and the DOE and the World Bank.¹¹ Whilst the tour undoubtedly improved DPRK-US relations, it would have been difficult for the US state to arrange

such a visit because of the inseparability of official state positions and inter-state relations.

The development of these personal relationships can be crucial to improving long-term state relations. Lankov argues that such experiences ‘help to end the demonization—and contribute to the demystification—of foreigners in the eyes of North Koreans’, as well as exposing to North Koreans ‘the prosperity and freedom they are deprived of at home’, a process he links to the rise of Gorbachev and the reformers in Soviet Russia and believes could be at least partially replicated in the DPRK (Lankov, 2006).

The final strength of NGO engagement with the DPRK energy sector is its tendency to illustrate what is possible. All three NGOs which have significant experience in this area—the UNDP, EEMP and Nautilus—have tried to set up new projects that illustrate the potential for sustainable development and engagement to both the DPRK and external actors. In part this may be due to budgetary constraints: the largest project so far has not had more than a few million dollars of funding, which is best spent on small, innovative projects. However, the independence of the NGOs and their non-partisan motivations has enabled them to be more creative and flexible in their engagement projects. Surveying the experiences of these three organisations in the DPRK, one sees that they may be providing an illustrative model for other, more well-resourced actors to follow. Indeed, the World Bank notes a similar phenomenon in the Kenyan photovoltaics market, where NGO-installed demonstration systems led to large-scale uptake by private companies and the state (Hankins, 2000).

4. Regional involvement: motivations and prospects

‘The combination of the correct policy of the DPRK is to establish an efficient, stable and sustainable energy system. If we were to combine our people’s steady efforts with the international co-operation with Northeast Asian countries should get good results’ [sic]. (DPRK Delegation, 2004a)

Section 3 outlined some of the benefits that NGOs can bring to engagement with the DPRK. However, when one compares the sub-five million US dollar budget of the largest NGO collaborative project (UNDP support for the Greater Tumen Initiative) with the budgets of regional state collaborative efforts, one can quickly see the importance of the latter to rehabilitation of the DPRK energy sector.¹² Because the sustainable development path can be pursued on a step-by-step basis at relatively low cost with immediate benefits, it seems perfectly suited to engagement strategies with the DPRK.

Countries engaging with the DPRK in the area of sustainable energy development each have differing strengths, motivations, and goals. To assess likely engagement

paths for each country this section will examine: respective countries' existing engagement practices with the DPRK; their general aims in engagement; and their current conceptualisations of (and importance placed on) sustainable development.

4.1 *Russia*

I. BACKGROUND TO ENGAGEMENT

The end of the Soviet Union brought with it the demise of one of the DPRK's most important, and favourable, trade partnerships. Overall trade fell from 3.5 billion USD in 1988 to under 100 million USD by 1995 (Moltz, 2003).¹³ In part, this was due to the economic difficulties experienced by the former Soviet Union in the 1990s. Without the shared ideological heritage as a foundation for a close relationship, when improvements in relations eventually came they were led by pragmatic economic considerations.¹⁴ Such measures paved the way for an improved political relationship, heralded in July 2000 with Putin's visit to P'yŏngyang (the first for either a Soviet or Russian Federation President) and Kim Jong Il's return trips to Moscow in 2001 and 2002. At these summit meetings, both sides confirmed their mutual friendship, their respect for each other's sovereignty, and their intentions for economic cooperation (KCNA, 2000). This has expressed itself most recently in the agreements made between the ROK, DPRK and Russia for the latter to provide an electricity transmission line supplying limited energy to Northeast DPRK, and Russia's November 2006 decision to write off eight billion USD of debt owed to the Soviet Union by the DPRK (CRS, 2007).

II. MOTIVATIONS BEHIND ENGAGEMENT

According to Moltz (2003), Russia's aims from economic cooperation with the DPRK are to be viewed in relation to its goals for the region: namely the reduction of regional tensions, the re-establishment of Russia's presence in the region (it was not included in the 1994 Agreed Framework, for example), and the development of the Russian Far East (RFE).¹⁵

Russia sees DPRK stability as key to regional stability. As G. Toloraya, Deputy Director-General of the First Asian Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia notes:

Helping North Korea survive and providing it with both security guarantees and the minimal subsistence level for its population is the key to stability in Korea (Toloraya, 2000).

In order to achieve this stability, Russia sees international energy assistance as key:

Military and political security does not mean much without economic security. The

urgent task is to prevent economic decline in North Korea—providing food and energy assistance (ibid.).

Engagement with the DPRK also enables Russia to maintain its political presence in the region. Initially left out of bilateral and trilateral negotiations in the 1990s despite its enviable knowledge and understanding of the DPRK situation, Russia has made concerted efforts to improve its position in the region, for example by engaging in shuttle diplomacy in an attempt to resolve the Agreed Framework breakdown. Moltz (2003) argues that Russian efforts in that instance failed primarily because with bilateral trade at just 115 million USD, Russia still lacked adequate leverage over the regime.

Finally, the potential for DPRK involvement in the development of the RFE is significant, not only in the form of DPRK forestry teams and as a market for Russian military equipment (Cho, 2004), but also in terms of the access it can provide to the ROK and Japan. Such access is chiefly concentrated around two possibilities: the extension of the Trans-Siberian Railway to the ROK (and potentially Japan if a ROK-Japan rail materialises) through the DPRK, and the creation of gas pipelines to the ROK and Japan. Not only would such scenarios increase the export markets for the RFE, but it would also make investment in the RFE more attractive to the ROK and Japan.

III. ATTITUDE TO SUSTAINABLE ENERGY ENGAGEMENT

Sustainable development is not currently addressed as a priority policy area for the Russian Federation, indeed it may even conflict with Putin's vision of a doubling of Russia's GDP by 2013 (IEA, 2004a). Combined with Russia's stated interest in developing the hydrocarbon resources of the RFE, it seems unlikely that Russia will be proactive in initiating sustainable development projects in the DPRK energy sector. However, Russia has signed up to the Kyoto protocol and as such will need to incorporate environmental considerations into its energy development choices. It has also confirmed its support for engagement and the provision of energy assistance to the current DPRK regime in order to stave off hardships for the DPRK people and the collapse of the DPRK state. If Russia continues to place importance on following international environmental measures such as Kyoto, then it can only serve to reinforce the DPRK's sense of obligation for meeting its responsibilities under its FHCCC commitments. Furthermore, despite its enthusiasm in the development of its hydrocarbons, Russia has significant experience of renewable energy projects. For example, cooperation with Denmark has resulted in the setting up of a demonstration wind farm in Kaliningrad, which generates 900,000kWh per year, with another farm producing 8,200,000kWh a year, and plans for extensive off-shore development (IEA, 2004b). Although Russian motivation of developing the RFE may mean that

it doesn't initiate renewable energy projects in the DPRK energy sector, if there is an international consensus towards this then Russia will not want to be left out, and would be capable of bringing significant implementation experience with it.

4.2 China

I. BACKGROUND TO ENGAGEMENT

As the DPRK's major trading partner, DPRK-Sino economic engagement is extensive and the two enjoy cordial relations in public, with three summit meetings since 2001. Recent examples of economic engagement include the Chinese provision of a glass factory to the DPRK *gratis* from July 2004, and the joint construction of the Pyongyang International Business Complex (Oh, 2005). The DPRK's reliance on China's energy exports increased after the US withdrawal of its annual provision of 500,000 tons of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) in 2002, with imports in the first half of 2005 up 45.5% from the previous year to 295,000 tons of crude (Zhang, 2007).

Chinese businesses also have an unparalleled position in the DPRK economy (Li, 2006). In October 2005 the first Joint Venture outside a DPRK special development zone was established, with the Chinese Minmetal Corporation investing in Dragon Lantern Coalmine, the largest open-face coal mine in Asia, and with many more DPRK-Sino partnerships following suit (Zhang, 2007). The Chinese government seems increasingly keen to conduct economic engagement with the DPRK through non-governmental Joint Ventures, and the extent to which the government is supporting domestic companies to do so is not clear.¹⁶ In any case, the importance of China—whether the government or business—to the DPRK economy is considerable. Swanström (2004) writes that 90% of DPRK energy needs and 40% of its food requirements are met by China, whilst Scobell (2004) has China as supplying three-quarters of DPRK's petroleum and food imports. Trade volume for the two countries reached 1.7 billion USD—10 times the DPRK's trade volume with Russia (CRS, 2007).

Important as China is to the DPRK, the DPRK represents a smaller export market to China than Bulgaria, Egypt or Hungary, and a smaller import market than Gabon, Peru, or Belgium (CRS, 2007). This imbalance in the relationship is telling, and points to claims that whilst the DPRK needs China economically, China needs the DPRK in other ways. As Shen (2006) shrewdly notes:

There is no altruism in international relations, including those between China and North Korea. By providing aid to North Korea, China is in essence helping itself.

II. MOTIVATIONS BEHIND ENGAGEMENT

Shambaugh (2003) provides analysis of one way in which aid to the DPRK serves Chinese interests: 'because collapse would have enormous tangible human and

economic consequences for China, not to mention the intangible political impact of another failed Communist state'. This analysis is similar to suggestions for reasons behind Russia's support of the DPRK regime. Shen (2006), however, argues that economic support for the DPRK not only reduces the humanitarian risks of collapse, but also enables the DPRK to sustain itself as a buffer for China against the US military in the ROK. Furthermore, faced with a nuclear DPRK with an army which, when including reserves, numbers around 7 million, the US military may be wary of overstretching itself with military intervention over Taiwan. An irony not explored by Shen is that although the DPRK may be a buffer to US forces, it is the strongest justification for a continued US military presence in the region and the extension of the US missile defence shield, something China (like Russia and the DPRK) is ardently against. Scobell (2004) argues that consequently, China seeks to maintain the stability of the DPRK regime whilst using its influence to discourage DPRK actions that will antagonise the US.

III. ATTITUDE TO SUSTAINABLE ENERGY ENGAGEMENT

It is not clear whether China would be pro- or anti-future engagement with the DPRK for the promotion of sustainable development in the energy sector. On the one hand, China has made important commitments to the sustainable development of its own energy sector. It is keen to continue and export the technological advancements it is making in the cheap wind-turbine sector and, by 2015, aims to have 20%–30% of families using solar water heaters, and several thousand medium to large biogas plants recycling animal waste (Gu and Liu, 2000). By 2020, it hopes to have increased the share of renewables in the energy mix from 7% to 15% (Zhang, 2007). Combined with the close economic penetration that China has achieved within the DPRK, China seems opportunely placed to both encourage and assist the DPRK in implementing mass, cost-effective renewable energy solutions.

On the other hand, it is difficult to see possible Chinese motivations for initiating such solutions in the DPRK. As outlined earlier, for China the DPRK is a very sensitive and complicated political dilemma that must be carefully managed. Currently, Chinese businesses are earning good favour with the DPRK through their development of DPRK coalmines, and it would seem counter-intuitive for the Chinese government to intervene and discourage this positive engagement experience. Moreover, as China desperately tries to improve its social and environmental record by switching away from coal (which is getting increasingly harder and more damaging to mine), it may find it favourable to outsource the associated 'social ills' (such as environmental degradation and dangerous working conditions) by developing and importing DPRK coal as a substitute for its own. Whichever way China does decide to go, it seems likely that it will continue to separate the political from the economic where possible, and conduct future economic engagement by proxy through Joint Ventures with Chinese companies.

4.3 Japan

I. BACKGROUND TO ENGAGEMENT

Japan has been one of the most important trading partners with the DPRK and is one of the few countries with which the DPRK runs a trade surplus, despite the two countries not sharing diplomatic relations. A large group of pro-North ethnic Koreans live in Japan and provide not only a market for DPRK imports but also hard currency in remittances to the DPRK (CRS, 2007). Japan has provided significant amounts of humanitarian assistance to the DPRK since the 1990s, and played an important part in KEDO. It has promised several billion dollars of 'economic aid' upon normalisation of relations (as it did with South Korea in 1965), but North Korea's missile threats, North Korean denuclearisation, and the Japanese abduction issue all need to be resolved before this can happen (Cha, 2001).¹⁷ Japan has used economic engagement with the DPRK to encourage normalisation talks and discourage isolationism and belligerence, and seems likely to continue doing so in the future.¹⁸

II. MOTIVATIONS BEHIND ENGAGEMENT

Japan's goals are primarily to ensure its security through the DPRK's dismantlement of its nuclear weapons programme, and reliable DPRK commitments to desist with missile threats and appropriately account and apologise for abducting Japanese citizens in the past (CRS, 2007). It believes it is best able to achieve these goals through DPRK commitments under normalised relations, and that the DPRK will see the accompanying 'economic aid' as more beneficial than continued belligerence and isolation.

III. ATTITUDE TO SUSTAINABLE ENERGY ENGAGEMENT

Japan is proactive on sustainable development, particularly on issues related to climate change, carbon dioxide reduction, sustainable use of marine resources, food production, solid waste management, and environmental taxation (CSD, 2006).¹⁹ Its firms 'have become world leaders in the production of pollution-control equipment', and 'the principles [sustainable development] embodies have slipped smoothly into the lexicon of official thinking and policy drafting' (Grainger, 2004). Japan established a governmental Council for Sustainable Development in 1996, and was instrumental in formulating the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. As we will see with the ROK, however, the extent to which reality matches official proclamations of commitment to sustainable development can be questioned. Central government-led large construction works took precedence over sustainable development even up to the 1990s recession, and much of the 'greening' of its economy has been due to its outsourcing of its heaviest and most polluting industries to neighbouring countries (*ibid.*).

Of all the regional powers, Japan seems most likely to support sustainable

energy development in the DPRK, and indeed such support may be financed by the several billion USD economic aid package it is offering for normalisation of relations. Trinidad (2007) has shown how Japan has taken leadership initiatives in Southeast Asia through Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the past. If the DPRK removes the barriers to these normalisation talks and provides Japan with the security assurances it needs, and Japan is able and willing to potentially break with US policy on the DPRK, then Japan may be willing to use its ODA to once again take regional leadership initiatives.

4.4 ROK


I. BACKGROUND TO ENGAGEMENT

Although the ROK government has granted ROK companies licences to engage with the DPRK since 1988, it has only been since the summit meeting of 2000 that inter-Korean trade has taken off. This is shown in Figure 1, which details the levels of inter-governmental and commercial trade activity between 1989 and 2004:

Commercial activity has mostly been limited to the importing and exporting of foodstuffs, textiles, forestry items and some processing operations, and does not involve significant development of the DPRK economy.²⁰ Many ROK businesses suffer from being overly enthusiastic about the prospect of trading with the DPRK and overlook feasible business models, resulting in an ultimately unsuccessful experience and damaged DPRK confidence in the sincerity of ROK enterprises. It is primarily to this reason that they attribute the decline in businesses operating with the DPRK from 536 in 2000 to 462 in 2004 (Yoon and Yang, 2005).

There are currently three major economic cooperation projects between Seoul

Figure 1: Inter-Korean Trade Values for Commercial and Inter-Governmental Trade, 1989–2004 (Yoon and Yang, 2005).



and P'yŏngyang: the development of the Kaesŏng Industrial Complex (KIC), the re-opening of rail and road links across the DMZ, and the Mt. Kŭmgang tourist resort. In terms of cooperative energy projects, the ROK clearly recognises the developmental need for improvements in the DPRK energy sector and has shown solid support for initiatives in this area. Principal energy projects it has supported have been the (disbanded) KEDO implementation of two LWRs in the DPRK, supply of electricity to the KIC, and proposals of major electricity transmission lines to the DPRK.

Total trade value between the ROK and DPRK increased from 403 million USD in 2001 to 1,350 million USD in 2006, making the ROK set to overtake China as the DPRK's main economic partner in the near future (CRS, 2007). There are some similarities between the ROK and China in terms of their economic relations with the DPRK: in both cases much of the trade is actually aid to maintain DPRK stability (for the ROK this is mostly food and construction materials), and in both cases trade with the DPRK makes up a very small proportion of total national trade (exports to the DPRK represent less than one percent of the ROK's total exports whilst DPRK exports to the ROK represent around a third of its total exports, despite the ROK operating a trade surplus with the DPRK).

II. MOTIVATIONS BEHIND ENGAGEMENT

There are significant and varied goals in the ROK with regards to its relationship with the DPRK. A primary national security goal is the reduction of the military threat the DPRK poses. There are cultural goals of reunification of some form, and economic hopes for an alliance of the high-tech capital of the ROK with the cheap workforce of the DPRK to bolster Korea's standing in the region. Since the 1990s there has been a growing feeling that the best way to achieve these goals is through engagement with the DPRK, and from this the building up of trust and mutual confidence in the mid- to long-term. Although policy specifics vary, there is now a broad political consensus that this approach should be maintained.

In recent years there has been a new motivation behind engagement with the DPRK: that of perceived competition with China. Such perceived competition is not new; there is an ongoing struggle to resist Chinese claims over the identity of ancient northern cultures such as Koguryŏ, for example, and perceptions of economic competition as the Chinese economy advances into direct competition with the ROK over shipbuilding, and chip technology. This sense of competition has extended to engagement with the DPRK, an area that many in the ROK feel should be rightfully dominated by the ROK for nationalist reasons. Yoon and Yang (2005) cite a 2005 KDI study that found 49.7% of surveyed businesses engaging with the DPRK feeling a competitive pressure with China, and 91.3% of surveyed 'experts' feeling the same. More recently, former ROK president Kim Dae-jung spoke out on this issue, saying:

'I believe we should expedite our entry into North Korea so as to attain balance against China' (*The Korea Times*, 27 September 2007).

As Yoon and Yang note, ROK-initiated infrastructure development in the DPRK is not merely aid or a simple expense, but is rather 'preservation of Korean wealth for the time when the two Koreas unify'. There is a general consensus in the ROK that the per capita GDP of the DPRK needs to increase considerably if any reunification schemes are to be successful. Newly inaugurated President Lee Myŏng-bak has called for the DPRK's GDP per capita to reach 3000 USD before unification, and has announced plans for a 40 billion USD fund for DPRK development to this end.²¹ Sustainable development of the energy sector would not only help the DPRK's economy grow, but would do so in a relatively equitable manner by diffusing access to energy and control over energy resources across the population. The most immediate benefit of this would be to improve agricultural capacity, and thus directly raise the living standards of the DPRK rural (i.e. majority) population (Williams et al, 2000).

III. ATTITUDE TO SUSTAINABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT

The ROK has publicly committed itself to pursuing sustainable development policies: in 2000 the Presidential Commission on Sustainable Development was set up; on World Environment Day, 2005 President Roh announced the Vision for National Sustainable Development, aiming to build 'an advanced nation where the economy, society and environment progress simultaneously'; and in July 2007 the ROK committed itself to pursuing 20-year goals and creating specific policies with the passing of the Framework Act on Sustainable Development.

These sustainable development policy goals have extended to the energy sector. The First National Energy Plan (1997–2006) focused on reducing the energy usage of the steel, petrochemical and cement industries (which accounted for 78.4% of all energy demand in the manufacturing sector in 1997), privatising public-owned energy enterprises, and improving energy efficiency.²² However, the Second National Energy Plan (2002–2011) is a self-described 'paradigm shift' away from the first. It says:

Due to changes of basic conditions, such as demand for higher quality energies and growing concern for the environment, *the energy policy must pursue a new goal of 'sustainable development' which takes the factors of economic growth, environment, and energy security all into consideration* [emphasis added] (KEEI, 2007).²³

The government's proclamations are not backed up by its actions, however. In 2001, new and renewable energy occupied just 1.2% of the ROK's energy mix, with 94% of this figure coming from municipal and industrial waste incineration (Kim, 2002). The government is aiming for 5% of its total energy supply to be met by new and renewable energy by 2011, a very small increase from the 2.2% 'business-as-usual'

forecast and still very low when compared with other OECD countries (such as Spain's 30.3% target by 2010). One reason for this discrepancy may be the influence of the large, powerful energy companies in the ROK which, having only recently and partially been denationalised, still retain important connections within government and sit on policy bodies such as the National Energy Committee (personal interview with Paul Cheong of the Sustainability Strategy Institute, 19 August 2007).

The ROK can certainly be expected to maintain engagement with the DPRK as one of its most pressing national policies. Its experience of significant energy cooperation proposals with the DPRK and its stated commitment to sustainable development of energy suggests that the ROK may be proactive in pursuing this path in future. However, powerful ROK businesses have been closely involved with every major DPRK collaboration to date, and the representation of their interests in ROK domestic energy policy choices suggests that their interests will continue to be represented in future ROK-initiated cooperative energy projects with the DPRK. As such, it is likely that the ROK will continue to promote large-scale energy projects involving significant contracts for ROK construction companies, rather than small-scale energy efficiency measures or renewable energy implementation. As improvement of relations with the DPRK is an important issue for ROK voters, it is possible that the ROK government will be more concerned with making such projects high-profile and domestically popular than with ensuring the projects correlate with the DPRK's most pressing developmental priorities for its energy sector. However, since the ROK has stated commitments to sustainable development, it has a well-developed policy structure to accommodate any proposed cooperative projects.

4.5 USA

I. BACKGROUND TO ENGAGEMENT

With no peace treaty between the USA and DPRK, US firms are restricted in economic relations with the DPRK under the Trading with the Enemy Act. The paucity of US-DPRK economic relations is shown in Figure 2 (most of the US exports shown in the years from 2000 are agricultural products in the form of humanitarian assistance).

As the DPRK remains on the USA's list of state sponsors of terrorism, the US Treasury is not allowed to support any international financial institution's assistance to the DPRK (Babson, 2003). Furthermore, the US is able and willing to impose restrictions on financial institutions that it believes are assisting the DPRK as a state sponsor of terror, as shown by its freezing of DPRK funds in Banco Delta Asia. In response to the DPRK's 2006 nuclear test explosion, the US rallied regional support for wide-ranging sanctions on the regime, including the right to stop and search all DPRK-registered ships. Despite such aggressive and punitive economic actions, the USA has also, at times, provided considerable economic support to the DPRK. As

Figure 2: US Merchandise, Exports, Imports, and Trade Balances in thousand USD with North Korea, 1990–2006 (CRS, 2007).

Year	U.S. Exports	U.S. Imports	Balance
1990	32	0	32
1991	484	10	474
1992	83	0	83
1993	1,979	0	1,979
1994	180	0	180
1995	11,607	0	11,607
1996	541	0	541
1997	2,409	0	2,409
1998	4,454	0	4,454
1999	11,265	29	11,236
2000	2,737	154	2,583
2001	650	26	624
2002	25,012	15	24,997
2003	7,977	0	7,977
2004	23,750	1,495	22,255
2005	5,757	3	5,754
2006	3	0	3

part of the 1994 Agreed Framework the USA provided large amounts of financial, technical and political assistance for the KEDO's provision of two LWRs, as well as shipping 500,000 tonnes of HFO annually until the collapse of the framework in 2002. Economic support resumed in 2007 when the DPRK promised once again to abandon its nuclear programme.

II. MOTIVATIONS BEHIND ENGAGEMENT

The USA clearly and openly uses economic relations, or the promise of such relations, as both a carrot and a stick to maximise its influence over the DPRK regime. Its goals with respect to the DPRK are:

1. to halt or eliminate North Korea's development of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction;
2. to curtail illegal and questionable activities by North Korea to include illicit sales of missiles, dealing in illegal drugs, counterfeiting of currency, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly to terrorist groups;
3. to reduce the threat of war on the Korean peninsula;
4. to ensure that North Korea does not participate in international terrorist activity;

5. to induce economic, political, and societal change in the country that could bring about favourable changes in the Kim regime, in governance, in the standard of living of its people, and in attitudes toward the United States, and
6. to enhance the security of South Korea and Japan with respect to the DPRK (CRS, 2007).

Whilst China, the ROK and Russia encourage domestic companies and institutions to engage with the DPRK in order to increase the amount of influence of the respective country, the USA conversely seeks to limit not only the economic engagement of US organisations with the DPRK, but also the organisations of other countries (through sanctions and usage of the Patriot Act on financial institutions like Banco Delta Asia), as its chief means of influencing the DPRK. These two strategies are wholly different and help account for the difficulty the USA faced in persuading the ROK, China and Russia to impose sanctions on the DPRK after its 2006 nuclear test.

The USA is willing to develop bilateral relations with the DPRK, conditional on the complete, verifiable and irrevocable dismantlement of the DPRK nuclear programme. Following that, there are signs that the USA is willing to engage very proactively with the DPRK: on 13 January 2007 US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly said:

Once we get beyond nuclear weapons, there may be opportunities with the US, with private investors, with other countries to help North Korea in the energy area (ibid.).

Extensive US economic engagement with Vietnam and China are precedents for such a possible shift in US engagement policy. State Department and United States Agency for International Development officials visited the DPRK in November 2007, and announced US support for DPRK hospitals with a \$4 million funding for electricity provision. Details are still not clear, but the US will provide the aid through four international NGOs.²⁴

III. ATTITUDE TO SUSTAINABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT

The USA is one of the world's most extensive polluters, and has proven hostile to international efforts limiting hydrocarbon consumption (Grainger, 2004). In terms of national sustainable development policy, the USA does not compare favourably to other countries in the OECD. However, the size and breadth of the US economy harbours advanced technological expertise in the field of renewable energy and significant funding opportunities.

Whilst the US government may therefore not choose to initiate sustainable energy development projects in the DPRK, it has enviable expertise in the field that would be of great benefit to such projects. In addition to this it has the power to greatly affect the capability of the DPRK to access international financial institutions, not

just negatively (through freezing accounts under the Patriot Act) but positively by supporting DPRK applications to the World Bank and IMF (Babson, 2003). While development assistance from such organisations may not be critical for development of the DPRK energy sector (alternative funds could, for example, come from the normalisation package promised by Japan) they would most likely be essential for sustained development in other areas of the economy.

4.6 Regional benefits of a nuclear-free energy future

As described in section 3, nuclear energy could not be included in the energy-mix of a DPRK that was serious about developing its energy sector, or doing so sustainably.²⁵ Sailer (2004) argues that the absence of nuclear reactors in the DPRK would bring great benefits to the region, something that is a priority issue for every major regional power (CRS, 2007). Sailer notes the crossover potential of nuclear energy between civilian programmes and military programmes, as happened under both the Pakistani and Indian nuclear programmes. If efforts were made again to develop DPRK nuclear energy capacity, it is most likely they would be in the direction of the Light Water Reactors (LWR) part-built by the failed Korean peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO). Though such reactors limit direct military applications, they would still produce an estimated 500 kilograms of plutonium in spent fuel every year, which would provide an ample source for weapons development if the DPRK restarted its enrichment programme (Albright and Higgins, 2000). North Korean technicians would also gain experience in handling fissile materials, calculating fissile processes, and handling neutron sources, which are essential for successful military applications and which would be considerably more difficult to achieve if there were no nuclear reactors in the country.²⁶ Even if the DPRK had neither the intention nor actual capability to produce weapons-grade material from civilian nuclear programmes, the very suspicion of these alone would produce the same reaction in the DPRK's neighbours:

Every state that has nuclear energy can be accused of secretly working to use it for military purposes. The use of nuclear energy thus increases the potential for tension between states. Such tension can worsen international relations, lead to destabilization, and—in extreme cases—even lead to armed conflicts (Sailer, 2004).

The DPRK has recently been accused of conducting illicit nuclear transfers with Syria. Whether or not the allegations are true, the mere possession of nuclear technology and materials exposes the DPRK to claims of non-compliance with the Non Proliferation Treaty that, whether substantiated or not, promote the belief that the country is a 'rogue regime' and consequently damage its international standing.

A sustainable development plan for the DPRK's energy sector could not include plans for the redevelopment of nuclear energy, and this would bring crucial 'peace

dividends' to the region particularly to Japan (which is very concerned about the possibility of a nuclear threat from the DPRK) and to the ROK (where nuclear suspicions impede desired engagement and cooperation) (Uriu, 2003; Yoon and Yang, 2005). Ostensibly, the USA is also keen for denuclearisation of the North, despite supporting the development of LWRs before the collapse of the Agreed Framework in 2002. However, the US undoubtedly benefits from fears over the DPRK's nuclear capability and security threat, as it increases Japanese and ROK dependence on security alliances with the US (Berkofsky, 2003). Threats from the DPRK have promoted US arms sales to the region, and provided legitimising cover for extending the Missile Defence Shield to include China.

4.7 The potential of the clean development mechanism (CDM)

Under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I (industrialised) countries are permitted to invest in projects that decrease greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries as substitution for decreasing their own emissions. Of the regional powers looked at in this paper, only Japan and Russia are Annex I countries (the USA has not ratified the Protocol), with China and the ROK receiving CDM investment (149 and 16 projects to date, or 17% and 2% respectively of total CDM projects to date). Whilst Russia has not invested in any CDM projects to date, Japan has financed 96 projects, or 13% of total CDM projects. Japan recently announced plans to purchase a portion of China's carbon allowance as part of its strategy to meet its Kyoto Protocol commitments (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, 3 January 2008). Sustainable energy development projects in the DPRK are likely to meet CDM criterion, and would allow Russia and Japan to achieve foreign policy goals whilst meeting their emission obligations. As with other forms of economic assistance, Japan is likely to delay CDM investment in the DPRK as a carrot for normalisation talks.

5. Potential problems associated with regional energy engagement

'Economics is not the sole reason for undertaking projects in the region' (Ivanov et al, 2002).

Engagement for its own sake may neither benefit DPRK energy sector development nor improve regional relations. There is a clear case for careful consideration of the potential problems that may come with regional energy engagement with the DPRK.

5.1 Project progress needs to be independent from political progress

When economic projects are linked to political relations, problems in one area can quickly sour the other.²⁷ China and the ROK have recognised this maxim and are

moving to separate the two processes: China by encouraging joint ventures, and the ROK by continual official assistance under the Sunshine Policy. An example of this recognition was their reticence in joining the US-led economic sanctions after the DPRK's nuclear test explosion.

It is easier for China, the ROK and Russia to separate political developments from economic because, as considered in section 4, sustained economic engagement is an important means for them to achieve their goals with the DPRK. For the USA, however, the development of economic relations is used more clearly as a varied tool in the construction of political relations, and as such it is harder for it to separate the two. For example, when the USA failed to deliver the DPRK's Banco Delta Asia funds within 30 days as promised, it very nearly derailed all that the Six-Party talks had achieved since the 2006 nuclear test. Likewise, political relations and trust between the DPRK and the USA soured over slow implementation of the KEDO LWRs, and the whole economic project collapsed as punishment by the US after the DPRK reneged on political agreements. However, even with the USA's overtly political approach to economic engagement it is possible to prevent one from adversely affecting the other through honesty, openness, and an empathic understanding of the other's position. This lesson was learned well in the Banco Delta Asia fiasco, where US representative Christopher Hill was in very regular behind-the-scenes meetings with DPRK counterparts. The respect earned by his efforts ensured that improvements in political relations were not thrown away by technical problems in economic relations.

5.2 Business goals may not meet development needs

Industries and businesses have their own goals when engaging the DPRK, which may tend to see the DPRK primarily in terms of what the largely unpenetrated market with rich mineral resources and a disciplined workforce can offer the company, rather than how long-term DPRK energy development needs can best be met. Examples of such goals include the profit that would be earned by Russian energy companies from gas pipelines traversing the DPRK to the ROK and Japanese markets, and the calls from US agriculture representatives for access to the DPRK market (Paul, 2001). Provision of the LWRs under the Agreed Framework, a 4-billion US dollar construction agreement, saw large contracts going to the ROK's sole electricity provider (Korea Electric Power Corp., of which 51% is owned by the ROK government) and to engineering company ABB, one of whose directors (Donald Rumsfeld) may have had vested interests upon taking office in George W. Bush's government (*Fortune*, 12 May 2003). There is nothing wrong with this *per se*, but if political awareness of business goals (and their efforts to influence policy) is not acute then it may result in engagement projects being diverted away from areas of high political and

developmental priority, and towards areas of large profit for non-DPRK companies and industries.

5.3 Countries may vie to achieve influence with the DPRK

KEDO's delivery of two LWRs may have failed, but that the respective countries were able and willing to cooperate in concert through a proxy institution is undoubtedly a success and offers hope for similar joint actions in energy development for the future. It is also promising that the Six-Party mechanism has endured and borne such fruitful negotiations, despite intermittent crises. Indeed, KEDO and the Six-Party talks stand out as good examples of cooperation in a region which is notable for its lack of major cooperative bodies.

There remain many signs that the respective countries are not willing to cooperate with each other, and more worryingly that they may even develop competitive policies in energy engagement with the DPRK (something which has many historical precedents on the Korean peninsula).²⁸ The danger of such competition is that, like unchecked business interests, it may skew assistance given to the DPRK away from the developmental needs of its energy sector and towards projects aimed at least partially at ingratiating the assisting country with the DPRK regime vis-à-vis others. For example, the reputed 500 million USD paid to the DPRK by the ROK/Hyundai for agreeing to the 2000 summit was criticised for the possibility that it was used to sustain the DPRK military, and for being used to win domestic support for the ruling ROK party. Similar criticisms have been made over the ROK's direct food donations to the DPRK, instead of going wholly through the World Food Programme (which, it is claimed, is better able to ensure aid goes to areas where it is most needed, rather than straight to the military) (Moon, 2005). Development assistance needs to be done openly and with clear anticipated results in order to reduce the legitimacy of such charges.

5.4 Projects need to be feasible

Yoon and Yang (2005) have argued that the enthusiasm of ROK enterprises to conduct business operations with the DPRK pushed aside appropriate consideration of the financial viability of such projects, and that the ultimate failure of those projects damaged the DPRK's perception of ROK sincerity whilst contributing little to DPRK development. Similarly, numerous authors have slated the KEDO LWR project as being economically and technically unviable; a project that was not born of a measured assessment of DPRK energy needs, and little more than a temporary political solution.²⁹ Both of these cases have been analysed as damaging longer-term political relations with the DPRK. By contrast, successful joint ventures with China and the rapidly developing Kaesŏng Industrial Complex show DPRK

the benefits of engagement with its neighbours, as well as illustrating to the DPRK successful business models for a world in which centrally planned production has little relevance.

6. Concluding remarks

'There is no altruism in international relations' (Shen, 2006).

The DPRK energy sector has not moved away successfully from its reliance on the once-forthcoming hydrocarbons and technical assistance of the Communist bloc and this is restricting attempts for economic recovery. The DPRK has shown that it is keen to redevelop its energy sector according to sustainable development principles but, lacking adequate expertise and funding, it openly admits it needs international assistance in this task. Such assistance would not only benefit the DPRK but would also bring important benefits to the region, not least advancing the prospects of a denuclearised Korean peninsula.

The DPRK has already received international assistance in sustainable energy development from various NGOs. These engagement experiences have been significantly successful. They have demonstrated the feasibility of renewable energy implementation in the country, and helped set up communications and relationships between DPRK energy experts and officials with their counterparts in other countries. Despite their successes, NGOs lack the funding necessary to take such development beyond demonstration projects. The regional powers, however, which include three of the world's four largest economies, could provide the funding necessary for comprehensive sustainable development of the DPRK energy sector. These countries all have engagement with the DPRK as a high priority, and all have unique qualities that they could bring to sustainable energy assistance. Japan, for example, has promised considerable funds upon normalisation of relations and, as with the ROK, has advanced experience in improving energy efficiencies. The USA has strong technical expertise in renewable energy and can control the DPRK's access to international finance. China has knowledge of implementing renewable energy projects in conditions comparable to the DPRK's, and the ROK has committed itself to massive developmental assistance for the DPRK. The stage thus seems set for the regional powers to draw from the NGOs' experiences, to answer the DPRK's call, and to meet DPRK energy sector challenges. There is now, after all, a general agreement among the powers that a stable DPRK is in regional interests, and that this stability is dependent on an energy sector capable of recovering the DPRK's collapsed economy.

Yet, despite their capabilities and the benefits to be gained, such assistance is not being initiated by the regional powers. In each instance, complex motivations behind

engagement currently prioritise development paths that differ for each regional power, but that all point away from sustainable energy. Significant changes in these motivations do not seem imminent, although increased uptake of Clean Development Mechanism or a breakthrough in normalisation talks with Japan may alter this. If such changes are not forthcoming, however, the DPRK may have to compromise on its developmental engagement goals, and instead work on ways to shape sustainable energy engagement projects to meet the specific motivations of the regional powers and interests.

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Notes

1. For brevity the term 'sustainable development' is not explored here. The DPRK has cooperated with the UN in various projects in the area, and it seems safe to assume that DPRK authorities use a similar definition of the term as the UN-ratified Brundtland Commission's of 1987 (UNEP, 2003; WCED, 1987). For a discussion on ambiguities of the term see Dresner, 2004 and Peacock, 2003.
2. For example, Heavy Fuel Oil shipments to the DPRK as part of Six-Party negotiations. The USA has recently announced \$4 million of funding for off-grid generators to be supplied to DPRK hospitals through four international NGOs.
3. The DPRK Delegation to the 2006 Asian Energy Security workshop noted, 'DPRK has not discovered its oil yet' [sic]. It has gone to apparently fruitless lengths to find and develop this oil in the Yellow Sea with China (1965–80); the Soviets (1986); the Australians (1988–90); the Swedes (1993); the Malaysians (1997); and the British (2004) (Calder, 2005).
4. Given such reasons for oil-aversion, it must be asked why the DPRK is so insistent on Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) in Six-Party energy negotiations. One reason may be that although future reliance on this resource is undesirable, the severity of the DPRK's economic collapse was such that it has been unable to renovate or replace its old, hydrocarbon-dependent economic foundations. This possible reason is supported by the conditions of the 1994 Agreed Framework, which allowed for HFO shipments until the Light Water Reactors come on grid. Here the HFO was presumably intended to maintain the economy in 'business as usual' operation until it could be successfully substituted for another fuel, and this may be what is happening with current HFO negotiations. Hayes (2002) argues that HFO is of very little value to the DPRK, and that energy negotiations use it as a base unit for the sake of political expedience. 'Provision of HFO was never more than a sub-optimized, politically driven way for the DPRK and the United States to come to a working agreement. It had nothing to do with a rationally determined way to meet DPRK energy needs or energy development.' (Note: the 13 February, 2007 agreement allowed for the DPRK to be provided with one million tons of HFO equivalent in economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance, not necessarily HFO itself.)

5. For an exploration of the political reasons, see section 5.1 below. Technically, the safety concerns over DPRK operation of the LWRs is too high, and the DPRK grid is far too small to cope with the power generated by the reactors. See Von Hippel et al (2001). The reason why it is pushed at negotiations may be because energy technocrats have been under-represented at previous Six-Party negotiations, which are dominated instead by military and foreign affairs interests (Hayes and Von Hippel, 2007).
6. 18% of the land has average wind speeds of at least 4.5m/s, with many areas having average speeds of 10m/s (DPRK Delegation, 2006). Annual average solar irradiation is 1200kwh/m², with 55–60% of days clear, and the west DPRK coast has very high tidal rises of between four and six metres (DPRK Delegation, 2004a).
7. Programmes it has supported in connection with energy-engagement are: Enabling Korea DPR to Prepare its First National Communication in Response to its Commitments to UNFCCC (1997); Preparation of Strategic Action Programme (SAP) and Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis for the Tumen River Area and Environs (1998); Renewable Energy Development for Rural Electrification Project (1999); Formulation of Documentation on Sustainable Rural Energy Development and Investment Plan (2002); Small Wind Energy Development and Promotion in Rural Areas (SWEDPRA) (2004); National Capacity Needs Self-Assessment for the Global Environment Management (2004) (UNDP, 2007). Of these projects, the Tumen River Strategic Action Programme (SAP) is the most significant, with several million dollars of funding. Its remit is to ‘provide a common framework for the identification and formulation of strategies, programmes and projects, responding primarily to transboundary issues of environmental management’. It was built on previous UNDP-funded work that culminated in the ‘Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Principles’ in 1995 between the ROK, the DPRK, China, Russia, and Mongolia—a historic agreement and the first sub-regional forum for the five countries. The SAP led to the creation of the Tumen River Area Development Programme (renamed the Greater Tumen Initiative in 2005), which aims to stimulate environmentally sensitive development in the area where Russia, China and the DPRK meet. In order to achieve this, the UNDP has promoted legislative harmonisation between the border countries, information sharing (including energy capacity-building training for DPRK officials in China in May/June 2006), and the creation of cooperative mechanisms. The UNDP’s second SAP (2006–2015) is focusing on transport, energy, tourism and investment, with environmental concerns cutting across all goals (<http://www.tumenprogramme.org>).
8. Go to <http://www.gefonline.org/projectDetails.cfm?projID=2397> for a Project Summary.
9. Personal communication with Scott Bruce of the Nautilus Institute, 28 August 2007.
10. For examples of such presentations see DPRK Delegation, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006a, b.
11. ‘DPRK Renewable Energy Delegation visits U.S.’ The Nautilus Institute, 3 June 1999. See <http://www.nautilus.org/archives/dprkrenew/visit9712.html>
12. The ROK gave 229 million USD of material assistance in the year following the July 2006 floods alone, spent around 500 million USD in return for the 2000 summit meeting, and is seeking to increase the total amount of official government assistance from 500 million USD per annum to 750 million USD (*Dong-A Ilbo*, 11 July 2007).

13. Imports from the former Soviet Union fell from 60% of the DPRK's total in 1988 to just 10% in 1994, lower even than imports from the ROK (Flake, 1995).
14. Moltz (2003): 'the new relationship with Kim is based not on Russian largesse, as in the past, but a new policy of 'pragmatism' on the part of Moscow'. Examples of this include the New Agreement on the Forestry Industry of 1995, and the Science and Technology Cooperation Plan of the same year.
15. This is supported by G. Toloraya (Deputy Director-General of the First Asian Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia): 'Based on our 55-year experience of relations with DPRK, as well as our 10-year experience of relations with ROK we now see peace and stability in Korea as the primary objective of our policy in Northeast Asia' (Toloraya, 2000).
16. Its motives for such encouragement are also unclear, though there are several possibilities. One may be that China finds advantage in separating developments in economic relations from political relations. Another possibility may be that China wishes to support the 2002 reforms by showing how financially lucrative opening-up a state-controlled economy can be. Yet another possibility may be that China is trying to renegotiate its relationship with the DPRK away from the mutual political alliance as implied under the 1961 Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, and towards one based on economic pragmatism, as it has done with the ROK: by engaging with the DPRK through third-party businesses, the Chinese government is able to free itself politically from a DPRK alliance, whilst maintaining a strong economic foothold in the DPRK economy.
17. The DPRK abducted several Japanese in the 1970s and 1980s and has neither returned them nor acceptably accounted for them. Though the amount of aid has not been firmly decided, it is expected to range between five and ten billion USD. Hayes (2003) argues that the figure should be the latter. Any normalisation package offered by Japan is more likely to be understood in the DPRK as 'colonial reparations' (Cha, 2001), and is put in inverted commas here to reflect this ambiguity of naming.
18. For example, Japan imposed sanctions after the 1998 launch of Taepo-dong missiles over Japan, and lightened them prior to 1999 bilateral talks. As these talks developed into more formal proceedings for normalisation, Japan lifted a 3-year ban on food aid to North Korea and provided 100,000 tons of rice through the World Food Programme (*ibid.*). Japan has since resumed sanctions on the DPRK following its 2006 nuclear test.
19. For an alternative, more critical view of Japan's commitments to marine resources sustainability see Clover, 2004.
20. According to Yoon and Yang (2005), just 200 million USD was invested by ROK enterprises between 1996 and 2005 (apart from KEDO), a figure that is reduced to 50 million USD if one also excludes the Mt. Kŭmgang tourist resort.
21. 'Reunification of the nation will be possible only when the per capita income reaches US\$3,000 in North Korea and \$30,000 in South Korea. If the North gives up its nuclear programmes and opens its economy, the South will help the North so that its per capita income will rise to \$3,000 within a decade' (Lee Myŭng-bak, 2007).
22. The Korea Energy Economic Institute (KEEI): http://www.keei.re.kr/web_keei/en_Issues01.nsf/frame.htm

23. KEEI (ibid.). Note that this interpretation is different from the UN's 'Triple Bottom Line' interpretation discussed earlier, by its substitution of 'energy security' for 'social development'.
24. The Eugene Bell Foundation, Mercy Corps, Samaritan's Purse, and Global Resource Action Center for Environment.
25. See, e.g., Lee and Ouellette, 2003: 'Considering the physically weak, highly fluctuating, and rapidly decaying electricity grid in the North, current total capacity of generation in the DPRK, and lack of reliable offsite power for coolant pumps in the event of a shutdown, the power generated by two LWRs could not possibly be used'.
26. Victor Gilinsky, holder of senior posts at the Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, said on the subject of the nuclear material used in LWRs: 'Reprocessing the stuff is not a big deal [...] you don't even need special equipment. The KEDO people ignore this. And we're still building the damn things'. Cited in *Fortune Magazine*, 12 May 2003.
27. For example, the DPRK was quick to mistrust the USA after slow progress with KEDO's installation of the LWRs, and the USA was quick to withhold funds for the LWRs after reports of a clandestine DPRK nuclear programme.
28. For example, Yoon and Yang (2005) cite a study finding that almost half of all ROK businesses engaging with the DPRK, and nearly all ROK experts on the DPRK, feel a competitive pressure with China. Analysis shows that China feels the need to retain strong pro-Chinese sentiments in the DPRK (Scobell, 2004); Russia is engaging with the DPRK in part to make itself a more prominent actor in regional negotiations (CRS, 2007); and Kim Dae-jung called for increased development assistance to prevent Chinese domination (*The Korea Times*, 27 September 2007).
29. See for example Lee and Ouellette, 2003; Babson, 2003; Hayes and von Hippel, 2007. Babson writes: 'KEDO was created not with the intent to solve these [DPRK energy] problems, but to manage cooperation with North Korea with regard to its nuclear program, and must be viewed in this light. [...] If a proper energy sector development plan were to be prepared for North Korea, it is unlikely that nuclear power would even be part of the equation, when economic, technical, financial and environmental considerations were given proper weight'.

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